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FEELING VALUES: 
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CASE FOR MORAL REALISM 
 
TANNER HAMMOND 
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Major Professor: Daniel O. Dahlstrom, John R. Silber Professor of Philosophy 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The present work is an attempt to vindicate the notion that feelings are a source of 
justification for our ordinary moral and evaluative beliefs. On the account I defend, certain 
intentionally directed emotional experiences constitute perceptions of the evaluative features of 
objects and states of affairs in the world. The unique properties presented through such 
emotional experiences are what we ordinarily call values, and these irreducibly evaluative 
properties are the truthmakers of our evaluative and moral judgments. In sum, feelings are 
an avenue for arriving at moral and evaluative knowledge, because feelings are our access to 
those special features of the world that determine what the moral and evaluative facts are.  
My case proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I draw upon conceptual resources taken 
from Alexius Meinong and Franz Brentano in order defeat to recent efforts to reduce value 
concepts and properties to other non-evaluative terms. In Part II, I advance an affect-based 
version of substantive value realism—Affective Value Perceptualism—according to which values 
are sui generis properties given through intentional acts of emotional experience. On the 
broadly Husserlian account I defend, evaluative perceptions are emotionally-mediated 
presentations—that is, intentional experiences in which we are immediately aware of the 
 viii 
evaluative features of some intentional object, and this by way of non-conceptual mental 
content. In Part III, I attempt to show how such an affect-based realism can furnish action-
guiding norms and a priori moral principles. After tracing the historical aversion to the latter 
idea to a specious intellectualist prejudice in our understanding of the a priori, I develop an 
appropriation of Max Scheler's material a priori account of values. According to the latter, law-
like constraints on correct evaluative judgments and actions are grounded in the material 
essences of emotional phenomena, which constitute a unique domain of a priori experiential 
facts alongside those governing all other experiential modalities (e.g. color, tone, space, etc.). 
After motivating the material a priori through an analysis of color incompatibility knowledge, 
I argue that the phenomenological analysis of paradigmatically evaluative emotions reveals a 
priori facts grounded in the nature of evaluative experience itself. 
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INTRODUCTION:  
BECAUSE IT FEELS THAT WAY: EMOTION, VALUES, AND PERCEPTION 
 
“Because it feels that way.” This is almost always where the buck stops when my 
undergraduate students are asked to justify their beliefs that certain things are morally good 
or bad, right or wrong. Take the example of deliberately inflicting pain and suffering for no 
other purpose. A majority of students will acknowledge believing that the latter is morally 
wrong, and even the most skeptically inclined students will admit that it at least seems to be 
true to say that such an action is morally wrong. When asked to explain this putative fact, 
justification will typically begin with a series of rational inferences to other propositions 
assumed to be true—e.g. “Causing pain could only be justified if there were some other end 
to be realized.” But when the inferential chain reaches certain foundational claims—say, that 
“Pleasure is ceteris paribus better than pain” or that “Suffering for its own sake is bad”—the 
justification invariably bottoms out with a flat-footed appeal to some state of “feeling that 
it’s true.” By comparison, when asked to explain how they know certain truths in non-moral 
domains—say for example, that two plus two equals four—the response is almost never that 
it “feels that way.” In such cases, other epistemic locutions are used, such as “seeing logically” 
or “just knowing.” And yet, just as in the latter cases, something’s “feeling” a certain way at 
least purports to be an avenue for knowing about some way things are, evaluatively speaking. 
The present work is an attempt to vindicate the notion that feelings are a source of 
justification for our ordinary evaluative beliefs. On the account I defend, certain intentionally 
directed emotional experiences constitute perceptions of the evaluative features of objects and 
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states of affairs in the world. The properties and features presented through such emotional 
experiences are what we ordinarily call values, and these irreducibly evaluative properties are 
the truthmakers of our evaluative and moral judgments.  Drawing upon insights from the 
phenomenological tradition, I make the case that emotional presentations disclose the 
evaluative profile of the world by way of non-conceptual and irreducibly affective mental 
contents. In contrast to existing accounts, evaluative perceptions are not intellectual 
appearances or true-seeming thoughts that are merely accompanied by some affective 
content. Rather, an evaluative perception is an emotionally-mediated presentation—that is, an 
intentional experience in which we are immediately aware of some way the world is 
evaluatively speaking. On this picture, propositionally formulated and inferentially generated 
evaluative judgments are derivative forms of moral cognition, which are founded upon and 
justified by the perception of those evaluative states of affairs that serve as their truthmakers.  
In sum, feelings are an avenue for arriving at knowledge of evaluative truths, because 
feelings are our access to those special features of the world that determine what those 
evaluative truths are.  
To be sure, one can maintain the belief that emotions are explanatory of our 
evaluative and moral knowledge without endorsing such a perceptualist framework. Indeed, 
the perceptualist account is only one species of a broader category of so-called Sentimentalist 
views. Often traced back to early 18th Century moral sense theorists,1 sentimentalism is given 
                                                        
1 Sentimentalism’s early roots can be found in Clarke (1706); Shaftesbury (1711); Hutcheson (1725); Hume 
(1740); Brentano (1889); Husserl (1988); Scheler (1913–1916). Contemporary versions can be found in Ewing 
(1947, 1959); Wiggins (1976, 1987); Chisholm (1981, 1986); Falk (1986); McDowell (1985); Blackburn (1984, 
1998); Gibbard (1990); Lemos (1994); Tappolet (1995, 2000); Anderson (1993); Mulligan (1998); Sainsbury 
(1998); Skorupski (2000); D’Arms and Jacobson (2000a; 2000b); Zimmerman (2001); Helm (2001); Oddie 
(2005); Danielsson and Olson (2007) 
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its most ecumenical and succinct definition by John Skorupski (2010), who defines it as “the 
view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons - some or all of these - can be 
analyzed in terms of feeling.”2 While sentimentalists agree that emotions are fundamental to 
our evaluative and moral lives, they diverge radically in how they understand the relevant 
analysis. As such, there are seemingly as many sentimentalisms as there are sentimentalists. 
Before I turn to build my case for the perceptualist thesis, I will first situate my account in 
opposition to an especially prominent form of sentimentalism, according to which evaluative 
concepts and properties do not ultimately refer to substantive features of the world, but are 
rather reducible to normative relations that hold between emotional attitudes and some 
other non-evaluative terms. On this rival account, feelings are not presentations of values. 
Rather, values are themselves defined in terms of emotional attitudes that would be 
reasonable, fitting, or otherwise appropriate for one to have.  
 
Sentimentalism and Evaluative Objectivity: 
Recessive Sentimentalism Versus Substantive Sentimentalism 
 
 
While sentimentalism is neither a new nor an uncommon metaethical view, empirical 
research into folk moral attitudes conducted over the past thirty years has motivated 
renewed interest in sentimentalism, as there is a growing consensus among psychologists 
that ordinary moral and evaluative judgment and deliberation is, at bottom, an emotional 
affair. One of the most influential endeavors to draw this body of research together into a 
                                                        
2 Skorupski (2010) p. 125 
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complete model of moral psychology comes from Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt 
(2002). Central to their analysis is the dual-process model of decision-making (Chaiken and 
Trope 1999), according to which human beings make judgments and solve problems 
through the cooperation of two different cognitive processing systems: (i) The “hot” or 
“intuitive” system, which is fast, automatic, noninferential, cognitively encapsulated, and 
affect-laden; (ii) The “cool” or “rational” system, which is slow, inferential, cognitively 
corrigible, and consciously controlled. The principle claim of Greene and Haidt’s analysis is 
that paradigmatic evaluative judgments are typically generated through noninferential 
“intuition-like” affective states associated with hot processes, and that cool processes of 
inferential reasoning only serve an ancillary role in rendering moral judgments: 
 
[M]oral judgment is much like aesthetic judgment: we see an action or hear a story and 
we have an instant feeling of approval or disapproval. These feelings are best thought of 
as affect-laden intuitions, as they appear suddenly and effortlessly in consciousness, with 
an affective valence (good or bad), but without any feeling of having gone through steps 
of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.3 
 
Significant evidence for this model is drawn from functional neuroimaging studies 
from Jorge Moll and colleagues (2001), which demonstrated that brain states associated with 
hot processes exhibit increased activity when subjects were presented with claims with moral 
content (e.g. ‘The state hung an innocent person’) as opposed to claims devoid of moral 
content (e.g. ‘Stones are made of water’).  Other studies suggest that while cool processes 
can and do interact with hot processes in the deliberative sequence, their involvement usually 
                                                        
3 Greene and Haidt (2002) p. 517. See also Haidt (2001). 
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takes the form of post hoc rationalizations of initial evaluative judgments arrived at through 
automatic affective responses (Kuhn 1991; Kunda 1990; Nisbett and Wilson 1977; and 
Perkins, Farady, and Bushey 1991). In stark contrast to the rationalist psychological 
paradigm (Kohlberg 1969; Piaget 1932/1965; Turiel 1983), according to which moral 
judgments are rendered through rule-governed rational deliberation, Haidt (2001) claims that 
these trends in research suggest that evaluative judgments are made through a “feels right 
ethic,” whereby "We use conscious reflection to mull over a problem until one side feels right. 
Then we stop.”4 On this account, while inferential reasoning can sometimes help us to 
narrow in on the morally salient details of a given deliberative scenario, this step comes only 
after the moral import of these details has been decided through some prior noninferential 
affective process. In this way, evaluative reasoning is guided by affective intuitions. Or as 
Haidt puts the Humean point, in our evaluative lives, the “emotional dog” wags the “rational 
tail.”5 
If we take the recent convergence in empirical moral psychology to be any 
indication, it is plausible to impose the following broad sentimentalist constraint on our best 
metaethical theories:  
Affectivity:  Paradigmatic evaluative judgments are either constituted by or explained 
by reference to emotional states 
 
While the endorsement of some form of Affectivity has become increasingly popular 
among metaethicists, radically different implications have been drawn from it. One way in 
                                                        
4 Haidt (2001) p. 829 
5 ibid. 830 
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which affect-based models of evaluative judgment diverge is with respect to the objectivity 
of evaluative discourse. While many sentimentalists endorse the primacy of emotion in our 
evaluative lives, the idea that Affectivity is compatible with some form of objectivism is far 
from obvious. Moreover, for as much as folk evaluative discourse might suggest that 
something’s “feeling right” purports to be a legitimate basis for drawing putatively objective 
moral judgments, emotions are just as often thought to be paradigmatically subjective and 
non-truth tracking states, as evidenced by the connotation of epistemic deficiency when we 
say that something is “just a feeling.” Indeed, the idea that the primacy of emotion in 
evaluative judgment should pose a challenge to objectivism is an old one, often traced back 
to David Hume (though not without exegetical controversy6), who claims that “there is 
nothing in itself valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed" insofar 
as “these attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of human sentiment and 
affection.”7 According to a lineage of arguments that Shaun Nichols (2004) classifies as the 
“Humean Sentimentalist” tradition, the fact that our moral judgments are grounded in our 
emotional states suggests that the truth or falsity of our judgments is an arbitrary matter of 
our possessing a certain emotional repertoire. Nichols summarizes the “Humean challenge” 
to moral objectivism as follows: 
 
1. Rational Creatures who lack certain emotions would not make the moral judgments 
that we do.  
                                                        
6 See Blackburn 1993; Mackie 1980; Norton 1982; Sturgeon 2001. As Nichols (2004) notes, Hume himself may 
not have been a Humean Sentimentalist, though many of the arguments in this strain of thought are grounded 
in Humean considerations. 
7 David Hume. 1742 (1987), 162 
 7 
 
2. There is no principled basis for maintaining that these certain emotions (on which 
our moral judgments depend) are the right emotions.8  
 
Of course, the extent to which accepting Affectivity is either in tension or in harmony 
with Evaluative Objectivity will depend upon how we are to understand the kind of emotional 
states that are thought to constitute or explain our evaluative judgments, including in 
particular whether they are taken to be intentionally directed states or something closer to 
syndrome-like reactions. But just as fundamentally, the extent to which Affectivity is amenable 
to objectivism will also depend upon what, exactly, it means for evaluative judgment to be an 
“objective” affair. Perhaps the most ecumenical definition of objectivism comes from 
Christine Korsgaard, who claims that to believe that there are objective moral truths is to 
believe “that there are answers to moral questions” and that “when we ask practical 
questions like ‘What must I do?’ or ‘What is best in this case?’ or ‘How should I live?’9 there 
are correct and incorrect things to say.” In contrast to “skepticism, relativism, subjectivism, 
and all the various ways of thinking that the subject [of ethics] is hopeless,”10 Korsgaard 
claims that for the objectivist—or in her terminology, the “procedural realist”—our correct 
answers to moral questions are subject to constraints that are judgment-independent: 
“[T]here are answers to moral questions,” she claims, “because there are correct procedures 
for arriving at them.”11 Of course, as Korsgaard acknowledges, objectivists radically diverge 
                                                        
8 Shaun Nichols (2004) p. 185 
9 Korsgaard (1992) p. 36 
10 Korsgaard (1992) p. 36 
11 ibid. 38 
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in what they take these constraints to be. Nevertheless, as a baseline, we can formulate this 
minimal conception of evaluative objectivity as follows: 
 
Evaluative Objectivity: Some evaluative judgments are correct, and their 
correctness conditions make reference to judgment-independent normative criteria 
 
The challenge for someone who endorses both Evaluative Objectivity and Affectivity is to show 
how there can be correct answers to our moral questions while explaining how our grasp of 
these answers should essentially involve emotional states. To this end, we can distinguish 
two major families of sentimentalist views that endorse Evaluative Objectivity—what I will be 
calling Recessive Sentimentalism and Substantive Sentimentalism, respectively. These 
opposing families differ over two fundamental questions. The first concerns the ontological 
status of normative truths, including in particular whether evaluative predicates like “good” 
or “valuable” make reference to substantive evaluative properties. The second concerns the 
relationship between affective states and normative truths.  
The first way to distinguish sentimentalists who endorse Evaluative Objectivity is over 
their affirmation or rejection of what Christine Korsgaard has referred to as Substantive 
Realism. Take for example the following evaluative judgments: “Suffering for its own sake is 
bad”; “Happiness is good”; “The sky is beautiful.”  According to a substantive realist 
account of such judgments, to say that some object is “good” or “bad” or “beautiful” or 
otherwise valuable is to posit object-side properties that are irreducibly evaluative; the fact that 
the object possesses these substantive features is what makes our evaluative judgments 
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correct. Whatever else an irreducibly evaluative property is on this account, what sets it apart 
from any other property is that it is thought to underwrite its own normative force: If 
something’s being valuable is a reason to promote it or respond to it in certain ways, this is 
because it simply belongs to the intrinsic nature of that property that it calls for that 
response. In this way, Korsgaard claims, for the substantive realist, the answer to a moral 
question is ultimately a metaphysical one: 
We can keep asking why: “Why must I do what is right?”-“Because it is commanded 
by God”- “But why must I do what is commanded by God?” - and so on, in a way 
that apparently can go on forever. This is what Kant called a search for the 
unconditioned - in this case, for something that will bring the question “Why must 
I?” to an end. The unconditional answer must be one that makes it impossible, 
unnecessary, or incoherent to ask why again. The [substantive] realist move is to 
bring this regress to an end by fiat: he declares that some things are intrinsically 
normative.12 
 
The idea that evaluative objectivity turns upon such intrinsically normative value properties 
has been thought by many to count in favor of some form of moral nihilism. J.L. Mackie 
famously objects to the notion of moral objectivity precisely insofar as he takes it to entail 
properties with “intrinsic prescriptivity,” and thus would commit us to positing queer entities 
unlike anything else in the world: 
 
The assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or 
features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgments presuppose, is, I hold, not 
meaningless but false...An objective good would be sought by anyone who was 
acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every 
person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-
pursuedness somehow built into it.13 
                                                        
12 Korsgaard (1992) 34 
13 Mackie (1977) p. 38/40 
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By Mackie’s lights, to endorse the idea of an objective good or a non-hypothetical end is to 
establish a metaphysical link between a substantive property P and a normative fact about 
the responses we should have toward something on account of P, such that the intrinsic 
properties of an object or a state of affairs constitute non-derivative normative criteria for 
those responses. When applied to objective values, for example, we would have to say that it 
simply belongs to the intrinsic nature of certain entities that they call for a given evaluative 
response; an “admirable” object, for example, would be an object that possesses intrinsic 
“to-be-admiredness,” a “lovable” object would possess intrinsic “to-be-lovedness,” etc. In 
the case of actions, an objectively “right” action would somehow have “to-be-done-ness" 
built in. On Mackie’s account, positing such properties would require us to radically alter our 
picture of the world: “If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities 
or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.”14 
Insofar as we can provide alternative, anti-realist explanations of our evaluative practices that 
better cohere with our naturalistic paradigm, the ontological profligacy and queerness of 
value properties is thought to count against moral objectivism.  
Of course, not all proponents of evaluative objectivity endorse the substantive realist 
picture. While Korsgaard accepts that there are correct answers to our moral questions, she 
denies that “there are answers to moral questions because there are metaphysical entities and 
facts that those questions ask about.”15 On Korsgaard’s account, evaluative judgment is to be 
                                                        
14 Mackie (1977) p. 31 
15 Korsgaard (1992) p. 36 
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understood not as an epistemic matter of discovering “knowledge of the normative part of 
the world,” but as an irreducibly practical affair of deciding what there is reason to do: 
"Normative concepts exist because human beings have normative problems. And we have 
normative problems because we are self-conscious rational animals, capable of reflection 
about what we ought to believe and to do.”16  T.M. Scanlon endorses a similar non-
substantive view of evaluative objectivity. For Scanlon, normativity is grounded not in entities 
but relations, relations that can be thought to obtain only from within the standpoint of our 
normative practices themselves. That is, reason-giving relations:  
[C]ontrary to what is sometimes said, belief in irreducibly normative truths does not 
involve commitment to any special entities. The essential element in normative 
statements is not a term referring to an entity, but a relation: the relation R(p, c, a), 
that holds between a proposition, a set of conditions, and an action or attitude when 
p is a reason for a person in situation c to do or hold a...Normative truths do not 
require strange metaphysical truth-makers. Such truths are determined by the 
standards of the normative domain itself.17 
 
Scanlon claims further that, since countenancing such reason-giving relations is something 
we do only from the domain of normative discourse, holding that there are normative truths 
does not commit us to claiming that they are part of the furniture of the world that science 
aims to describe:  
 
If by “the world” one means the natural world of physical objects and causal 
relations, which science aims to describe, then there is no disagreement [with 
Mackie]. Those of us who believe in irreducibly normative truths would not claim 
that the normative relation R itself is part of the (natural) world—that to claim that it 
holds is to make a claim about natural facts. Indeed, we explicitly deny this. 
                                                        
16 ibid. 47 
17 Scanlon (2009) p. 19 
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Normative facts about reasons, as we understand them are “part of the world” only 
in the broader sense in which “the world” is simply the reflection of all true 
sentences.18 
 
Now, while objectivists like Scanlon will reject intrinsically normative substantive 
value properties, this is not thought to entail the elimination of meaningful discourse about 
evaluative properties.19 Indeed, the most prominent example of a non-substantive account of 
evaluative properties can be found in Scanlon’s own Buck Passing Analysis of Value (BPA). 
According to the BPA, X’s being “good” or otherwise valuable is not itself a substantive 
property, but the merely formal property of having lower-order non-evaluative properties 
that provide reasons to have a favorable attitude towards X.20 The BPA is a close cousin of 
the Fitting Attitude Analysis of value (FA), according to which an object is called good insofar 
as it would be fitting or appropriate to have a pro-attitude towards it. Contemporary BPA 
and FA theories alike are often traced back to Franz Brentano, who maintained that to call 
something good or valuable is just to say that it is “fitting” or “correct” [richtig] to love it.21 
As Brentano claims: 
If we call [nennen] an object good … we do not thereby want to add a further 
determination [Bestimmung] to the determinations of the thing in question … If we 
call certain objects good, and others bad, we say no more than that whoever loves 
this, hates that, is correct to do so [verhalte sich richtig].22 
 
                                                        
18 ibid. 17 
19 Crisp (2009) provides a compelling argument for thinking at the traditional BPA does lead to eliminativism 
about value concepts 
20 Scanlon (1998) 
21 Brentano (1902) 
22 Brentano (1952) p. 144 
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While Brentano’s non-substantive account analyses value in terms of emotional 
attitudes like love and hate, contemporary buck-passing and fitting attitude accounts diverge 
over the nature of the relevant pro-attitudes in the analysans of value. For some, the pro-
attitudes in question are to be understood as cognitive states like beliefs or other belief-like 
evaluative attitudes (Scanlon 1998; Stratton-Lake 2005; Suikkanen 2005); for others these 
pro-attitudes are to be understood as desires, intentions, or other motivational attitudes 
(Gibbard 1998; Parfit 2011; Schroeder 2010). Accordingly, given the range of possible 
interpretations of the relevant pro-attitudes, neither the BPA nor the FA entail the 
endorsement of some form of Affectivity. Nevertheless, both views are readily amenable to 
such an endorsement, and some of the most prominent contemporary buck-passing and 
fitting attitude accounts follow Brentano in maintaining that the relevant pro-attitudes in 
question are emotional in nature (D’arms and Jacobson 2000a, 2000b; Danielsson and Olson 
2007; Mulligan 1998; Oddie 2005; Skorupski 2010; Zimmerman 2001; Wiggins 1987). These 
emotion-based variants of BPA and FA are often categorized under what D’arms and 
Jacobson have called Neo-Sentimentalism, which turns upon the claim that “to think that X has 
some evaluative property F is to think it appropriate [or fitting, merited, rational, etc.] to feel 
F in response to X.”23  
When considered as a catch-all category for emotion-based forms of non-substantive 
objectivism, neo-sentimentalism comes close to fitting the bill. However, this 
characterization is significantly complicated by the fact that some versions of neo-
sentimentalism are compatible with substantive value properties, as the concept of emotional 
                                                        
23 Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (2000a) pp. 722–48. See also D’Arms and Jacobson (2000b) pp. 65–90. 
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appropriateness is sometimes analyzed in terms of the emotion’s correspondence to the 
object’s evaluative features. Christine Tappolet (2011) and Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni 
Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004) have suggested that D’arms and Jacobson’s own neo-
sentimentalist account comes close to such a view at times. As D’arms and Jacobson claim, 
“[e]motions present things to us as having certain evaluative features,” and thus “when we 
ask whether an emotion is fitting...we are asking about the correctness of these 
presentations.”24 In this way, they claim, “fittingness of an emotion is like the truth of a 
belief,”25 which, in Tappolet’s estimation, suggests that a correct emotional presentation is 
one that is adequate to some way things are evaluatively speaking. 26 For her own part, 
Tappolet herself advances a form of Neo-Sentimentalism that is explicitly friendly to 
substantive value properties—what she calls Epistemic or Descriptive Neo-Sentimentalism—
according which value-making emotional attitudes are fitting or appropriate to their objects 
just insofar as they adequately present their object‘s evaluative features. As Tappolet claims: 
“An emotion of admiration with respect to a friend will be correct just in case the friend is 
really admirable...It simply amounts to saying that such an emotion is one that corresponds 
to how things are evaluatively speaking.”27 Unlike the non-substantive variants of BPA and 
FA, Tappolet’s descriptive neo-sentimentalism “has no eliminative or reductive ambitions,” 
and “is compatible with robust values realism” as well as response-dependent value realism 
                                                        
24 D’arms and Jacobson (2000b) p. 72 
25 ibid. 
26 Tappolet (2011) pp. 120n/127n. Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2004) raise the same 
interpretative question about D’arms and Jacobson’s account. "Unless we are mistaken,”  they claim, 
"fittingness on this view is supposed to consist in some relation of adequacy between the emotion and the 
value of its object,” and thus, "it is fitting to feel F in response to X, where F is an emotion that represents X as 
having F, if the evaluative representation F contains is correct, i.e., insofar as X does have the evaluative 
property F” (2004; 423n). 
27 Tappolet (2011) p. 120 
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alike.28  Tappolet traces the roots of descriptive neo-sentimentalism back to Francis 
Hutcheson, Alexius Meinong, and Max Scheler, and identifies a range of contemporary 
views that fall under the definition (Brady 2014; Cowan 2015; Cuneo 2006; Deonna and 
Teroni 2012; Döring 2003; Johnston 2001; Milona 2016; Oddie 2005; Pelser 2014; Roberts 
2013; Tolhurst 1991; Wedgwood 2007). 
As the foregoing considerations show, while buck-passing, fitting attitude, and neo-
Sentimentalist accounts all bear important connections, none of these categories can serve as 
a proper class of emotion-based alternatives to substantive realism. In order to accurately 
demarcate the class of emotion-based variants of non-substantive realism, I submit that the 
latter can be more helpfully categorized as members of a larger family of what I call, 
following terminology taken from Alexius Meinong, Recessive Sentimentalism.29 In Meinong’s 
framework, an evaluative property is called "recessive“ iff it is reducible, without residue, to 
relational facts obtaining between some non-evaluative property X and certain emotional 
attitudes directed towards X.30 Call this analysis of value Recessive Sentimentalism. On a 
recessive sentimentalist analysis of the value of beauty, for example, to say that the sky is 
beautiful is not to posit some substantive property of the sky to which the term ‘beauty’ 
corresponds; Rather, to say that the sky is beautiful is only to make a claim about certain 
emotional attitudes directed towards the sky—e.g. that such attitudes are fitting, rational, 
                                                        
28 Tappolet (2011) p.131 
29 Meinong (1923). In Meinong’s framework, a “recessive” property of some object X is a property that is 
reducible, without residue, to relational facts obtaining between X and certain psychological states. See 
Mulligan (2017) for a helpful overview of Meinong’s transition from a recessive analysis to a substantive realist 
view. 
30 Meinong (1923). See Mulligan (2017) for a helpful overview of Meinong’s transition from a recessive analysis 
to a substantive realist view. 
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required etc. Recently, there has been a proliferation of recessive sentimentalist analyses 
offered under different banners, some styled as emotion-based variants of BPA (Danielsson 
and Olson 2007; Skorupski 2010) while others as emotion-based variants of FA (D’arms and 
Jacobson 2000; Mulligan 1998; Zimmerman 2001). What unites recessive sentimentalist 
analyses is the claim that value properties are exhaustively analyzable in terms of an 
emotional attitude and its relation to some other normative concept that is thought to be 
foundational to morality—e.g. ought, reasons, fittingness, rightness, etc. Recessive 
sentimentalist analyses are often thought to be an attractive option insofar as they promise to 
preserve the fundamental connection between our emotional life and evaluative truths while 
avoiding the explanatory profligacy and queerness of positing irreducibly evaluative and 
intrinsically normative entities.  
Of course, the attractions of the recessive sentimentalist analysis come at a price. The 
first issue is that they are not readily amenable to the phenomenology of ordinary evaluative 
experience. On a recessive sentimentalist analysis, what makes some X good or bad is that 
there are relational facts that provide some normative reason to have certain emotional 
attitudes towards X. But in most ordinary cases of evaluative judgment, in taking something 
to be good or bad, we do not find ourselves directed towards our emotional attitudes and 
their status as relata in reason-giving relations, and only thereupon deem something to be 
valuable. Rather, we are directed towards some value-laden way the world already shows up 
for us. Consider the following example from Gilbert Harman (1977): “If you round a corner 
and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, you do not need to 
conclude that what they are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out; you can see 
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that it is wrong.”31 Indeed, our ordinary lives are replete with scenarios in which we seem to 
survey the value of something before we consider the reasons for having certain attitudes. In 
fact, it is often the case our reasons for having certain attitudes seem to consist precisely in 
the value that things appear to have. As Roger Crisp (2005) argues, when one is viewing 
Piero della Francesca's Madonna, one might regard it as beautiful or as something to be 
admired. However, Crisp argues, I don’t encounter it in the first place as an object with 
natural properties that provide me with reasons to have a favorable attitude towards it. 
Rather, I have a favorable attitude towards it insofar as I see it as valuable: 
 
When I look at Piero della Francesca's Madonna, I see it as a good or beautiful 
painting. I recognize that it has certain natural, non-evaluative properties, and that its 
beauty depends on its having those properties. And, of course, I see it as an artefact 
to be admired. But the reason for admiration lies not in the natural properties - these 
could be understood by someone with no aesthetic sense - but in the beauty.32 
 
From beautiful works of art to horrifying scenes of cruelty and human depravity, the 
world shows up for us as having evaluative features. The recessive sentimentalist is thus 
saddled with the problem of explaining why our ordinary evaluative experience should so 
poorly reflect the actual nature of evaluative and moral truth. This problem is not only an 
epistemic concern. For the ontological purport of our ordinary evaluative experience is also 
reflected in the nature of our value concepts themselves. Indeed, some reasons to have 
certain evaluative attitudes seem to be grounded solely in what things are, independent of their 
                                                        
31 Harman (1974) p. 4. Emphasis original. 
32 Crisp (2005) p. 82 
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standing in certain extrinsic reason-giving relations. For example, it is extremely plausible to 
say that pain is disvaluable not only in virtue of standing in certain reason-giving relations—
e.g. insofar as pain distracts me from my other aims, etc.—but because the unpleasant 
phenomenal character of pain is immanently disvaluable. Prima facie, the value of pain is 
grounded in the intrinsic nature of what pain is, and not its status as a relatum in a reason-
giving relation that makes reference to considerations besides pain. The same point extends 
to a range of evaluative categories. Take “pleasantness.” Typically, I don’t decide that some 
scene or sojourn is “pleasant” insofar as I believe it would be fitting or maximally rational to 
have a positive attitude towards it. Rather, I have a positive or pleasant attitude towards it 
just insofar as I see it as possessing qualities that are thought to be positive or pleasant in 
themselves. As R.J. Wallace (2002) argues:  
 
To say that a resort is ‘‘pleasant,’’ for instance, is a way of adverting to the 
distinctively positive qualities of experience that are enjoyed by a visitor to the resort. 
It is not merely an evaluatively neutral description of the natural properties of the 
resort or of the experiences induced by the resort in its visitors, and this is what 
makes it appropriate to think of pleasure itself as a concrete category of evaluation.33 
 
Prima facie, our ordinary evaluative experience and evaluative discourse suggest that 
evaluative judgments can be true because things have the evaluative features that our 
experiences and judgments present them as having. That is to say, our evaluative experiences 
suggest that there are correct answers to at least some of our moral questions precisely 
insofar as there are unique properties that those questions are about—namely, substantive 
                                                        
33 Wallace (2002) p. 448 
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values. The challenge for the substantive value realist who endorses sentimentalism is to 
explain how substantive values, emotions, and evaluative judgment can all cohere in a unified 
metaethical framework. Call such a picture Substantive Sentimentalism. 
The present work attempts to make some headway in providing such an account. In 
particular, I will attempt to show that the recessive sentimentalist analysis fails by its own 
lights, and to motivate a version of substantive sentimentalism according to which emotions 
are perceptions of the evaluative features of the world—what I will call Affective Value 
Perceptualism. My case will proceed in three parts. 
Abstract of Part I 
Values without Values: Recessive Sentimentalism and Why It Fails 
 
In Part I, I draw upon conceptual resources taken from Alexius Meinong and Franz 
Brentano in order to diagnose a recent spate of emotion-based variants of buck-passing and 
fitting attitude analyses of value. According to the latter analyses—which I submit are 
helpfully categorized as belonging to a broader family of what I call, following Meinong’s 
framework, Recessive Sentimentalism—evaluative concepts do not make reference to 
substantive properties, but are merely formal or “syncategorematic” properties that are 
exhaustively analyzable in terms of a relation between an emotional attitude and some other 
normative concept (e.g. reasons to respond in certain ways, fittingness relations, obligations, 
etc.). The most adaptable of these contemporary accounts marries the conceptual resources 
from the BPA and neo-sentimentalism into a single emotion-based analysis—what I’ll call 
the recessive sentimentalist BPA. According to the latter, value-making reasons to favor some 
object are to be understood as lower-order properties of an object that make a positive 
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emotion towards it “fitting” or ”correct.” As we will see, the appeal to attitudinal fittingness 
is often offered as a strategy for saving the traditional buck-passing analysis from the so-
called “wrong kind of reason” problem (WKR), which is thought to charge the BPA with 
collapsing our evaluative discourse into a kind of normatively vacuous psychologism.34 In 
order to properly assess the prospects of emotional fittingness for saving the recessive 
sentimentalist BPA from the WKR, I distinguish and clarify three different and often 
conflated ways in which this notion can be understood: (i) Adequation; (ii) Deontic Satisfaction; 
(iii) Unanalyzability. I argue that Adequation and Deontic Satisfaction will not help the recessive 
sentimentalist BPA escape the WKR problem without positing intrinsically normative 
object-side value properties, and that Unanalyzability turns upon theoretical posits that incur 
the same charges of explanatory profligacy and queerness levelled against value-based 
axiologies, thereby forfeiting one of the principle motivations in favor of recessive 
sentimentalism. 
Abstract of Part II     
Seeing, Feeling, and Values: A Phenomenological Case for Value Perceptualism 
 
Having undercut the idea that recessive analyses hold a clear abductive advantage 
over value-based axiologies, I then turn in Part II to develop a Substantive Sentimentalist 
account of the relationship between values and emotions. Here I advance and defend an 
                                                        
34 A classic problem facing the BPA—namely the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem—is that the presence of 
reasons to favor x appears insufficient to determine the goodness (or other evaluative status) of x, as there are 
cases in which we have reasons for a pro-attitude toward an object despite the fact that the object is clearly 
devoid of value—in which case, the reasons to favor x are of the “wrong kind” to ground the goodness of x. 
The most well-known articulation of this problem appeals to a scenario in which an evil demon will inflict 
severe pain on me (or impose some other disastrous consequence) unless I have a pro-attitude towards a saucer 
of mud. Insofar as my having the attitude will shield me from pain, it appears I have a reason to favor the 
saucer of mud, and thus we are lead the unpalatable conclusion that the saucer of mud is good. 
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affect-based version of perceptualist intuitionism – what I call Affect Value Perceptualism -
according to which values are sui generis substantive properties given through intentional acts 
of emotional experience. I begin by examining a recent form of perceptualist intuitionism 
made popular by Michael Huemer, which attempts to account for the reason giving force of 
foundational mental states strictly in terms of true-seeming conceptual contents. In 
foreclosing the world-disclosive intentionality and epistemic relevance of non-conceptual 
content, I argue that such theories leave us with no resources to account for the distinction 
between the merely conceptual act of thinking that some proposition is true and a direct 
awareness of the very conditions in virtue of which the proposition is true. Drawing upon 
the conceptual resources of Husserlian phenomenology, I attempt to show how a more 
fruitful model of noninferential evaluative justification can be found through the 
phenomenological notion of “originary intuition” and the attendant theory of “fulfillment.”  
On the broadly Husserlian account I defend, propositionally formulated moral 
judgments are merely empty acts of thought which, on their own, provide no justification 
whatsoever for believing their contents. In order to yield a reason for belief, such acts must 
be aided by intuitive acts of intentional feeling, which disclose the evaluative matter in question 
by way of irreducibly affective, non-conceptual mental contents. On this view, the ethical 
intuition properly speaking consists not in the propositionally articulated thought that p, nor 
in the corresponding justified belief that p, but rather in the felt givenness of the evaluative 
matter itself—that is, in an evaluative perception, which can include both the simple perception 
of concrete particulars as well as the grasping of abstract universal facts. As sources of 
noninferential evaluative knowledge, evaluative perceptions are not intellectual appearances 
or true-seeming thoughts, but affectively-conditioned presentations—that is, intentional 
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experiences in which we are immediately aware of the evaluative features of some intentional 
object.35 Building upon Husserl’s account of noninferential justification, I argue that it is in 
the joint recognition that things are immediately given in feeling as they are propositionally 
meant—namely, in acts of evaluative fulfillment—that we enjoy noninferential justification for 
our evaluative beliefs. We can formulate the thesis of Part II as follows: 
 
Affective Value Perceptualism: Some foundational evaluative beliefs are 
noninferentially justified in virtue of their propositional content being epistemically 
fulfilled through evaluative perceptions, which are irreducibly affective yet intentionally 
directed acts of feeling that constitute immediate epistemic access to the objective 
correlates of some first order evaluative claims, and this by way of non-conceptual 
yet intrinsically intentional affective contents. The objective correlates of evaluative 
perceptions are value properties. 
 
 
Abstract of Part III 
Emotion, Axiology, and Formalism: A Schelerian Case for the Affective A Priori 
 
Finally, in Part III, I attempt to show how an affect-based realism can furnish universal 
action-guiding norms and a priori moral principles. After tracing the historical aversion to the 
latter idea to a prevailing intellectualist prejudice in our understanding of the a priori, I 
develop an appropriation of Max Scheler's material a priori account of values. According to 
the latter, law-like constraints on evaluative judgments are grounded in the a priori essences 
of emotional phenomena, which constitute a unique domain of a priori experiential facts 
                                                        
35 I will follow the current if not unproblematic trend of reserving the term “presentation” for Husserl’s 
Gegenwärtigung and “representation” for Vergegenwärtigung, and this as to set off Husserl’s account of intuition 
from the representationalist theory of perception in anglophone philosophy. For an important discussion of the 
indelicacies of the presentation/representation parsing, see Uwe Meixner (2014). Since my aim will be to 
address Husserlian considerations to contemporary analytic metaethical debates, in which the term 
“presentational” carries a meaning approximating Husserl’s account, “presentation” will be contrasted against 
“representation.” 
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alongside those governing all other experiential modalities (e.g. color, tone, space, etc.). In an 
effort to vindicate a broadly Schelerian model of the material a priori, I provide an analysis of 
color incompatibility knowledge as a paradigm case, arguing that traditional formalist 
analyses given by Wittgenstein and Schlick fail to adequately explain the a priority of color 
incompatibility claims without appealing to our capacity to imagine experiential contents. 
After developing a corrective intuitionist model of a priori color knowledge based on 
Scheler’s account of the material a priori, I argue that the phenomenological analysis of 
paradigmatically evaluative emotions also reveals a priori facts grounded in the nature of 
evaluative experience itself—for instance, the fact that value kinds are positively or 
negatively valenced, and thus normatively ordered by nature, which is self-evidently given 
through the experience of value preference. I then provide an account of how action-guiding 
deontic concepts of “correctness” and “oughtness” can be analyzed in terms of actions that 
aim at realizing higher as opposed to lower values. I conclude Part III by addressing a 
forceful genealogical debunking argument against moral intuitionism, and sketching the 
unique prospects of affect-based intuitionism for resolving these concerns.  
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PART ONE 
 
VALUES WITHOUT VALUES: RECESSIVE SENTIMENTALISM AND WHY IT FAILS 
 
Introduction: The Recessive Analysis of Value  
 
The two most prominent rivals to substantive realism that endorse Evaluative Objectivity are 
the Fitting Attitude Analysis and the so-called Buck-Passing Analysis: 
 
Fitting-Attitude Analysis of Value (FA): X is “good” (or otherwise valuable) just 
insofar as it would be fitting to have a pro-attitude towards X 
 
 
Traditional Buck-Passing Analysis of Value (BPA): X’s being “good” (or 
otherwise valuable) is a merely formal property of having other lower-order non-
evaluative properties that give us reasons to have a pro-attitude towards X 
 
 
The buck-passing analysis is sometimes characterized as a contemporary species of the 
fitting-attitude analysis, while other times both views are treated as being roughly equivalent. 
However, both of these characterizations are complicated by (i) the question of whether 
“fittingness” is to be analyzed in terms of other familiar deontic notions or is rather an 
unanalyzable primitive, as well as (ii) the question of how “reasons” are to be analyzed. 
Furthermore, as we will see, there are ways to pass the reason-giving buck from certain 
higher-order evaluative concepts like “goodness” which do not entail the wholesale 
reducibility of all value properties to other normative terms, thereby complicating the use of 
“buck passing” as an adequate description for emotion-based accounts of value that reject 
substantive realism.  
A more helpful way to categorize these rivals to value-based axiologies, following 
terminology drawn from Meinong, is to classify the BPA and FA as members of a larger 
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family of what can be called recessive analyses of value. In Meinong’s framework, a “recessive” 
property of some object X is a property that is reducible, without residue, to relational facts 
obtaining between X and certain psychological states directed towards it.36 On a recessive 
analysis of the value of beauty, for example, to say that the sky is beautiful is not to posit 
some substantive property of the sky to which the term ‘beauty’ corresponds; Rather, to say 
that the sky is beautiful is to make a claim about certain psychological attitudes directed 
towards the sky—e.g. that certain affective states directed towards the sky are fitting, rational, 
required etc. As John Laird (1929) writes in summarizing Meinong’s terminological framing, 
such views are aptly called recessive, “because, after analysis, the nominal subject of which 
beauty (or some other value) is ostensibly a predicate recedes altogether.”37 Moreover, the 
notion of receding, as opposed to eliminating values, also speaks to the fact that value predicates 
remain informative: what prevents recessive analyses of value from becoming eliminative 
accounts of evaluative discourse is that they make essential reference to a characteristic 
relation between emotional attitudes and the objects we call valuable.  
Now, recessive analyses of values diverge over the question of what exactly this 
relation is supposed to be. However, as discussed in the introduction, what unites recessive 
analyses of sentimentalist stripes is the attempt to make values exhaustively analyzable in terms 
of a relation between an emotional attitude and some other normative concept thought to be 
foundational to morality, such as ought, reasons, fittingness, rightness, etc. In recent 
metaethical debate, such recessive sentimentalist analyses of evaluative objectivity have 
                                                        
36 Meinong (1923). In Meinong’s framework, a “recessive” property of some object X is a property that is 
reducible, without residue, to relational facts obtaining between X and certain psychological states. See 
Mulligan (2017) for a helpful overview of Meinong’s transition from a recessive analysis to a substantive realist 
view. 
37 Laird (1929) p. 236 
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proliferated, and their proponents often take them to have an abductive advantage over 
value-based axiologies due to concerns about the explanatory profligacy and queerness of 
substantive value terms. The most adaptable of these recessive sentimentalist accounts 
marries the conceptual resources from BPA and the FA into a single sentimentalist 
analysis—what I’ll call the ‘recessive sentimentalist BPA.’ As we’ll see, the recessive 
sentimentalist BPA can take on a number of forms, depending upon how we are to 
understand the relevant normative concepts that populate the analysans of values. In the 
following, I examine the prospects of the recessive sentimentalist BPA in each of its 
principle variations. In showing why the recessive sentimentalist BPA fails on each of these 
accounts, we will reveal theoretical constraints that any recessive analysis must meet. To the 
extent that these theoretical constraints incur the very same explanatory challenges levelled 
against substantive value properties, these problems will motivate a return to some of the 
more intuitive attractions of value-based axiologies.  
 
1. Buck Passing, Fitting Attitudes, and the Recessive Sentimentalist Analysis:  
Why Recessive Sentimentalism Fails 
 
 
A mark of the enduring influence of the buck passing analysis of value is that it continues to 
constrain even the ways in which it is rejected. Originally understood as a program for 
preserving evaluative discourse while eliminating substantive value properties from our 
explanatory framework, today so-called “buck passing” accounts can be found in both value-
based and non-value-based varieties. According to what is sometimes called the “traditional” 
or “reductive” buck-passing analysis of value (henceforth BPA), value predicates are 
reducible to non-evaluative natural facts that give us reasons to respond in certain ways. On 
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this decisively recessive account, X’s being “good” or otherwise valuable is not itself a 
substantive, reason-giving property, but is the merely formal property of having lower-order 
non-evaluative properties that provide reasons to have a favorable attitude towards X.  
A classic challenge facing the BPA—namely the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem 
(WKR)—is that the presence of reasons to favor something appears insufficient to 
determine the goodness (or other evaluative status) of that thing, as there are cases in which 
we have reasons for a pro-attitude toward an object despite the fact that the object is clearly 
not good—in which case the reasons are of the wrong kind. The most well-known articulation 
of this problem appeals to a scenario in which an evil demon will impose some disastrous 
consequence unless I have a pro-attitude towards him. Insofar as my having the attitude will 
prevent catastrophe, it appears that I have a reason to favor the demon, and thus it seems 
that the BPA leads us to the unpalatable conclusion that the demon is good. Objections of 
this kind are varied and can be applied to a range of different evaluative concepts, but they 
all turn upon the basic idea that the BPA suffers from a problem of definitional promiscuity, as 
it leads to the result that the definition of some evaluative concept could extend to objects 
that contradict our platitudes about which things should have this value and why.  
Responses to the WKR problem in defense of the BPA typically involve some 
attempt to furnish constraints on good-making or “right kind” reasons for having a 
favorable attitude, such that we can explain why the reasons that appear in putative examples 
of definitional promiscuity are not of the right kind to ground goodness. To this end, several 
recent attempts to rescue the BPA from the WKR problem have tried to marry it to the 
notion of a fitting or correct attitude (See Danielsson and Olson 2007; McHugh and Way 2016; 
Zimmerman 2001). On these accounts, right-kind reasons for an attitude towards an object 
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are to be understood as properties of an object that make a pro-attitude towards it correct or 
fitting.  In response to the “evil demon” articulation of the WKR problem, the fit-based buck 
passer will argue that while it may be true that we have some reason to have a pro-attitude 
towards the evil demon insofar as doing so will shield us from pain, it also seems clear that 
this attitude is not fitting with respect to its object, and thus we can avoid the problematic 
result that the demon is “good” without positing substantive value properties. Call this the 
fit-based BPA. While fit-based accounts vary in whether they allow fittingness and reasons to 
be two self-standing categories (Danielsson and Olson 2007) or whether reasons are to be 
analyzed in terms of fittingness (McHugh and Way 2016), they are united in holding that 
goodmaking reasons to favor something are facts that make it fitting to favor that thing. 
When we combine the fit-based BPA with the claim that the relevant fitting attitude in the 
analysans of value is an emotional attitude, we arrive at the recessive sentimentalist BPA. 
In what follows, I’ll show that the putative appeal of the recessive sentimentalist 
BPA rests upon the equivocal use of an unclarified notion of emotional ‘fittingness’ or 
‘correctness’ (Because the term “fittingness” carries connotations in common parlance that 
do not always comport with the way this concept is employed by fit-based buck passers, I’ll 
use the term emotional “correctness” wherever possible as a more theory-neutral surrogate). 
In order to assess the prospects of emotional fittingness for saving the BPA, I distinguish 
and clarify three different and often conflated ways in which this notion can be understood: 
 
Adequation: Emotional attitudes are “fitting,” or “correct,” in virtue of a relation of 
adequacy between some essential feature(s) of a given emotion and some correlate 
feature(s) of the object of that emotion. Loosely put, a correct emotion is one that 
“gets its object right.” 
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Deontic Satisfaction: Emotional attitudes are “fitting, or “correct,” just insofar as 
they are required or permitted by some normative schema that sets deontic 
constraints on what ought to be or what one is obligated to do. On this account, a 
correct emotion is just a species of all states of affairs that are required according to 
this general normative schema. A good object would then be analyzed as the object 
of an attitude that ought to be according to these norms. 
 
Unanalyzability: “Fittingness,” or “correctness,” is a primitive, unanalyzable feature 
of emotional attitudes. The fact that an object is “correctly” favored, and thus good, 
tells us nothing more than the fact that an attitude of favoring this object possesses 
the property of being correct, sans phrase. Correctness is thereby a normatively self-
imposing feature of emotional attitudes.   
 
 
While each account has certain attractions, I argue that all of them fail to save a properly 
recessive analysis of value. More specifically, I argue that Adequation and Deontic Satisfaction 
will not help the BPA escape the WKR problem without appealing to unreduced value 
terms, and furthermore that the commitments needed to defeat these challenges will 
pressure the fit-based buck passer to appeal to Unanalyzability. However, I argue that 
Unanalyzability turns upon theoretical posits that incur the same charges of explanatory 
profligacy and queerness leveled against value-based axiologies, thereby forfeiting one of the 
principle motivations in favor of the recessive sentimentalist analysis.  
 
1.1 Preliminaries: Values, Buck Passing, and the Terms of the Dispute 
 
Before I turn to examine each of these accounts of emotional correctness, I should first say 
what I am taking to be necessary success conditions for any properly recessive analysis. Here 
there are at least three: 
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I. Must be Genuinely Reductive: The first success condition is that the account 
must actually reduce evaluative terms into non-evaluative terms. In other words, 
there can be no unreduced value properties in the analysans of the value concept 
in question. 
 
II. Must Avoid Definitional Promiscuity: The second success condition is that 
the fit-based analysis must avoid problems of definitional promiscuity similar to 
the WKR problem. In general, the account must preserve the integrity of 
evaluative concepts: that is, a given evaluative concept must refer only to things 
that actually possess this value, and must do so in virtue of properties that are 
relevant to the value in question. 
 
III. Must Fulfill Purported Explanatory Advantages: The third success condition 
is that the account must make good on the purported theoretical advantages that 
are thought to motivate an abductive case in favor of the BPA over value-based 
axiologies. Here there are two claims in particular: 
 
(i) Avoids the Problem of Redundancy: The BPA is taken by its proponents 
to avoid an apparent reason-giving redundancy in appealing to substantive 
value terms in practical deliberation 
 
(ii) Avoids Explanatory Profligacy and Queerness: The second is that the 
BPA avoids or at least mitigates Mackie-style concerns over the explanatory 
profligacy and “queerness” of substantive value terms. In general, the BPA is 
thought to present a more economical framework than its value-based rivals.  
 
 
Now, in order to assess whether each account of emotional correctness can meet all of the 
foregoing success conditions, it will be necessary to first take inventory on the two 
aforementioned explanatory advantages, and this so that we can clarify the real force of the 
challenge that the recessive sentimentalist BPA faces. First, as we’ll see, the problem of 
redundancy does not pose a special problem for value-based accounts, and so cannot be 
taken to motivate an abductive case in favor of a recessive sentimentalist BPA (§ 1.2). This 
leaves the appeal to explanatory parsimony. In unpacking just why it is that value-based 
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axiologies are thought to be so objectionable on this score, we will be able to draw out 
additional constraints that any successful version of the recessive sentimentalist BPA must 
meet (§ 1.3). 
 
1.2 Preliminaries: Values and the Problem of Redundancy 
 
The clearest articulation of a buck passing analysis motivated by the so-called “problem of 
redundancy” can be found in Scanlon’s What We Owe Each Other. Here Scanlon disputes the 
view, often attributed to G.E. Moore, that in addition to the reason-giving properties in 
virtue of which something is taken to be good, the “goodness” itself provides a reason to 
favor or desire it. If we take this property to constitute a distinct reason, it is easy to see how 
we run into redundancy problems. Suppose a friend were to ask you why a particular beach 
would make for a good travel destination. If we suppose the beach is a good destination in 
virtue of some finite set of properties, it would seem oddly redundant if, after listing all of 
these reasons, you were to add: “And if those reasons weren’t enough, I should add that it’s a 
good beach.” Scanlon claims that reflection upon such ordinary cases of practical deliberation 
suggests that “[i]t is not clear what further work could be done by special reason-providing 
properties of goodness and value, and even less clear how these properties could provide 
reasons.” In an effort to avoid such a problem of deliberative redundancy, Scanlon outlines 
an account of axiological concepts that has since become the locus classicus of non-
substantive analyses of value: “A being good, or valuable, is not a property that itself 
provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to 
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have other properties that constitute such reasons.”38 On this view, the normative or reason-
giving buck is passed from the merely formal property of goodness to the non-evaluative, 
natural properties of a thing; it is these natural properties that can give us reasons to respond 
in certain ways, and this by virtue of standing in certain reason-giving relations. When a 
natural property of X gives us reason to have a positive evaluative attitude towards X, we call 
that X ‘good.’ 
That a given theory avoids the problem of redundancy certainly counts in its favor. 
The problem of redundancy can be resolved, however, without reducing all value terms to 
other non-evaluative terms. For even if we accept the buck-passer’s claim that a higher-order 
value term like “goodness” is not itself a reason-giving property, this alone does nothing to 
preclude the possibility that the lower-order reason-giving properties in virtue of which 
something is considered “good” are themselves irreducibly evaluative. For instance, Wallace 
(2002) argues that we might call a beach “good” because it has certain lower-order yet 
nonetheless irreducibly evaluative properties that give us reasons to favor it—e.g. 
“pleasantness.”39 Roger Crisp (2005) makes a similar case that a work of art can have the 
higher-order property of being “beautiful” insofar as it has lower-order evaluative properties 
of “sublimity, delicacy, profundity, boldness, imagination, vitality, grace.”40 Now, whether 
these specific evaluative properties, or any for that matter, really are irreducible to non-
evaluative terms is besides the issue. The point is rather that positing such irreducible lower-
order value properties would be sufficient to resolve the problem of redundancy without 
                                                        
38 Scanlon (1997) p. 97 
39 Wallace (2002) p. 429 
40 Crisp (2005) p. 82 
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endorsing a reductive analysis of value. All else being equal, then, the problem of redundancy 
does not pose a special challenge for value-based reasons in particular, but rather applies to 
any account in which the merely formal or summative property Pf  of having some set of 
substantive reason-giving properties—ex. Pf  = {P1...Pn}—is counted as a calculatively distinct 
member of its own set: e.g. Pf  = {P 1...Pn , Pf  = (P1...Pn)}. Notice that this problem can arise 
regardless of whether we understand the reason-giving properties to be evaluative or non-
evaluative. There are at least three possibilities that avoid reason-giving redundancy which do 
not entail a reductive analysis of value:  
 
I) Goodness is not itself a reason-giving property, but the merely formal property of 
having lower-order reason-giving properties, some of which are irreducibly 
evaluative 
 
 
2) Goodness is not itself a reason-giving property, but is nonetheless a substantive 
property that supervenes on irreducibly evaluative properties which are reason-
giving. (Cf. Crisp’s “Revised Buck-Passing Analysis” proposal) 
 
 
3)  Goodness is a reason-giving property, but its reason-giving force or “weight” is 
indistinct from that of the set of lower-order reason-giving properties that make an 
object good, some of which are irreducibly evaluative (see Crisp 2005; Schroeder 
2006). In other words, the fact that something is good can be considered a 
summative reason-giving property, which is definitionally specified by the set of 
lower-order reason-giving properties that make the object good; some these lower-
order properties may be irreducibly evaluative.  
 
 
All three options are sufficient to resolve the problem of redundancy without resorting to a 
reductive analysis of value, and the first does so while granting the buck passers claim that 
goodness is a merely formal property. In this case, the normative buck is passed from the 
higher-order property of “goodness,” however the buck stops again with further lower-order 
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evaluative properties. Thus, insofar as we can avoid deliberative redundancy without 
eliminating substantive value properties, one of the principle motivations for the buck-
passing analysis can actually be accommodated by a value-based axiology. Along these lines, 
Crisp (2008) argues that we can distinguish between two distinct buck-passing theses in the 
traditional account, each of which is in principle separable from the other: 
 
Negative Buck-Passing Thesis or BPA(-) : Being good is not itself a reason-
providing property 
 
Positive Buck-Passing Thesis or BPA (+) : Being good is merely the higher-order 
property of having lower-order non-evaluative properties that provide reasons to 
respond in particular ways.41 
 
A redutive buck-passing analysis requires a commitment to both BPA(-) and BPA (+). 
However, the problem of redundancy can be avoided by merely accepting BPA(-) alone: one 
can deny that goodness is reason-giving without claiming that the lower-order reason-giving 
properties in virtue of which something is good are themselves strictly non-evaluative. Since 
accepting BPA(-) is sufficient to resolve the problem of redundancy, and since BPA(-) is 
compatible with value-based reasons, the concern about deliberative redundancy does 
nothing on its own to motivate a reductive buck passing analysis. The BPA will have to 
appeal to further considerations in order to make an abductive case in its favor. On this 
score, it is worth noting that in response to problems of this kind, Scanlon (2002) has since 
come to distance himself from the positive buck-passing thesis and the reductive analysis it 
entails: “My thesis was that goodness is not itself a property that provides reasons, not that 
                                                        
41 Crisp (2008) p. 263 
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the underlying properties that do this are always natural (non-evaluative) properties, and I 
should not have written in a way that suggested this [...] more specific evaluative properties 
often play this role.”42  For Scanlon, as for many other reformed buck passers, passing the 
deliberative buck from higher-order terms like “goodness” to lower-order reason-giving 
properties is no longer presumed to entail a reductive analysis of value. 
 
1.3 Preliminaries, Continued: Values, Explanatory Profligacy, and Queerness 
 
Of course, despite Scanlon’s apparent disavowal, reductive versions of the BPA continue to 
enjoy wide support (See Danielsson and Olson 2007; Lang 2008; McHugh and Way 2016; 
Stratton-Lake 2016; Suikkanen 2005; Zimmerman 2001), and are often taken by their 
proponents to have the explanatory edge over value-based axiologies due to Mackie-style 
concerns over the putative explanatory profligacy and queerness of substantive value 
properties. Whatever else a substantive value property is, it is often thought to be 
objectionable insofar as it must possess what Mackie calls “objective, intrinsic prescriptivity.”  
To revisit Mackie’s claim cited in the introduction: 
 
The assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or 
features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgments presuppose, is, I hold, not 
meaningless but false...An objective good would be sought by anyone who was 
acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every 
person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-
pursuedness somehow built into it.43 
                                                        
42 Scanlon (2002) p. 513 
43 Mackie (1977) p. 38/40 
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By Mackie’s lights, to endorse the idea of an objective good or a non-hypothetical end is to 
establish a metaphysical link between a substantive property P and a normative fact about 
the responses we should have toward something on account of P, such that the intrinsic 
properties of an object or a state of affairs constitute non-derivative normative criteria for 
those responses. When applied to objective values, for example, we would have to say that it 
simply belongs to the intrinsic nature of certain entities that they call for a given evaluative 
response: e.g. an “admirable” object would be an object that possesses intrinsic “to-be-
admiredness,” a “lovable” object would possess intrinsic “to-be-lovedness,” etc. In the case 
of actions, an objectively good action or end would somehow have “ought-to-be-ness" built 
in. On Mackie’s account, positing such properties would require us to radically alter our 
picture of the world: “If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities 
or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.”44 
In sum, substantive value properties are thought to be queer precisely insofar as they 
must underwrite their own reason-giving force. We can contrast this picture with the kind of 
reason-giving property that the traditional buck passer has in mind. Recall that on the 
traditional version of the BPA, objects are called good just insofar as they possess natural 
properties that give us reasons to have favorable attitudes towards them. Now, ordinary 
parlance permits us to refer to properties that “give us reasons” as also “being reasons” for certain 
responses—e.g. the fact that there will be dancing at the party can be said to give me a reason 
to go, and can also be said to be a reason to go. In this way, when understood as being reasons 
                                                        
44 ibid. 38 
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for certain responses, the reason-giving natural properties appealed to by the BPA might 
sound like intrinsically normative properties as well. However, that is not the picture that the 
BPA is meant to provide. Rather, on the buck passing picture, the substantive properties of 
objects are thought to consist of strictly non-normative natural properties, properties which 
derive their normative significance only by standing in certain reason-giving relations. For 
example, the fact that there will be dancing at the party is by itself a non-normative natural 
property of the party. However, in relation to a reason-giving schema according to which, 
say, one always has reason to have a favorable attitude towards what one desires, together 
with the additional fact that one desires to dance, then this fact can be said to give us a reason 
insofar as its obtaining makes it the case that there is a reason to have a favorable attitude 
towards the party. Strictly speaking, it is not the natural properties of the object which 
underwrite their own reason-giving force, as is the case with intrinsically “to-be-favored” 
evaluative properties. Rather, the reason-giving force of those natural properties we call 
‘reasons’ is derived from a set of reason-giving relations distinct from these properties 
themselves. Properly speaking, it is the reason-giving relations that are thought to be the 
ground of normativity, not the worldly entities and properties that stand in these relations.  
The alleged advantage of the foregoing picture is that it allows us to “demystify” 
value concepts by reducing them to ordinary terms with which we are already familiar, 
namely reasons and the ordinary natural properties of objects that give them. Of course, the 
extent to which this picture is truly demystifying will depend upon the ontological status of 
the normativity of reasons. According to some accounts, reasons can be analyzed in purely 
non-normative naturalistic terms, such as desire-satisfaction (See Schroeder). In this case, the 
BPA will be straightforwardly consonant with a naturalistic framework. On other accounts, 
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reasons are taken to be irreducibly normative, and so in a certain sense non-natural insofar as 
they cannot be reduced to natural properties, and yet positing them is not thought to saddle 
our ontology with any queer entities. Scanlon defends this view of normative reasons, which 
is sometimes interpreted as a kind of metaphysical quietism about reasons. For Scanlon, 
reasons “are not reducible to or identifiable with non-normative truths, such as truths about 
the natural world of physical objects, causes and effects,” and in this limited sense Scanlon’s 
view counts as kind of non-naturalism. However, Scanlon claims: 
 
[C]ontrary to what is sometimes said, belief in irreducibly normative truths does not 
involve commitment to any special entities. The essential element in normative 
statements is not a term referring to an entity, but a relation: the relation R(p, c, a), 
that holds between a proposition, a set of conditions, and an action or attitude when 
p is a reason for a person in situation c to do or hold a…Normative truths do not 
require strange metaphysical truth-makers. Such truths are determined by the standards 
of the normative domain itself.45 
 
 
For Scanlon, reasons are not entities but relations, relations that can be thought to obtain only 
from within the standpoint of normative reasoning itself. Since countenancing such relations 
is thereby something we do only from the domain of normative discourse, then holding that 
there are irreducibly normative truths does not commit us to claiming that they are part of 
the furniture of the world that science aims to describe: 
 
If by “the world” one means the natural world of physical objects and causal 
relations, which science aims to describe, then there is no disagreement [with 
Mackie]. Those of us who believe in irreducibly normative truths would not claim 
that the normative relation R itself is part of the (natural) world—that to claim that it 
holds is to make a claim about natural facts. Indeed, we explicitly deny this. 
Normative facts about reasons, as we understand them are “part of the world” only 
                                                        
45 Scanlon (2009) p. 19 
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in the broader sense in which “the world” is simply the reflection of all true 
sentences.46 
 
Now, whether we tie the BPA to a naturalistic account of reasons or Scanlon’s quietistic 
non-naturalism, either version of the BPA is thought by its proponents to avoid the 
explanatory burdens of substantive value realism. Furthermore, even if reasons cannot be 
reduced to non-normative terms, and even if, pace Scanlon, reasons remain in some sense 
ontologically queer, a remaining attraction of the BPA is that it can nevertheless still provide 
a more parsimonious explanatory framework than the value-based picture, insofar as we can 
make fewer appeals to irreducibly normative posits. Whereas the buck passer can claim that 
his account is subject to only one kind of irreducibly normative category—e.g. reasons—the 
value-based account is committed to two kinds of irreducibly normative posits—e.g. reasons 
and values. On this score, Jonas Olson notes that “[BPA] is economical insofar as it attempts 
to analyse axiological concepts (such as ‘value’ or ‘goodness’) in terms of deontic concepts 
(such as ‘reasons’ or ‘ought’), so that what were formerly taken to be two separate normative 
categories are reduced to only one.”47 As such, even if we accept that reason-giving relations 
are ontologically queer, the BPA might still be thought to retain the explanatory advantage of 
minimizing queerness, not to mention reducing the overall quantity of theoretical posits.  
Whatever explanatory advantages are gained by eschewing substantive value 
properties from our explanatory framework, the cost is that we lose the most straightforward 
way to account for the difference between right-kind and wrong-kind reasons to favor 
something. On a value-based account, right-kind or “goodmaking” reasons to have a 
                                                        
46 ibid. 17 
47 Olson (2004) p. 2945 
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favorable attitude towards some object will be those substantive properties of the object that 
have intrinsic to-be-favoredness somehow built into these properties themselves. This 
explanation, of course, is not available to the BPA. For it is precisely by severing the 
metaphysical link between the concrete properties of an object and their normative 
significance that the BPA is able to avoid positing what are thought to be mysterious, 
intrinsically normative entities. And yet it is also precisely by creating daylight between the 
substantive properties of an object and its normative significance that the WKR problem is 
able to loom into view. For if the reason-giving significance of an object is determined by its 
relation to considerations that are extrinsic to it, then in principle, for any given object with 
some finite set of properties, it appears that all it takes is the right set of external 
considerations to obtain—e.g. that an evil demon demands that I admire a saucer of mud—
in order to make it the case that we have a reason to favor this object, and thus that the thing 
in question is “good.”  
In order to avoid such cases of definitional promiscuity, the buck passer must find 
some way to establish a necessary connection between the genuine properties of an object 
and our reasons to have a favorable attitude towards it, and this without saddling the object 
with intrinsically normative, sui generis value properties. And it is here that the notion of 
emotional fit is thought to save the day: while it may be true that we have some reason to 
have a pro-emotion towards the evil demon insofar as doing so will shield us from pain, it 
also seems intuitive to say that this attitude would not be not fitting with respect to its object.  
If goodmaking reasons are thought to be fit-making reasons to favor, and fit-making reasons 
to favor are grounded in the natural properties of an object, we can avoid the problematic 
result that the demon is “good” without positing substantive value properties: Goodmaking 
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features of an object will just be those features of an object that are able to stand in a fitting 
relation to the attitude in question. This is why the appeal to fittingness is such an attractive 
dialectical move for the BPA. For here the recessive buck passer appeals not to a new kind 
of entity, but a special kind of relation—the relation of being fitting. Now, the challenge for the 
sentimentalist fit-based buck passer is to explain the special normative connection between a 
fitting emotional attitude and the natural properties of its object without either (i) appealing 
to explanatory posits that make essential reference to unreduced evaluative terms, or (ii) 
appealing to explanatory posits that incur equivalent theoretical problems to those attending 
substantive evaluative properties. As we’ll see, on the three principle notions of emotional 
correctness that inform the fit-based analysis—Adequation, Deontic Satisfaction, and 
Unanalyzability— the recessive sentimentalist BPA runs afoul of these constraints. 
 
2.1 Why Adequation Fails to Save the Recessive Sentimentalist BPA 
 
One way to understand emotional correctness is in terms of a relation of adequacy between an 
attitude and some corresponding feature of its object. Loosely put, a favorable attitude 
would be correct insofar as it gets its object right. The most intuitively straightforward way to 
account for such adequation is to posit a correlate feature of the object that simply mirrors 
the essential character of the attitude in question: for instance, a favorable attitude would be 
correct insofar as we find some correlate property of “favorableness” on the object-side of 
the attitude. This understanding of adequation, however, analyzes value-making reasons by 
appeal to further evaluative terms, and so will not do for the recessive analysis of value the 
recessive sentimentalist BPA is meant to provide. Nonetheless, we might wonder whether a 
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properly recessive account of emotional adequation can be given strictly in terms of the non-
evaluative properties of objects. The problem with this prospect, I’ll argue, is that even upon 
the most minimalist conception of a positive emotional attitude, we cannot make sense of 
attitude-to-object adequacy without positing evaluatively-laden object-side properties. 
 
2.2 Valence and Adequation:  
 
At a minimum, positive and negative emotional attitudes towards some object must involve 
at least two components:  
 
(i) Cognitive Base: Some representation of the non-evaluative properties of an object 
(ii) Valence:  Some content or feature of the emotion in virtue of which it is a “positive” or 
“negative” attitude.  
 
The first thing to recognize is that the accuracy of an attitude’s cognitive base 
underdetermines emotional correctness: one may accurately judge that p as part of an 
attitude of favoring it, while another may accurately judge the same as part of an attitude of 
disfavoring it. Accordingly, in order to explain how one attitude can be correct while the 
other incorrect, the valence of the attitude must also be subject to accuracy conditions. For 
to the extent that attitudes of favoring or disfavoring are individuated from each other at 
least in part by their valence, then for at least some correct pro-attitude, it must be the case 
that an otherwise identical attitude with a negative valence, a pro-attitude, would have been 
incorrect (otherwise everything would be both correctly favored and correctly disfavored, and 
thus at once good and bad, in virtue of same properties). Take for instance, a correct attitude 
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of disfavoring the fact that an act of recreational killing has taken place. If this con-attitude is 
correct, then surely it must be the case that an otherwise identical attitude with a positive 
valence would be incorrect. As such, the positive valence of a favorable attitude towards 
recreational killing must, in some way, fail to get its object right. Thus, if emotional attitudes 
are adequate to their objects, the adequacy relation must apply to the valence of an 
emotional attitude.  
Now, if the positive or negative valence of an attitude must be adequate to its object, 
we can understand this relation of adequacy in one of two ways: either (i) as a thetic or 
descriptive relation in which an emotional attitude accurately represents or presents its object, 
or else (ii) as a non-descriptive and irreducibly normative relation in which an attitude is somehow 
“called for” or demanded by its object. I’ll treat each of these in turn. 
 
2.3 Valence and Descriptive Adequation 
 
On a descriptive reading of emotional adequation, a correct emotion would be one that 
presents or represents some way that its object actually is. Here the analogue of a correct 
emotional attitude would be a true belief or a veridical sensory perception. As Christine 
Tappolet describes this understanding of emotional correctness when applied to the case of 
disgust: “The claim is that something is disgusting just if feeling disgust towards this thing 
were correct from an epistemic point of view – it would represent the thing as it is, 
evaluatively speaking.”48 Applied to the valence of an emotional attitude, we would say that 
                                                        
48 Tappolet (2011) p. 120 
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the positive or negative valence of an attitude is adequate to its object insofar as it serves as 
epistemic content that represents or presents some corresponding feature of the object. 
This, however, would entail a flagrant violation of any recessive analysis. For in order for a 
positively valenced attitude to be correct, we must posit some “positive” feature on the 
object side of the favorable attitude, either as a mind-independent or a mind-dependent 
property, which would serve as the representational correlate of the attitude’s valence. 
Simply put, if a positive valenced attitude is adequate to its object, this means that the object 
must possess substantive properties that are positive by essential definition. But if correctly 
favored (i.e. “good”) objects are analyzed as those that have object-side features that are 
essentially positive, then our analysans of good will contain unreduced evaluative terms: 
positive attitudes would be correct insofar as they accurately represent the positive properties 
of their objects. If positively valenced attitudes are to be understood as correct insofar as 
they are adequate to their objects, then unless we are to forfeit a recessive analysis, this 
cannot be in virtue of representing or presenting some correlate feature of the object.  
 
2.3 Valence and Object-Oriented Normative Adequation 
 
In order to avoid the problems associated with a descriptive reading of adequacy, we might 
appeal to an irreducibly normative relation of adequacy in which an attitude is somehow 
“called for” or prescribed by its object without thereby representing it. Here I’ll take a 
certain construal of “meriting” to count as a paradigmatic example. For instance, a standing 
ovation, as an expression of praise, might be merited by a pianist’s performance without it 
being the case that there is a descriptive relation between the expression of praise and the 
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performance. In general, it seems we can say that something merits or calls for a given 
response without thereby thinking that the response somehow represents this object. In such 
cases, it nonetheless seems natural enough to say that the praise is “adequate” to its object to 
the extent that the object can be said to call for this response. On this reading of attitude-to-
object adequacy, the fit-based buck passer might say that an object would be correctly 
favored, and thus good, if and only if it has intrinsic properties that merit, deserve, or 
otherwise “call for” a favorable attitude. Thus, if the evil demon demands praise for his 
travesty of a take at a Rachmaninoff piece, we may have reason to give it praise, but this 
would not make the performance good, as this favorable response would not be merited by 
the performance itself.  
In order to assess the prospects of this account of adequation for the recessive 
sentimentalist BPA, we must take care to clarify the normative criteria that determines how 
the relation of meriting or “calling for” obtains. Here we can distinguish between an object-
oriented merit schema and a norm-oriented merit schema. An object-oriented merit schema would be 
one in which the normative criteria that demand a given attitude towards some object 
consist only in the intrinsic features of the object in question: in short, on this account it is 
the object itself that calls for a given response. By contrast, a norm-oriented merit schema is 
one in which an object’s status of meriting a response would be a relational property 
determined by and derivative upon the satisfaction of some further normative consideration. 
For example, we might say that a dutiful action merits praise insofar as such a response will 
be conducive to further dutiful behavior: in this case, what makes it the case that the object 
merits praise is the relational property of being such that favoring it will satisfy some further 
normative criteria, such as promoting dutiful action.  
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Now, whatever prospects it might have for the recessive sentimentalist BPA, the 
norm-oriented meriting relation would no longer constitute a relation of attitude-to-object 
adequacy. For here we would not be getting the object right, so much as satisfying a set of 
norms to which the object is somehow related. Take as an analogy the normative schema of 
a game of “Tag,” in which a player is designated “It” until they tag another participant. 
When I am “It,” certain responses are called for or prescribed according to the rules of the 
game: e.g. the other participants are to evade being tagged by me. Now, in one sense, we 
might think it accurate to say that evasion is “called for” by the object of this response (in 
this case me) in virtue of my being “It.” However, what determines the fact that these 
responses are called for is not the object itself in virtue of its intrinsic properties. Rather, it is 
the rules of the game, together with my standing in relation to them by playing the game, 
which determine that the correct response to me is evasion. Likewise, in the case of norm-
oriented emotional adequation, it is not the object’s intrinsic properties that call for the 
attitude, but rather a set of norms that prescribing’ certain responses to the object in 
question. Properly speaking, it is the norms that call for a response to a given object, not the 
object itself.  
Now, I will examine the latter understanding of correctness in section 3, when I look 
at an attempt to analyze emotional correctness as the satisfaction of a general normative 
requirement. However, for our present purposes, if the meriting relation is to count as a kind 
of attitude-to-object adequation, then this type of meriting will not fit the bill. Only a merit 
schema based upon object-given merit could provide an account of attitude-to-object 
adequation. Insofar as this adequation relation is not a descriptive relation, but an irreducibly 
normative one, call this ‘object-oriented normative adequation.’  
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The problem with genuine cases of object-oriented meriting, however, is that they 
saddle the object with intrinsically normative properties that incur the exact same theoretical 
problems as substantive value properties. Take the example of disfavoring an act of 
recreational killing.  If the normative criteria that determine this response are grounded in 
the intrinsic properties of the object, then it must belong to the nature of these properties 
that they call for a disfavorable response. That is to say, in Mackie-style terms, the intrinsic 
properties of an act of recreational killing would somehow have “to-be-disfavoredness” built 
into these properties themselves. When applied to the relation between an object and the 
valence of a corresponding emotional attitude, we must say that X has the property of 
meriting attitudes with a positive or negative valence. In general, for any positively or negatively 
valenced attitude E of favoring some object x, if we say that E has the property of being 
called for by X’s intrinsic properties, then we also say that X’s intrinsic properties include the 
property of calling for E.  The result is that correctly favored objects would possess intrinsically 
normative properties that make essential reference to valenced responses: in Mackie-esque 
terms, it would belong to correctly admired objects that they possess intrinsic “to-be-
admiredness” as a substantive property.  
This result, of course, is unacceptable for a recessive sentimentalist BPA. For on a 
properly recessive buck passing picture, the substantive properties of objects we call good 
are supposed to consist of strictly non-normative natural properties, properties which derive 
their normative significance only by standing in certain reason-giving relations. It is the 
reason-giving relations that are thought to constitute irreducibly normative facts, not the 
worldly objects, properties, or states of affairs that stand in the reason-giving roles. 
However, on the present version of adequation, the intrinsic properties of an object are 
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made to constitute non-derivative normative criteria for evaluative responses: it simply 
belongs to the intrinsic nature of these properties that they merit or call for a given 
evaluative response. A good object, qua correctly favored object, would then be defined as 
an object that possesses intrinsically normative properties that make essential reference to 
evaluative categories: e.g. an “admirable” object would be an object that possesses intrinsic 
“to-be-admiredness,” a “lovable” object would possess intrinsic “to-be-lovedness,” etc.  The 
recessive sentimentalist BPA would then not only fail to be a genuinely reductive analysis of 
evaluative concepts insofar as the analysans would include unreduced evaluative terms, but it 
would also appeal to precisely the kind of queer, intrinsically normative properties that the 
BPA was meant to avoid. If the recessive sentimentalist BPA is going to remain a recessive 
analysis, then, it cannot be through an appeal to emotional correctness understand as 
adequation. 
 
 
 
3.1 Why Deontic Satisfaction Fails to Save the Recessive Sentimentalist BPA 
 
In order to avoid appealing to object-side value properties in accounting for emotional 
correctness, we might try to analyze a correct emotion in terms of all things considered 
deontic notion, like “ought” or “requirement” (or else “permissibility,” understood as the 
absence of a countervailing ought or requirement). On this view, favorable attitudes would 
be “correct” just insofar as they are required or permitted by some normative schema that sets 
deontic constraints on what ought to be (whether the latter is understood in agential deontic 
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terms—e.g. “Mary ought to help Tom”—or non-agential deontic terms—e.g. “It ought to 
be the case that Mary helps Tom”). Whatever normative criteria are thought to ground these 
deontic constraints—e.g. universalizability, promotion of pleasure, divine commands, etc.—
correct favorable attitudes could then be understood as a species of all phenomena required 
by these general norms. A “good” object, in turn, would be analyzable as the object of a 
favorable attitude that ought to be insofar as it satisfies these norms.  
On a first pass, the problem with analyzing a correct pro-attitude as one that satisfies 
some general deontic condition or constraint is that it appears to make correctness an 
essentially instrumental property of favorable attitudes, leading to cases where we ought to 
have pro-attitudes towards objects that we would not thereby consider good on this basis. In 
general, if having a favorable attitude towards X is conducive to some other object or state 
of affairs that ought to be, then insofar as we have a reason to realize this end, it seems we 
also have a reason to have this attitude, regardless of the evaluative status of X itself. For 
example, suppose that the evil demon threatens to destroy the planet unless we admire him. 
Assuming for now that we could admire the demon in this capacity, it seems plausible, ceteris 
paribus, to conclude that we ought to. The evil demon would thereby constitute the object of 
an attitude that “ought to be.” Applying a buck-passing analysis of value, we are led once 
again to the definitionally promiscuous result that the evil demon is good.  
Now, in order to block cases like this, we might stipulate that goodmaking favorable 
attitudes cannot redound to considerations that are external to the object in question. That 
is, we might say that the object of a required favorable attitude can only be called good if it is 
to be favored on account of its intrinsic properties. Michael J. Zimmerman has put forth an 
account of this kind. On Zimmerman’s account, to say that an object is correctly favored, 
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and thus good, is to say that there is a requirement to favor it. However, in order for a 
required favoring to be goodmaking, “we must also understand the pertinent favor or 
disfavor to be directed on to the state for its own sake, that is, for its being what it is . . . and 
not for the sake of its relation to some other valuable state.”49 We can formulate this account 
of correctness as follows: 
 
Favoring X is correct iff there is a requirement to favor X for its own sake 
 
In order to assess whether this modification is sufficient to avoid cases of definitional 
promiscuity, we must first clarify a fundamental ambiguity in claiming that the pertinent 
favoring must be directed on to the object “for its own sake.” For it is unclear whether this 
is only a claim about what properties can serve as the intentional object of the required 
attitude, or whether it is also a claim about why an attitude directed at these properties is 
required. To this end, it will help to first draw a distinction between the required-favoring and 
the favoring-requirement: The required-favoring would be the actual attitude that is required by the 
deontic schema; the favoring-requirement would be the rationale that specifies why the required-
favoring is required. The question, then, is whether the restriction that we favor some X “for 
the sake of” its intrinsic properties is only meant as a restriction on the object of the 
required-favoring, or whether it is also meant as a restriction on the criteria that determine 
the favoring-requirement. I’ll address each of these candidate strategies in turn. 
 
                                                        
49 Zimmerman (2001) p. 91 
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3.2 Required-Favoring and Intrinsic Properties 
 
The first possible solution to the threat of definitional promiscuity is to stipulate that the 
required-favoring cannot be directed at properties or states of affairs that are external to the 
object in question: only a required-favoring or disfavoring directed at a given object’s 
intrinsic properties can be said to make that object good or bad. This appears to be at least 
part of the solution that Zimmerman has in mind. As an illustration of his claim that 
goodmaking favorable attitudes must be directed onto something for its own sake, 
Zimmerman discusses the example of having reason to disfavor some otherwise intrinsically 
good state of affairs “because I’m aware that it will have terrible consequences.”50 In this 
case, he suggests, our attitude of disfavoring cannot make it the case that the state of affairs 
is intrinsically bad, as this attitude is not directed to the state’s intrinsic properties, but only 
to some further consideration external to that state; it is these consequences that are the 
proper object of our disfavor. In sum, only a favoring or disfavoring directed at an object’s 
intrinsic properties can make that object itself good or bad.  
While this stipulation may be a necessary condition for any fit-based account of 
goodmaking favorable attitudes, it is insufficient to ward off the problem of definitional 
promiscuity, as there are obvious cases in which we can be required to favor an object’s 
intrinsic properties without the object thereby being good for that reason. For example, 
suppose that the demon makes the demand that we favor him specifically on account of his 
intrinsic property of being disposed to cruelty, or else he will destroy the planet. The result 
                                                        
50 Zimmerman (2001) p. 91 
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would be that we are obligated or required to favor the demon on account of his intrinsic 
properties, and this in order to satisfy the ethical requirement that we should avoid 
catastrophe in such circumstances. The evil demon would then be the proper object of a 
favorable attitude that ought to be, and would thus be “good.” If one will object that in this 
case our attitude of favoring is not really directed towards the demon for his own sake, since 
the requirement for having this attitude is based in some further criteria extrinsic to the 
demon, this objection will not hold. For the fact that I am required to favor the demon in 
order to satisfy some further criteria, like avoiding catastrophe, does not make it the case 
that the required-favoring is itself directed at this criteria. We can draw this point into relief by 
schematizing the difference between required-favorings and favoring-requirements as 
follows: 
 
Required-Favoring: F = {Favor some object X on account of X’s intrinsic property set P} 
Favoring-Requirement: “S is required to F in order to satisfy some criteria C” 
 
As the foregoing shows, the object of the attitude I am required to have is logically 
distinguishable from the criteria that require me to have it. The fact that I am required to 
hold some attitude F for the sake of satisfying some criteria C does not make it the case that 
the attitude F that I am required to have is itself directed towards this criteria. For example, 
applying this schematic to the evil demon scenario, the required-favoring would be Fd = 
{Favor the demon on account of the demon’s intrinsic properties}, and the favoring-requirement would 
be “S is required to Fd in order to avoid a disastrous outcome.”  In this case, the reference to 
further valuable states is a feature not of the required-favoring itself, but rather belongs to 
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the deontic criteria that make it the case that this attitude is an ethical requirement. That is to 
say, the reference to extrinsic criteria is a feature of the favoring-requirement and not of the 
required-favoring.  Indeed, favoring the demon for his own sake, full stop, is precisely the 
attitude that will avert disaster, and is thereby precisely the attitude I am required to have. 
Unless we can furnish some further constraint on goodmaking favoring-requirements, we 
are led to the result that the evil demon can be correctly favored for his own sake, and would 
thereby be good. Appealing to constraints on required-favorings is thus insufficient to avoid 
definitional promiscuity. 
 
3.3 Favoring-Requirements and Intrinsic Properties 
 
The second possible deontic solution to definitional promiscuity is to claim that for any 
object deemed good, the relevant favoring-requirement cannot refer to considerations that are 
external to the intrinsic properties of that object. In other words, in addition to stipulating 
that the required-favoring must be directed at an object’s intrinsic properties, we would 
stipulate that the normative criteria that determine our ethical requirement to favor some X 
for its own sake must also consist only of X’s intrinsic properties. In this case, we could say 
that our requirement to favor the demon for his own sake in order to avert disaster is not a 
goodmaking requirement, as the criteria that determine this requirement consist of 
considerations that are external to the demon’s intrinsic properties. We can formulate this 
account as follows: 
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Favoring X is correct iff (i) there is a requirement to favor X for its intrinsic properties, and 
(ii) this requirement is explained by no other consideration than the fact that X’s intrinsic 
properties are such that they require that we favor X for these intrinsic properties 
 
While the present account appears to succeed in avoiding cases of definitional 
promiscuity, it only does so at the cost of forfeiting both a reductive analysis of value as well 
as the explanatory advantage of avoiding ontological queerness. For on the present account, 
an attitude of favoring some X on account of property p would be correct just insofar as it 
belongs to the intrinsic nature of p that it ought to be favored. This would be to establish a 
conceptual link between a substantive property P and a normative fact about the responses 
we should have toward something on account of P, such that the property has intrinsic 
“ought-to-be-favoredness,” “ought-to-be-lovedness,” “ought-to-be-hatedness,” etc. built 
into P itself. The result is that correctly favored objects would possess intrinsically normative 
properties that make essential reference to evaluative terms: for example, it would belong to 
correctly admired objects that they possess intrinsic “ought-to-be-admiredness” as a 
substantive property. But as we saw in the case of object-oriented adequation, this result is 
unacceptable for the recessive sentimentalist BPA. For on a properly recessive buck passing 
picture, the substantive properties of objects we call good are supposed to consist only of 
non-normative natural properties, properties which derive their normative significance only 
by standing in certain reason-giving relations. For example, a resort’s being pleasant is 
understood on the BPA to be a non-normative natural property of the resort in the same 
way that the fact that there will be dancing at the party is a non-normative property of the 
party. Each of these properties can give us reason to pursue or favor objects possessing 
these properties when the right reason-giving relations obtain: for instance, when we assume 
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that one has a reason to do what one likes and that one likes dancing. It is the reason-giving 
relations that are thought to constitute irreducibly normative facts, not the properties or 
states of affairs that stand in the reason-giving roles. However, on the present account of 
deontic goodmaking, the intrinsic properties of an object are made to constitute non-
derivative requirements for evaluative responses: it simply belongs to the intrinsic nature of 
these properties that they require me to take up a given evaluative response towards them. A 
good object, qua correctly favored object, would then be defined as an object that possesses 
intrinsically normative properties that make essential reference to evaluative categories: e.g. 
an “admirable” object would be an object that possesses intrinsic “ought-to-be-
admiredness,” a “lovable” object would possess intrinsic “ought-to-be-lovedness,” etc.  Here 
again, the recessive sentimentalist BPA would fail to be a genuinely reductive analysis of 
evaluative concepts insofar as the analysans would include unreduced evaluative terms, and 
would appeal to the kind of queer, intrinsically normative properties that the BPA was meant 
to avoid.  
 
4.1 Why Unanalyzability Fails to Save the Recessive Sentimentalist BPA 
 
The foregoing problems lead us to the suggestion that correctness is a primitive, 
unanalyzable feature of emotional attitudes. On this view, an object is called good just 
insofar as an attitude of favoring it bears the feature of being correct, where this feature 
permits of no further analysis. To borrow deontic language, we can say that correct attitudes 
are such that when directed at certain objects, they are directed as they ought to be, except that 
the criteria that determines how the attitude ought to be directed is self-imposed by the 
 56 
nature of the attitude itself, and not by the satisfaction of any extra-attitudinal norms or 
adequational correspondence to object-side properties. A classic account explicitly motivated 
by this notion of emotional correctness can be found in Franz Brentano’s The Origin of the 
Knowledge of Right and Wrong. As Brentano claims:  
 
If we call [nennen] an object good … we do not thereby want to add a further 
determination [Bestimmung] to the determinations of the thing in question … If we 
call certain objects good, and others bad, we say no more than that whoever loves 
this, hates that, is correct to do so [verhalte sich richtig].51 
 
In construing emotional correctness as an unanalyzable property of emotional attitudes, the 
idea is that it is a constitutive feature of some emotional attitudes that they are directed as 
they ought to be when formed in response to certain properties, and directed as they ought 
to not to be when formed in response to others. For example, on this account, we would say 
that it belongs to the nature of favorable attitudes that they are correct when directed at 
generosity and incorrect when directed at cowardice. While the properties of an object 
thereby function as constraints on the attitudes it would be correct to have towards it, and in 
this sense can be said to give us reasons to favor or disfavor it, this is not to say that an 
emotional attitude is correct insofar as it is adequate to or required by any intrinsically to-be-
favored properties of its object. As McHugh and Way put the point, “the fittingness of a 
response is a matter of the satisfaction of a certain standard, internal to that response.” As 
McHugh and Way go on to elaborate: 
 
                                                        
51 Brentano (1952) p. 144 
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Take a specific attitude, like admiration. This attitude sets a standard for objects. The 
standard specifies certain features, having enough (or an appropriate weighted sum) 
of which makes an object fit to admire—that is, admirable. For example, features like 
humility and concern for others may be on the list for admiration. The demon is 
notably lacking in these sorts of features. Thus, it is not fitting to admire him.52 
 
On this account, the evil demon is not the kind of thing that can be correctly admired, 
because admiration is not the kind of attitude that can be correctly directed at an object 
having the finite property set possessed by the demon. In this way, correctness is a 
normatively self-imposing feature of an emotional attitude: it is the attitude, and not the 
object, that specifies its own conditions of correctness. The upshot is that we can avoid cases 
of definitional promiscuity without appealing to evaluatively-laden object-side properties or 
extra-attitudinal deontic requirements that are susceptible to WKR problems. For on this 
picture, emotional correctness is taken to be explanatory bedrock: it is simply a fact about 
certain emotional attitudes that they are as they ought to be when directed at objects with 
certain properties, and incorrect otherwise. As A.C. Ewing (1947) sums up this point: 
“Certain characteristics are such that the fitting response to what possesses them is a pro-
attitude, and that is all there is to it.”53 
 
4.2 Unanalyzability and Ontological Parsimony 
 
Now, whatever the independent merits of such a view might be, it runs afoul of the 
explanatory advantages that reductive buck passing analyses purport to have over value-
                                                        
52 McHugh and Way (2016) p. 12 
53 Ewing (1947) p. 172; cf. 157-58 
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based axiologies. First, if the recessive sentimentalist BPA is motivated in part by ontological 
concerns over the explanatory profligacy and “queerness” of substantive value properties, 
then appealing to an unanalyzable primitive feature of mental states will incur the same 
problems. On the present account, the evil demon would be “bad” not just because he 
possesses certain natural properties—say for example the property of being disposed 
towards recreational killing—but also insofar as the attitude of disfavoring him on account 
of these natural properties bears a numerically distinct property, the primitive property of 
correctness. We thereby avoid adding a substantive property to objects we call good only at the 
expense of adding one elsewhere—specifically, to the emotional attitude itself now considered as 
a psychological entity and an object of inner perception. The result is just as ontologically 
profligate as that of value-based axiologies: in addition to the natural properties that are 
thought to give us reasons to respond in certain ways, a new class of irreducibly normative 
properties is posited as part of the furniture of the universe such that we can explain why 
some reasons are good-making and not others. Thus, while “goodness” or “badness” may 
remain a merely formal term on the present account, “correctness” must now be given its 
own ontological purchase. Furthermore, if we accept the parsimonious brand of naturalism 
that often motivates reductive buck-passing analyses, then the properties we are adding to 
our ontology look to be just as ontologically queer as substantive value properties are 
accused of being.  For on the present account, objects are called good insofar as favorable 
attitudes directed towards them are directed as they should be, where the latter “should” is an 
irreducibly normative and unanalyzable feature that is self-imposed by the attitude itself. But 
if the problem with positing substantive value properties is that we posit properties with 
intrinsically prescriptive features unlike the familiar entities of our present scientific 
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paradigm, then positing an unanalyzable property of correctness on our mental states incurs 
the same problem. In Mackie-style terms, making correctness an unanalyzable and primitive 
feature of emotional attitudes would entail that a correct emotion somehow has the 
intrinsically normative features of “to-be-ness” or “ought-ness” built into the attitude itself. 
When compared to its value-based competitors, then, the question of how value predicates 
are metaphysically grounded on this version of the fit-based analysis remains just as 
explanatorily profligate and just as ontologically queer. 
 
4.3 Unanalyzability and Epistemic Worries 
 
Second, and in tandem with these ontological concerns, construing emotional correctness as 
an unanalyzable primitive also incurs epistemological problems parallel to the kind often 
levelled against value-based axiologies. For unless we are to forfeit our claim to moral 
knowledge, emotional correctness is a feature of which we must be aware in order for the 
object of the emotion to be judged good. Upon the present account, however, the 
correctness of an attitude can be given neither by the awareness of some object-side 
correlate property, nor by the awareness that some extra-attitudinal normative criteria are 
satisfied. Rather, correctness on this account is supposed to be an unanalyzable and 
irreducibly normative property of the attitude itself, which raises the question of how exactly 
we are supposed to have epistemic access to it. How do we know, for example, that 
admiration is correct when directed at the kind of properties that McHugh and Way 
suppose? The fact that correctness is presumed to be a feature of psychological states that 
are accessible in inner perception does not settle this issue. Just because a given thing is 
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perceptible in virtue of some of its properties, it does not follow that all of its features or 
properties are thereby known on that basis. Thus, just because the feature of correctness is 
thought to characterize an object that we can access in inner perception—namely, an 
emotional attitude—this does not resolve the question of how it is that we have epistemic 
access to this feature in particular—that is, to the correctness of the attitude.  The apparent 
difficulty in explaining our epistemic access to the correctness of an attitude, however, is that 
correctness, qua unanalyzable and irreducibly normative, does not seem to be of the same 
ontological kind as our ordinary empirically perceptible psychological contents. In his review 
of Brentano’s 1902 Origin, G.E. Moore raises concerns about precisely this issue: 
 
Obviously the conception of ‘good,’ as Brentano defines it, cannot be derived merely 
from the experience of loving, but only from that of ‘right loving’ – from the 
perception of the rightness [or correctness] of a love: its origin cannot be merely the 
perception of a love which is right but in which this quality is not perceived, it can 
only be a perception in which this quality is itself contained. But…[t]he quality of 
“rightness” is not a psychical content and the perception of it is not an impression in 
the ordinary sense of these words. A single mark is sufficient to distinguish it: by a 
“psychical content” we always mean at least an existent, and by “impression” the 
cognition of an existent, and “rightness” is not an existent.54 
 
 
As Moore’s remarks indicate, upon the presumption of a fit-based analysis of value like 
Brentano’s, the possibility of our knowledge of the good would require that the distinction 
between a correct emotion and an emotion in general must be surveyable, which means that 
the property of correctness must be an epistemically accessible feature of the emotional 
attitude itself. As the awareness of an unanalyzable primitive that sets normative constraints 
on good-making reasons for having favorable attitudes, the awareness of the correctness of 
                                                        
54 Moore (1903b) p. 117; italics original. 
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an attitude would amount to something like the perception of an irreducibly normative 
property. The idea that normative properties are perceptible, however, leads to one of two 
possibilities depending upon how we understand the nature of this kind of perception, each 
of which is problematic for a buck passing analysis. 
In the first option—one alluded to by Moore as a non-starter due to his own non-
naturalist commitments—we must suppose that correctness is perceptible in the same 
manner as all objects of descriptive empirical psychology: that is, as an object of inner 
perception and a real constituent of occurrent psychological states (what Moore, following 
Brentano, refers to as a “psychical content”), thereby rendering correctness an empirically 
contingent fact (or “existent” in Moore’s language). On this account, the primitive property 
of correctness would not merely supervene on the empirical properties of our psychological 
states, but would itself be an empirical property—we can call this the correctness-property. The 
evaluative status of an object would thus be determined by and explanatorily reducible to 
empirically contingent facts about occurrent psychological states: namely, whether they 
include the correctness-property as a real constituent. 
Now, pace Moore, the problem with this picture is not necessarily that it leads to a 
kind of naturalism, but rather that it does so in a way that makes evaluative status 
perniciously arbitrary. Recall that on the present account, attitudes towards some object are 
correct just insofar as they bear the property of correctness as a primitive feature, where this 
has no further explanatory basis in adequation to object-side correlates or satisfaction of 
extra-attitudinal deontic norms. If we then make the further assumption that this primitive 
feature is an empirical property of occurrent psychological states, then whether any given x is 
good or bad depends only upon the empirically contingent matter of whether a given pro-
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attitude or con-attitude towards x happens to exhibit this discrete property. For example, 
recreational killing would be “bad” only to the extent that a con-attitude towards recreational 
killing happens to bear the correctness-property among its empirically surveyable features. 
The problem is that without extra-attitudinal normative constraints, nothing in principle 
rules out the possibility that a complete description of the natural world could include an 
instance where the attitude of favoring recreational killing also bears this empirical property. 
In such a case, we would be committed to holding that recreational killing is “good.” If we 
try to rule out this possibility by claiming that the properties of recreational killing are 
somehow disfavorable by nature, such that they could never be correctly favored, then we 
slide back into an account of correctness as adequation: in order to explain why some things 
are correctly favored and others correctly disfavored, we must posit evaluatively-laden 
object-side properties, either as essentially favorable or disfavorable monadic properties or 
else as relational properties of meriting favorable or disfavorable attitudes. In either case, 
positing such properties would forfeit a genuinely reductive analysis: the analysans of 
concepts like good and bad would make reference to unreduced value terms. Without such 
properties, however, the possibility that recreational killing can be correctly favored always 
looms. The best we can hope for is an inductive generalization that this will never happen 
based upon prior experience. But insofar as such a case is even conceptually possible, 
evaluative status on this account looks to be normatively arbitrary in a way that few will 
accept. 
In the second option, we avoid the foregoing problems by accepting a difference in 
kind between empirical properties and the property of emotional correctness, but then face 
the challenge of explaining how our perception of the latter is possible if not by positing a 
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special epistemic faculty capable of tracking the irreducibly normative features of our mental 
states. On this score, the fit-based analysis once again loses any presumed advantage of 
explanatory parsimony over value-based theories: If value-based axiologies were 
objectionable on the grounds that they face the challenge of explaining our knowledge of the 
good without positing “queer” faculties of the mind utterly unlike our ordinary ways of 
accessing the world, the present version of the fit-based analysis faces the same challenge. 
Whether this challenge can be met, of course, is beside the point. That is to say, perhaps we 
can explain how a normative property like emotional correctness is perceptible in a way that 
is continuous with our ordinary epistemic faculties. Terrance Cuneo (2003), for example, 
argues that we can come to indirectly perceive the higher-order moral properties of states of 
affairs through our direct perception of the non-moral empirical properties upon which 
these moral properties supervene. For instance, it is through my empirical perception of the 
non-moral properties that underlie a group of teens causing pain to a cat for fun—e.g. bodily 
movements indicative of pain, smiling faces indicative of pleasure taken in the pain, etc.—
together with my conceptual understanding of the moral wrongness of any states of affairs 
bearing these property types, that I come to apprehend the moral status of this particular 
state of affairs. Assuming such a strategy were defensible, it would then be open to the fit-
based analysis to adapt this model to the perception of emotional correctness: e.g. one might 
argue that it is through the inner perception of certain lower-order empirical properties of 
our mental states that we come to indirectly perceive the higher-order property of 
correctness. The problem, of course, is that taking the latter strategy on behalf of the 
recessive sentimentalist BPA would thereby grant its viability for a value-based account as 
well; indeed, accounts like Cuneo’s are meant to extend to the perception of sui generis 
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evaluative properties. On the issue of whether we can access irreducibly normative 
properties without positing queer epistemic faculties, then, the primitive-fit-based analysis 
and value-based axiologies are either happy bedfellows or partners in crime. In either case, 
the recessive sentimentalist BPA fails to demonstrate an explanatory advantage over its 
value-based rivals. 
 
 
Conclusion: Why Recessive Sentimentalism Fails 
 
Each account of emotional correctness we’ve considered fails to meet at least one of the 
success conditions for a properly recessive analysis of value. First, as we just saw, appealing 
to an unanalyzable notion of correctness inherits all of the explanatory burdens of value-
based axiologies that the recessive sentimentalist analysis was meant to overcome. Second, 
making emotional correctness parasitic upon the satisfaction of normative requirements 
either (i) allows object-independent normative criteria and thus leads to cases of definitional 
promiscuity, or else (ii) restricts the normative criteria to the intrinsic properties of an object 
but thereby forces us to saddle objects with instrinsically normative substantive properties—
e.g. intrinsic to-be-favoredness.  And finally, appealing to a relation of adequacy between an 
emotion either (i) entails positive unreduced object-side value properties on a descriptive 
account of adequation, or else (ii), on an irreducibly normative account of adequation, entails 
positing intrinsically normative substantive properties no different from those thought 
objectionable on the value-based picture. Having undercut the idea that recessive analyses 
hold an abductive advantage over value-based axiologies on two principle claims, I now turn 
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to develop a substantive realist sentimentalist account of the relationship between values and 
emotions. On this view, emotional states are perceptions of values. 
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PART TWO 
 
SEEING, FEELING, AND VALUES: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CASE FOR 
VALUE PERCEPUALISM 
 
Introduction: Intuitionism, Perceptualism, and Value 
 
After nearly a century out of the limelight, moral intuitionism is currently undergoing 
a revival.  According to the moral intuitionist broadly construed, there are at least some 
moral beliefs which are noninferentially justified on the basis of certain foundational mental 
states with unique epistemic properties—namely, intuitions—and this in such a way that is 
adequate for genuine moral knowledge. Once the preeminent metaethical theory, moral 
intuitionism’s wane in appeal throughout the mid twentieth-century largely tracks with the 
rise of logical empiricism and scientistic naturalism. Under the latter paradigms, not only 
moral intuitions, but the very notion of intuition in general was under attack. As Gary 
Gutting sums up this historical shift: “Analytic philosophy had begun with the rejection of 
special intellectual insights into the nature of reality.”55 In the moral domain, the classical 
intuitionist’s appeal to non-empirical knowledge of moral truths was deemed either 
meaningless or demonstrably false, thereby sparking a proliferation of non-cognitivist and 
error theoretic analyses of moral discourse. The rigid empiricism and naturalism that buoyed 
these metaethical theories, however, began to fall out of favor the more it became clear that 
                                                        
55 Gutting (1993) p. 5-6 
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such frameworks posed as much of a threat to the kinds of fundamental knowledge needed 
to make these very same theories intelligible—including, in particular, logical and 
mathematical knowledge. Towards the close of the century, a growing backlash of anti-
scientism created fertile conditions for a return of moral intuitionism. Explaining the 
“renewed interest in intuitionism,” Robert Audi (2004) writes that 
 
[A] half century’s response to W.V. Quine’s attack on the a priori, and indeed on the 
power of reason to reveal significant truths, have restored in many philosophers a 
certain sense of epistemological freedom...We have also recovered from the attack 
on the possibility of non-inferential knowledge, something that intuitionism in any 
major form...is committed to positing for certain moral propositions.56  
 
 
Recent cases for moral intuitionism have attempted to motivate the plausibility of 
noninferential moral knowledge by arguing that its prospects rise and fall with the plausibility 
of our ordinary ways of knowing anything whatsoever. These accounts often proceed by 
trying to show an affinity between moral intuitions and our principle avenue for 
noninferential justification—namely, perceptions. Michael Huemer (2005) has famously 
advanced one such so-called “perceptualist” account of moral intuitionism, arguing that 
moral intuitions and ordinary sensory perception alike draw from the same justificatory 
source from which all noninferential justification is ultimately drawn—namely, from what 
Huemer calls seemings: 
 
I take statements of the form “it seems to S that P” or “it appears to S that P” to 
describe a kind of propositional attitude, different from belief, of which sensory 
                                                        
56 Audi (2004) p. 2 
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experience, apparent memory, intuition, and apparent introspective awareness are 
species. This type of mental state may be termed an "appearance.”57 
 
 For Huemer, what distinguishes seemings from other propositional attitudes is the 
fact that they present their propositional contents with a “feeling of assertiveness” or 
“forcefulness”—a positing character that recommends belief but is not identical with belief.  In 
the absence of defeating considerations, Huemer argues, a seeming that p is a sufficient 
condition for a reason to believe that p. This is the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: 
 
If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some 
degree of justification for believing that p.58 
     
According to Huemer, while the reason giving force of all mental states ultimately 
consists in true seeming propositional content, propositional seemings can be drawn from a 
diverse range of etiologies. Some propositional seemings, namely, perceptions proper, 
consist in sensory appearances; others, namely what Huemer terms “intellectual 
appearances,” or “intuitions,” are obtained on the basis of thought alone: 
 
An initial, intellectual appearance is an ‘intuition’. That is, an intuition that p is a state of 
its seeming to one that p that is not dependent on inference from other beliefs and that 
results from thinking about p, as opposed to perceiving, remembering, or introspecting.59 
 
 
                                                        
57 Huemer (2007) p. 30 
58 ibid.  
59 Huemer (2005) p. 102 
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For Huemer, intuition is a non-empirical species of propositional seeming marked by 
its independence from inferential reasoning. Simply put, intuition is a matter of thinking 
thoughts that seem true.  Like all other propositional seemings, an intuition that p is a prima facie 
reason for a belief that p. Upon this account, what makes an intuition an ethical intuition is 
not some proprietary content over and above propositional content, but simply that the 
proposition that serves as its content is one with evaluative significance: “An ethical intuition 
is an intuition whose content is an evaluative proposition.”60 To the extent that we are capable 
of thinking propositions with evaluative significance, and to the extent that such thoughts 
are also capable of seeming true—Huemer gives the example “Pleasure is ceteris paribus better 
than pain”—then we are capable of having noninferentially justified ethical beliefs on the 
basis of intuition alone.  
Ethical intuitionists like Huemer are right to argue that the notion of moral intuition 
does not presuppose some queer, mystical faculty of moral knowledge, and indeed that 
moral knowledge can be derived in some of the same ways as our ordinary ways of knowing 
anything at all. The problem, however, is that Phenomenal Conservatism rests upon a 
fundamentally inadequate understanding of the ordinary ways in which we acquire 
noninferential knowledge. According to the Phenomenal Conservative, the ultimate source 
of noninferential justification consists in no other factor than the true seeming propositional 
content of mental states.  As we will see, however, by reducing the reason giving force of all 
mental states to such a criterion, the Phenomenal Conservative struggles to explain the 
privileged epistemic access that certain mental states appear to have to their objects over and 
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against other mental states: namely, that of making their objects directly present to the subject. 
This problem is not unique to Phenomenal Conservatism, but is part and parcel of any 
intellectualist theory of noninferential justification that attempts to account for the reason 
giving force of foundational mental states strictly in terms of propositional and/or 
conceptual contents and their ancillary features. In foreclosing the epistemic relevance of 
extra-conceptual content—including sensory-perceptual and affective content alike—such 
theories leave us with no resources to account for the distinction between the merely 
conceptual act of thinking that some proposition is true and that of enjoying some kind of 
direct experiential awareness of the very conditions in virtue of which the proposition is true. 
When applied to the domain of moral epistemology, such theories of noninferential 
justification thereby foreclose the possibility most in keeping with the evidence drawn from 
folk moral judgments—namely, that ethical intuitions are not primarily thought but felt, and 
that what is felt is some way the world is, evaluatively speaking. In other words, that 
evaluative truth is immediately given by way of irreducibly affective mental content.  
Such a presumption against an affective model of moral intuitionism can be traced to 
two prevailing intellectualist prejudices. The first concerns a pervasive assumption about 
what constitutes the intentionality of a mental state—in particular, what constitutes the kind of 
intentionality that gives a mental state a “cognitive” or “mind-to-world” direction of fit. 
Indeed, upon an objectivist account, whatever moral intuitions are, they turn upon a 
directedness to some way things actually are. When I attend to the wrongness of a deed or 
the goodness of a person, this involves my awareness of a range of objects and states of 
affairs. According to two standard views of emotions, however, feelings, qua affective 
contents, are not up to the task of presenting the world as it is. On the first view, any 
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awareness enabled by the affective contents of feelings would be confined to the merely 
subjective interiority of sensory experience (See James 1884; Lange 1885; Prinz 2004). On 
this picture, feelings are either reducible to representationally inert sense data, or else 
reducible to an awareness of such sensations. On the second prevailing view, certain 
emotional states are judgments, and thus possess world-directed intentionality, but they do 
so only in virtue of propositional contents (See Greenspan 1988; Nussbaum 2001; Roberts 
2003; Solomon 1976). Upon either view, when considered in virtue of their affective 
contents, feelings by themselves do not purport to open out onto the world to represent 
how things are outside of sensory experience itself. Thus, when considered as a source of 
noninferential justification for our ethical beliefs, feelings cannot be disclosive of objective 
moral truths, it is assumed, because feelings do not possess world-directed intentionality.  
The second major prejudice concerns the possibility of a priori moral truths. As many 
moral objectivists will agree, if ethics is to remain an objective and robustly action-guiding 
matter, it must make essential reference to at least some unconditional truths, facts, 
principles, or procedures that are not subject to the vicissitudes of empirical contingency. 
According to what we might refer to as the Formalist Prejudice, however, the realm of a 
priori knowledge is exhaustively conterminous with that of formal reason, with all else being 
relegated to a posteriori contingency.  Upon this view, even if we were to grant intentionality 
to the affective contents of mental acts, the epistemic relevance of such contents would be 
limited to disclosing those features of the world owing to its contingent natural constitution. 
Accordingly, any a priori ethical truth disclosed by an act of moral intuition must redound 
only to propositional or conceptual content that can be derived from the application of 
 72 
formal reason. Feelings cannot constitute our primary access to moral truth, then, unless we 
are to forfeit the a priori foundations of ethics. 
My aim in Parts II and III is to make some headway in developing an alternative 
metaethical framework that overcomes each of these intellectualist prejudices. Drawing upon 
the phenomenological frameworks of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, Part II provides an 
affective model of noninferential ethical knowledge, according to which our emotional 
experiences constitute evaluative perceptions of the world. On the broadly Husserlian account I 
defend, propositionally formulated moral judgments are merely empty acts of thought 
which, on their own, provide no justification whatsoever for believing their contents. In 
order to yield a reason for belief, such acts must be aided by intuitive acts of intentional feeling, 
which disclose the evaluative matter in question by way of irreducibly affective, non-
conceptual mental contents. On this view, the ethical intuition properly speaking consists 
not in the propositionally articulated thought that p, nor in the corresponding justified belief 
that p, but rather in the felt givenness of the evaluative matter itself—that is, in an evaluative 
perception, which can include both the simple perception of concrete particulars as well as the 
grasping of abstract universal facts. As sources of noninferential evaluative knowledge, 
evaluative perceptions are not intellectual appearances or true-seeming thoughts, but 
affectively-conditioned presentations—that is, intentional states of awareness in which we are 
immediately aware of the evaluative features of some intentional object.61 Building upon 
                                                        
61 I will follow the current if not unproblematic trend of reserving the term “presentation” for Husserl’s 
Gegenwärtigung and “representation” for Vergegenwärtigung, and this as to set off Husserl’s account of intuition 
from the representationalist theory of perception in anglophone philosophy. For an important discussion of the 
indelicacies of the presentation/representation parsing, see Uwe Meixner (2014). Since my aim will be to 
address Husserlian considerations to contemporary analytic metaethical debates, in which the term 
“presentational” carries a meaning approximating Husserl’s account, “presentation” will be contrasted against 
“representation.” 
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Husserl’s account of noninferential justification, I argue that it is in the joint recognition that 
things are immediately given in feeling as they are propositionally meant—namely, in acts of 
evaluative fulfillment—that we enjoy noninferential justification for our evaluative beliefs. We 
can formulate the thesis of Part II as follows: 
 
Affective Value Perceptualism: Some foundational evaluative beliefs are 
noninferentially justified in virtue of their propositional content being epistemically fulfilled 
through evaluative perceptions, which are irreducibly affective yet intentionally directed acts 
of feeling that constitute immediate epistemic access to the objective correlates of some 
first order evaluative claims, and this by way of non-conceptual yet intrinsically 
intentional affective contents. The objective correlates of evaluative perceptions are value 
properties. 
 
 
 
Part II will focus on the emotional perception of values without explicit 
consideration of their moral status, and in that sense can be taken as an argument in favor of 
value realism without providing an attendant theory of normative reasons needed for a 
robustly action-guiding account of ethical objectivity. However, the perceptualist case for 
value realism Part I lays the groundwork for a value-based moral realist framework complete 
with action-guiding normative reasons and a priori moral principles—something I turn to 
argue for in Part III. 
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1. Intuitions, Propositional Contents, and Seemings: A Failed Case for 
Perceptualism 
 
Moral intuitionists like Huemer are right to argue that moral intuition does not 
presuppose some mystical faculty of moral knowledge, and indeed that moral knowledge can 
be derived in some of the same ways as our ordinary ways of knowing anything at all. The 
problem, however, is that Phenomenal Conservatism rests upon a fundamentally inadequate 
understanding of the ordinary ways in which we acquire noninferential knowledge. 
According to the Phenomenal Conservative, the ultimate source of noninferential 
justification consists in no other factor than the true seeming propositional content of 
mental states. What this leaves out is some account of the privileged epistemic access that 
certain mental states appear to have to their objects over and against other mental states: 
namely, that of making their objects directly present to the subject. The result is that 
Phenomenal Conservatism cannot explain the obvious evidential disparity between, on the 
one hand, a subject who merely entertains a true seeming proposition about some remote 
state of affairs, and, on the other, a subject who enjoys the unique evidential position of 
being directly presented with the state of affairs itself.   
Compare, for instance, a subject who believes it is snowing outside on the basis of 
trustworthy secondhand testimony, and a subject who believes it is snowing outside because 
he goes outside and sees falling snow. According to Huemer’s account, in the absence of 
defeating considerations, both subjects are prima facie justified in believing that it is snowing 
outside for what is ultimately the exact same reason: though the etiologies are different, they 
each undergo a mental state with propositional content that seems true. In the first case, the 
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seeming that P accrues from the trustworthiness of the testimony that P; in the second case, 
the seeming that P consists in the visual appearance that P.  
Now, to be sure, Huemer would undoubtedly agree that the two subjects have 
drastically different degrees of justification, and his explanation for this is simply that “Some 
appearances are stronger than others—as we say, some things are 'more obvious' than others.”62 
In the foregoing case, then, Huemer thinks we can readily see that the perceptual subject’s 
evidence “naturally” presents a stronger degree of seeming than that of the testimonial 
subject. Assuming the latter is true, however, the question is why the perceptual case should 
have a stronger degree of seeming and thus confer greater justification than certain other 
kinds of seemings, and it is this question that the Phenomenal Conservative appears unable 
answer. For according to the Phenomenal Conservative, sensory perceptions are essentially 
defined as a species of propositional seemings: all it means for a mental state to be a sensory 
perception is that it has true seeming propositional content that is implicated with sensory 
experience. While sensory perceptions are differentiated from other propositional seemings 
on the basis of their ancillary sensory features, none of those features are taken to be 
relevant to its epistemic value: all of the epistemic heavy lifting is being done on this account 
by no other feature than the seeming true of propositional content.  What this suggests is 
that there is nothing unique about perceptions qua perceptions which gives them the reason-
giving force they have over and against other mental states. It therefore remains a total 
accident that a sensory perceptual seeming that it is snowing outside should present a 
stronger degree of seeming and confer greater evidential support than a seeming on the basis 
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of testimony, or any other comparatively weaker species of seeming for that matter. 
Huemer’s explanation thus amounts to the bald claim that sensory perceptions just so happen 
to present a greater degree of seeming than certain other kinds of seemings. Such a position 
is not only unsatisfying; it completely overlooks the unique epistemic connection that 
perceptions that p have to the truthmakers of beliefs that p: namely, that of positing their 
objects as being present before the subject.  By reducing noninferential justification to 
propositional seemings, Huemer has no resources to account for the connection between a 
perceptual seeming that p and its actually being the case that p, and thus we are left with the 
view that perceptions that p just so happen to confer the degree of justification they do for 
beliefs that p.  
When we apply these considerations to the Phenomenal Conservative’s model of 
evaluative intuitions and evaluative beliefs, we run into an analogue of the very same 
problem.  For example, consider a child who comes to believe that inflicting pain on the 
family cat is morally wrong, and this solely on the basis of the fact that his parents tell him 
so. Suppose that while the child has a minimal grasp of basic moral facts and deontic 
predicates such as “right” and “wrong,” he is not yet able to make the associations needed to 
see the moral import of this particular situation for himself. Nevertheless, given that his 
parents have proven to be reliable sources with respect to a range of other propositions, the 
moral proposition in question seems true to him, and so on this basis he believes, with some 
degree of justification, that torturing the family cat is in fact wrong.  Now compare this child 
to the mature adult who believes that torturing the family cat is morally wrong not on the 
basis of secondhand testimony, but because she herself is aware of the moral facts that make 
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such an action wrong, and this insofar as she is, say, aware of the fact that actions causing 
pain for its own sake are, ceteris paribus, not to be pursued.  
Here again, the Phenomenal Conservative would hold that the mature adult and the 
child alike are each justified in their moral belief for exactly the same reason: they both 
entertain evaluative propositional content that seems true. Granting that both the child and 
the mature adult are indeed justified in their respective beliefs, the question is whether they 
enjoy significantly different degrees of justification, and it seems obvious that they do. The 
problem, as before, is that the Phenomenal Conservative does not have the resources to 
explain why the mature subject is more justified than the child, and why an intuition that P 
should constitute comparatively greater evidence than a seeming based upon secondhand 
testimony that P. For the Phenomenal Conservative, intuition is just another species of 
propositional seeming: all it means for a mental state to be an intuition or a perception is that 
it has true seeming propositional content that is generated “intellectually”—that is, generated 
on the basis of “initial” thinking that is neither empirically, introspectively, nor inferentially 
informed. But as with the case of perception, none of the proprietary features that 
distinguish intuition as intuition are thought to account for its reason giving force; the sole 
epistemic weight of such mental states, it is assumed, consists in no other feature than its 
true seeming propositional content.63  Now, to be sure, Phenomenal Conservatives like 
Huemer would no doubt agree that the subject of the moral intuition is drastically more 
justified than the subject of the secondhand moral testimony, and this inasmuch as the 
former enjoys a “stronger degree of seeming” than the latter.  And yet insofar as the 
                                                        
63 As Huemer claims: “An ethical intuition is an intuition whose content is an evaluative proposition.” (2005) p. 
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Phenomenal Conservative appeals to no other sources of justification than true seeming 
propositional content, it is left as a mystery why the propositional content of the moral 
intuition should more clearly seem true than that of the secondhand testimony, or any other 
less true seeming propositional attitude for that matter.  The only explanation that can be 
given is that intuitions just so happen to bear a greater degree of seeming and thus just so happen 
to confer a greater degree of justification than certain other non-intuitive mental states.  
As with the case of perception, the Phenomenal Conservative’s account of intuition 
severely understates their reason-giving force. For what characterizes paradigmatic cases of 
intuition is not that they merely seem true, but that their content somehow provides direct 
access to their truthmakers. Consider intuitions with the following propositional contents: 
“The same patch cannot be simultaneously red and green” or  “There is no color without 
extension.” Surely there is a sense in which these propositions “seem true.” However, to rest 
their justification on this fact would be to grossly underestimate their epistemic status. For 
I’m not justified in believing that these proposition are true on the basis of entertaining 
propositional content that only incidentally seems true. I’m justified, for instance, because I 
can vividly imagine red, then vividly imagine green, and then, on the basis of those joint 
experiences, I can see that redness and greenness cannot properly coincide. Likewise for the 
proposition “No color is without extension.” The proposition doesn’t merely seem true, but 
rather, to the extent that I can recognize that reducing an instance of a color to absolute zero 
extension would preclude the instantiation of that color, I can see that the proposition must 
be true, and indeed that its negation must be false. In each case, what justifies the belief that 
p is not that the proposition seems true, but rather that I can see that it is true, and this insofar 
as an intuition that p somehow enables direct access to the facts in virtue of which the 
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proposition is made true: in this case, essential facts about the nature of color. That and how 
intuitions afford such access is completely overlooked on the Phenomenal Conservative’s 
picture. 
If evaluative intuitions afford any privileged epistemic access to their truthmakers 
over and above certain non-intuitive evaluative states, then, no explanation of this 
affordance is given on Huemer’s Phenomenal Conservative brand of moral intuitionism. On 
the latter view, some evaluative propositional contents just so happen to seem true, and thus 
just so happen to confer justification. As a consequence, however, the Phenomenal 
Conservative cannot explain why some propositional attitudes should qualify for candidacy 
as intuitions but not others, and thus virtually any so-called “initial intellectual” state with 
evaluative propositional content, no matter how capricious the proposition, could 
theoretically qualify as a bona fide moral intuition provided that it happens to seem true. For 
example, consider a range of mental states with the following evaluative propositional 
contents: “It is sometimes permissible to sit”; “It is sometimes permissible to lie”; “Pain is 
ceteris paribus better than pleasure.”  All of these mental states involve tokening evaluative 
propositional content that is “intellectually” generated: that is, generated in virtue of simply 
thinking that p. Yet, clearly some propositions are prima facie more justified than others, and 
indeed it is arguable that propositional contents like “Pain is ceteris paribus better than 
pleasure” are simply incapable of conferring any prima facie justification at all. What explains 
this fact?  
Huemer thinks he can explain this by once again pointing to variations in degrees of 
seeming: “Not all intuitions are equal—some are more credible than others…[O]ne reason 
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for this is that some intuitions are simply stronger, or more clearly seem true, than others.”64  
Indeed, one may very well be right to claim that it more clearly seems true that “It is 
sometimes permissible to sit” than it does that “It is sometimes permissible to lie.”  
Moreover, I would even venture to assume that it has never seemed true to anyone that “Pain 
is ceteris paribus better than pleasure.” Such a proposition simply looks to be incapable of 
seeming true. Surely, then, it is true that the contents of some propositional attitudes are 
more true seeming than others, and true that some propositional contents are not capable of 
seeming true at all. However, none of this touches upon why it is that some propositional 
contents should “more clearly seem true” and not others, and thus there is no explanation of 
why an intellectual seeming that p should count in favor of a belief that p, nor why the fact 
that “Pain is ceteris paribus better than pleasure” never seems true should count against its 
possibly being true nonetheless. Without any account of the connection between its 
intuitively seeming that P and its actually being the case that P, it is left as a matter of pure 
accident that some intellectual mental states should confer a greater degree of justification 
than any other, and moreover a pure accident that some propositional attitudes should be 
excluded from candidacy as intuitions altogether.  
Such a result flies in the face of ordinary discourse, however. We don’t think it just 
accidental that “2+2=4” is true seeming and accidental that “Pain is ceteris paribus better than 
pleasure” is not true seeming. Rather, we generally think the forcefulness of such intuitions 
is imposed by our awareness of the things themselves. By reducing the noninferential 
justification of moral beliefs to the seeming true of propositional contents, however, the 
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Phemonenal Conservative cannot appeal to any connection between an intuition that p and 
its being the case that p, and thus lacks the resources to explain how we can ever move 
beyond the way things merely seem in order to see how things really are, morally speaking. 
That is to say, the Phenomenal Conservative has no account of moral insight.  
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From Seeming to Seeing:  
Perception, Fulfillment, and The Principle of All Principles 
 
The shortcomings of the foregoing account of moral intuitionism are not unique to 
Phenomenal Conservatism, but are part and parcel of any theory of noninferential 
justification that attempts to account for the reason giving force of foundational mental 
states strictly in terms of propositional contents and their ancillary features. In the domain of 
moral epistemology, the latter tendency can be traced to a predominant intellectualist strain 
of intuitionism represented by Henry Sidgwick, for whom moral intuitions are reducible to 
“propositions of real clearness and certainty.”65 On this view, intuition and justified belief are 
essentially conflated, as the immediate justification of epistemically basic moral propositions 
is a function of simply entertaining such propositions themselves, not of any direct 
awareness of the conditions in virtue of which the propositions are true.  As Dallas Willard 
(2002) observes, in “his failure to clarify the distinctions between proof, self-evidence, and 
intuition,” Sidgwick and his intellectualist scions neglected to consider whether “intuition 
might be a matter of perception-like insight into the subject matter which the proposition 
deals with, not of reflection on the proposition itself.”66 
Such an intellectualist tendency in moral epistemology runs parallel to a broader 
conceptualist prejudice about the reason giving status of mental contents in general. 
According to this prejudice, only mental contents that present how things are in the world 
can provide justification for beliefs about the world, and conceptual contents alone afford 
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such world-disclosive intentionality.67 As we saw in the case of Phenomenal Conservatism, 
however, the problem with such views is that they leave us with no resources to account for 
the distinction between merely thinking that p is the case and actually enjoying some kind of 
direct, privileged contact with its being the case that p. Unless we are to accept that simply 
thinking some proposition is true should give us reason to believe that it is true, the 
conceptualist is charged with explaining how reason-giving experiential states differ from a 
propositional attitude of mere thought, where the apparent difficulty in providing such an 
explanation is that the conceptualist has already forsworn the epistemic relevance of all 
extra-conceptual mental content. Pending such an explanation, it would appear that 
conceptual content underdetermines the reason-giving force of foundational experiential 
states. Of course, even if we grant that propositional contents are indeed insufficient sources 
of noninferential justification, the question remains: how do our experiential states provide 
reasons for belief, if not in virtue of conceptual content that can be inferentially linked to the 
belief in question? 
A fruitful answer can be found in Husserl’s notion of originary intuition and his 
attendant account of fulfillment. On Husserl’s theory, noninferential justification turns upon 
the contribution of a distinctive type of mental content afforded by acts of “intuition” 
[Anschauung].  In sharp contrast with Huemer’s account, intuitive contents do not yield mere 
seemings or appearances of objects, but are those contents in virtue of which an object is 
immediately given to me.  As Jaakko Hintikka (2003) summarizes this aspect of Husserl’s 
                                                        
67 See McDowell 1994 and Brewer 2001 for classic conceptualist accounts. It is worth noting here that both 
McDowell and Brewer have since come to change their views significantly. For a recent account, see Bengson, 
Grube, and Korman 2011. 
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thought, intuitions “are the interface of consciousness and of the object of consciousness” and 
thus “What is given in intuition for Husserl are components of reality, not our impressions 
of them...It is the medium in which reality impinges on my consciousness.”68 In other words, 
in intuition, I don’t represent an object, as through some mediating sign or mental image; 
rather, in intuition, the object itself is immediately present to me. In this way, upon a Husserlian 
framework, the ultimate source of noninferential justification is not to be understood in the 
idiom of seemings that p, but rather in that of seeings that p:  
 
Immediately "seeing”—not merely sensuous, experiential seeing, but seeing in general, i.e. any kind 
of consciousness that affords [something] in an originary fashion—is the ultimate source of 
legitimacy of all rational claims.69 
 
 
To be sure, not all intuitions are “seeings” in the sense required for immediate 
justification.  For example, intuitive acts of imagining that p also give their objects, but do not 
posit them as concretely existing. Certain intuitions, however, not only posit their objects as 
existing, but posit them as being actually present before the subject—namely, originary 
intuitions. As we’ll see, upon Husserl‘s theory, originary intuitions are not restricted to the 
simple perception of physical objects, but include the immediate presentation of ideal 
objects of knowledge. In proportion to the degree of adequacy in which the object is given, 
an originary intuition that p is a source of prima facie justification for believing that p.  This is 
Husserl’s Principle of all Principles:     
 
                                                        
68 Hintikka (2003) p. 57-79 
69 Ideas I sec. 19. Emphasis in the original. 
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[T]he Principle of all Principles: that each intuition affording [something] in an originary 
way is a legitimate source of knowledge, that whatever presents itself to us in “Intuition” 
in an originary way (so to speak, in its actuality in person) is to be taken simply as what it 
affords itself as, but only within the limitations in which it affords itself there.70   
     
 
Now, while originary intuition is a necessary condition for noninferential 
justification, it is not a sufficient condition. In order to see how originary intuition serves as a 
noninferential justifier, we can now turn to examine how it operates within Husserl’s model 
of fulfillment.  
 
Epistemic Fulfillment: Suppose I am told that it is snowing outside. Under normal 
circumstances, in order to determine whether it is in fact snowing outside, I would simply go 
outside and look. Say that upon doing so, I have a perceptual experience of falling snow. 
Absent any defeating considerations, I now have a significantly greater degree of justification 
for believing that it is snowing outside than I did before I had the perception. 
On a Husserlian account, the foregoing sequence of noninferential justification 
consists of three distinguishable intentional acts.  First is the purely conceptual act of empty 
signification, which is exemplified in this case by the mere thought that it is snowing outside 
unattended by any perception of this state of affairs. A signifying act is marked by the fact 
that it intends its object in absentia through the use of signs: that is to say, the object is meant, 
but not given, through the propositional content signified by “It is snowing outside.” As an 
act of meaning, a signifying act not only determines an objective reference, but also provides 
the referent with a distinctive “interpretive sense” that specifies both the object and “the 
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precise way in which it is meant”—what Husserl terms the intentional matter of an act.71 For 
instance, while the thought that “It is snowing outside” and the thought that “It is 
precipitating outside” both refer to the same objective referent, they do so under distinct 
senses, and thus mean different things in virtue of their distinct intentional matters. Finally, 
in addition to specifying an intentional matter, the signifying act can also intend this matter 
under one of a number of differing act characters—what Husserl dubs an act’s respective 
“quality”—which determine how the intentional matter is being considered—including 
positing characters like that of believing that it is snowing outside and non-positing 
characters such as wondering whether it is snowing outside.  
The act of signification is an epistemically critical moment in the justificatory 
sequence, as a signifying act that p keys the subject’s awareness to the conditions that would 
make a belief that p true: the empty intention, so to speak, queues the target at which 
knowledge aims. What such a signifying act cannot do, however, is present those very 
truthmaking conditions themselves.  On its own, then, the signifying act possesses no 
positive epistemic value, which is reflected in the ordinary commonplace that simply thinking 
that something is the case does not by itself give us any reason to believe that it is so. As 
Husserl claims, in an empty intention “an act of meaning is performed...but nothing is 
thereby known, recognized.”72  
In order to yield a noninferential reason for belief, the empty intention needs the 
contribution of a second intentional moment: namely, the act of intuition.  In the foregoing 
case, the intuitive act is exemplified when I go outside and enjoy a sensory perception of 
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falling snow. Unlike the signitive act, which represents its object only indirectly through the 
mediation of signs, the intuitive act gives the object itself, and this in virtue of having 
different content over and above the merely conceptual act of thinking. In this way, the 
intuitive act “fills” the empty intention: it exhibits (whether adequately or partially) what the 
empty intention only signifies. To the extent that empty acts of thought have different act 
qualities, the intuitive fullness provided by the intuitive act can also have different qualities, 
including both positing and non-positing characters. Only a positing intuition that gives its 
object originarily, however, provides evidence for the empty thought it fulfills. Merely 
visualizing that it is snowing outside, for instance, is not the same as perceiving that it is. As a 
species of originary intuition, “Perception is that mode of consciousness that sees and has its 
object itself in the flesh.”73 That is to say, perception, like all originary intuition, is a source of 
noninferential justification. 
Now, while an originary intuition is a source of evidence for belief, it alone is not 
sufficient for justification. For example, suppose I go outside to see whether it is snowing, 
and in the course of doing so, I perceive a state of affairs that would fulfill the proposition 
that there is a blizzard outside. If I have no concept of a “blizzard” as a distinct species of 
the class of cases in which it is snowing outside, however, this presentation in and of itself 
gives me no justification for a belief that there is a blizzard outside. On their own, then, 
neither the empty intention that p nor the intuition that p enjoys reason giving status: an 
empty intention by itself lacks evidence; an originary intuition by itself amounts to 
unrecognized evidence. In order to furnish a reason for belief, there must be a third intentional 
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act—namely, the higher order act of fulfillment—in which an intuition that p and an empty 
act of meaning that same p are brought together in a synthesized recognition of the evidence 
as evidence. In fulfillment, Husserl claims, we “experience how the same objective item 
which was ‘merely thought of’ in symbol is now presented in intuition, and that it is now 
intuited as being precisely the determinate so-and-so that it was at first merely thought or 
meant to be.”74 In other words, fulfillment occurs when we are jointly aware of the fact that 
we find things in intuition to be exactly as they are intended in mere thought: 
 
 What the intention means, but presents only in more or less inauthentic and 
inadequate manner, the fulfillment—the act attaching itself to an intention, and 
offering it ‘fullness’ in the synthesis of fulfillment—sets directly before us...In 
fulfillment our experience is represented by the words: ‘This is the thing itself.’75 
  
On the foregoing model of fulfillment, it is no accident that the perceptual subject is 
drastically more justified than a non-perceptual subject in believing that it is snowing outside. 
For whereas the non-perceptual subject only intends the object emptily, the perceptual 
subject acquires the object of her intention “in its actuality” and “in person.”  Furthermore, 
the foregoing account not only accounts for the noninferential justification afforded by 
straightforward perception of empirical contingencies, but also has a story to tell about how 
we come to have a priori knowledge of universal facts and essential necessities—what 
Huemer would classify as knowledge from intuition qua “initial thinking.” This form of 
intuition—what Husserl terms eidetic intuition [Wesensschau]—begins from the simple intuition 
of particular objects and ascends to an intuitive awareness of the essential structures that 
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govern the entire class of objects in question—specifically, through a process of imaginative 
variation.  
Take, for example, the proposition “No color is without extension.”  Here, we begin 
with an intuition of some color, whether imagined or perceived, and then through a series of 
imagined variations in its extension, we reach the point of zero, at which point there is no 
longer any color content to be found in intuition. At this moment, the intention “No color is 
without extension” finds intuitive fulfillment: I see that this proposition is true because in 
every attempted variation, I can see that there is no color at the point of zero extension. In 
the process of varying the imagined content, the invariable features of a phenomenon are 
sifted out from its merely contingent permutations, at which point we gain intuitive access to 
the essential laws governing the phenomenon in question—e.g. the essential law that color 
requires extension.  As Richard Tieszen (2005) describes the process: “in the midst of all of 
our free variations we will come up against certain constraints, as though we have a swirling 
sea of changes around some islands of permanence.”76 It is these constants that circumscribe 
the essence of the phenomena in question.   
Now, while the process of variation may involve multiple acts of meaning, each act 
of variation depends upon fulfillment in a content of intuition. Once again, contra 
Phenomenal Conservatism, it is no accident that propositions like “No color is without 
extension” seem true—for we can see that they are true, and any seeming is mere 
epiphenomenon of the fact that we have direct awareness of the essential facts in virtue of 
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they are true. In this way, Husserl claims, eidetic intuition, like simple perception, is a form 
of seeing an object, albeit one that involves the help of multiple intentional acts: 
 
The essence (Eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or experiencing intuition 
is an individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is pure essence. Not a merely external 
analogy, but a radical community is present here. Seeing an essence is also precisely an 
intuition, just as an eidetic object is precisely an object.77  
 
For straightforward perception and eidetic intuition alike, then, the decisive moment 
of noninferential justification lies in the evidentiary contribution of intuitive content. Now, 
exactly how intuitive content makes this contribution in Husserl’s account—and, in 
particular, whether or not it does so in virtue of being intrinsically intentional—is matter of 
some complication. According to Husserl’s early position in the Logical Investigations, the 
phenomenal or intuitive contents of perceptual acts (such as color sensations) are 
intrinsically non-intentional sense data—or ”hyletic data”—that only serve a representational 
function insofar as they are intentionally animated through the operation of conceptual 
capacities.78 However, the later Husserl suggests that the conceptual apprehension of objects 
already depends upon their prior givenness in virtue of pre-conceptual sensuous unities, and 
that such sensory contents stand in informationally rich associative relationships which 
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adumbrate the layout of an environment that exceeds their individual nature: The painful 
sensation in my foot feels down there, in my lower body; The sound of the gunshot has felt 
location in relation to a kinesthetic center of field: it really sounds behind me, and it really 
sounds proximate as opposed to distant;  The sound of the approaching train, first experienced 
as remote and then as increasing in proximity, is not experienced as a perforated series of 
independent aural events—each of which must be inferentially linked together through a 
separate act of judgment in order to enable the perception of an oncoming object—but is 
rather experienced as a continuous unity of a single movement across a spatial field.  In 
keeping with a non-conceptualist account of perceptual intentionality, the later Husserl tells 
us that: “Perception has its own intentionality that as yet does not harbor anything of the 
active ego and of its constitutive accomplishment. For the intentionality of perception is 
rather presupposed in order for the ego to have something for which or against which it can 
decide.”79  
Upon either understanding of the way in which intuitive content contributes to 
fulfillment, what explains the reason-giving force of intuitive acts is the fact that they have 
different content over and above the purely conceptual content of empty intentions. In the 
case of straightforward perceptual intuition (and the eidetic intuition it founds), this intuitive 
content is provided through the sensory modalities. Returning to the epistemological 
foundations of moral intuitionism, if evaluative significations can be fulfilled by intuitions 
affording an originary givenness of their objects, then it must also be in virtue of exhibiting 
content above and beyond that of conceptual thought.  
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Values, however, are not the kinds of things that we ordinarily take to be delivered 
by way of sensory perception.  As Sayre-McCord (1996) puts the issue: “We don't seem to 
see, taste hear smell, or touch moral properties, nor do we seem to rely on common 
methods of empirical investigation and conﬁrmation to discover them.”80 How do we come 
to perceive values, then, if not through conceptual or sensory contents?  
If experimental moral psychology is any indication, the first person phenomenology 
of evaluation would suggest that values are given by way of feelings. Empirical studies suggest 
that the process by which lay subjects make moral judgments turns upon “feeling” or “gut 
intuition” (see Haidt 2001; Greene and Haidt 2002). When these subjects are pushed to 
explain how it is that they know that there are basic moral facts and that certain moral 
propositions are true, lay explanations generally terminate with the philosophically naive 
commonplace that it “It feels that way”—where feeling appears to be playing an epistemic 
role analogous to that of something’s looking a certain way.  As Jonathan Haidt summarizes 
these findings, the moral epistemology suggested by ordinary folk psychology is a “feels right 
ethics,” whereby “We use conscious reflection to mull over a problem until one side feels 
right. Then we stop.”81  
Now, if we were to take the putative deliverances of ordinary moral experience at 
face value, then it might appear that feeling affords a mode of intuition akin to sensory 
perception, one which purports to give us veridical epistemic access to basic evaluative 
properties and facts.  That is to say, feelings would constitute immediate presentations of 
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evaluative phenomena. According to Max Scheler, this is precisely the case. Feeling, in 
Scheler’s view, 
 
is a type of experiencing whose “objects” are completely inaccessible to reason; reason is 
as blind to them as ears and hearing are blind to colors. It is a kind of experience that 
leads us to genuinely objective objects and the eternal order among them, i.e., to values and 
the order of ranks among them [...] This feeling therefore has the same relation to its 
value-correlate as “representing” has to its “object,” namely, an intentional relation. 
Feeling originally intends its own kind of objects, namely, “values.”82    
   
For Scheler, feeling is a sui generis mode of intuition that affords proprietary access to 
evaluative properties and facts. If Scheler is right that affective contents are capable of giving 
intentional correlates, and if those correlates are truthmakers for our evaluative 
significations, then I submit that a suitably modified Husserlian model of epistemic 
fulfillment tells us how some evaluative beliefs are noninferentially justified. In what follows, 
I briefly lay out the epistemological mechanics of a phenomenological model of Evaluative 
Fulfillment, assuming for now what I turn to argue for in section 3: namely, that feelings do 
indeed possess their own intentionality independent from that of conceptual consciousness.    
 
Evaluative Fulfillment: Suppose I am told, for some particular state of affairs S, 
that “S is bad”—say, for example, a state of affairs in which an act of cruelty takes place for 
its own sake. On its own, my entertaining this proposition amounts to an empty act of 
evaluative signification.  If I wanted to know for myself whether the proposition I am 
entertaining is true, I would do the same thing I would do in the case of propositions about 
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whether it is snowing outside or propositions about whether the same patch can be both red 
and green: I would turn to the things themselves.  In order to accomplish this in the case of 
propositions about the value of a case of cruelty, I must turn to consider cruelty itself, 
whether by beholding an actual occurrence of cruelty, or by imagining some possible 
instantiation of it. A salient example can be found in the recollections of Dostoevsky’s Ivan 
Karamazov:  
 
People talk sometimes of bestial cruelty, but that's a great injustice and insult to the 
beasts; a beast can never be so cruel as a man, so artistically cruel. The tiger only tears 
and gnaws, that's all he can do [...] These Turks took a pleasure in torturing children [...] 
cutting the unborn child from the mother's womb, and tossing babies up in the air and 
catching them on the points of their bayonets before their mothers' eyes. Doing it before 
the mothers' eyes was what gave zest to the amusement. Here is another scene that I 
thought very interesting. Imagine a trembling mother with her baby in her arms, a circle 
of invading Turks around her. They've planned a diversion: they pet the baby, laugh to 
make it laugh. They succeed, the baby laughs. At that moment a Turk points a pistol four 
inches from the baby's face. The baby laughs with glee, holds out its little hands to the 
pistol, and he pulls the trigger in the baby's face and blows out its brains.83 
    
How does one come to see that the depicted act of cruelty is bad? First we must 
clarify that in virtue of which the intentional matter of “cruelty” is thought to obtain in 
Ivan’s depiction, abstracting away from the ancillary details of the situation. To this end, we 
can locate a set of descriptive conditions that make a given state of affairs an instance of 
cruelty for its own sake: e.g. the intentional infliction of physical and psychological pain for its 
own sake; amusement or satisfaction taken in the infliction of pain, etc. These descriptive 
conditions make up part of the intentional matter of the original meaning intention “Cruelty 
for its own sake is bad.” But there is another component of the intentional matter not 
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reducible to the descriptive features of the situation, a component that determines the 
precise way in which the object is meant: namely, its value. While the value of cruelty may 
supervene on certain descriptive conditions, it is not identical with these facts: when I intend 
the badness of an act of cruelty, I don’t just intend the bad-making features of cruelty. 
Rather, I intend the value itself as a distinct aspect of the presentation as a whole. The value 
of cruelty is given by way of a felt disclosure of a distinctive negative quality that registers on 
the object side of the intention, as a correlated feature of the conditions constituting an act of 
cruelty: that is to say, the act of cruelty shows up for me as something of disvalue.  I feel the 
negative value of cruelty, not as a mere effect on my sensible condition, but as a correlated 
aspect of the object of feeling. It is this felt aspect that provides the intuitive fullness 
necessary to satisfy the thought that the depicted instance of cruelty is bad.  To put it in the 
lay language of folk attitudes, I am able to know that the act of cruelty is bad because it feels 
that way.  
Now, to be sure, a simple perception of the badness of the act of cruelty depicted in 
Ivan’s story only gives me the value of this particular instance of cruelty, and thus by itself 
can only fulfill the proposition that this act of cruelty is bad. In order to fulfill the 
universalizing intention that cruelty tout court is bad, I must disentangle the contingent 
information of a particular instance of cruelty and attend to the essence of cruelty as such.  To 
this end, I must first isolate the necessary conditions that must obtain in order for cruelty to 
be instantiated. It is these essential conditions that then become the proper object to be 
evaluated. Here again, it is by virtue of a felt awareness of these essential conditions that the 
value of cruelty as such is given. By running these essential conditions through a process of 
imaginative variation, I can see that any of the stipulative variations needed to endow an 
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instance of cruelty with a positive affective valence would require adding some consideration 
or end beyond that of cruelty for its own sake that would violate the constraint imposed by 
the original meaning intention. For instance, I might imagine that torturing an innocent 
person could be the only way to appease an evil despot who is holding an entire population 
hostage; or, returning to the context of Ivan and Alyosha’s conversation, I might imagine 
some divine providence that necessitates such sacrifices. In such cases, however, the 
production of a felt positive valence involves the explosion of the intentional matter of 
“cruelty for its own sake.” For with the stipulation of maximizing considerations in one’s 
motives, the act of torture ceases to be a genuine instance of cruelty; and with the stipulation 
of a higher end, the cruelty in question ceases to be “for its own sake.”  
Insofar as the value cannot be varied positively without a change to the essence of 
cruelty, I can see that any imagined object that satisfies the essence of cruelty will necessarily 
enjoin a negative affective valence. While the process of imaginative variation may involve a 
number of distinct intentional acts, each fulfillment of an act of variation must make 
essential reference to an aspect of the intentional matter that can only be given through 
consultation with feeling.  In the same way that imaginative variation permits me to see that 
color without extension is impossible, I can see that cruelty for its own sake cannot be good 
in itself, and that cruelty for its own sake is bad.  
 On the foregoing phenomenological model of evaluative fulfillment, propositionally 
articulated moral judgments—e.g. “Cruelty for its own sake is bad;” “Pleasure is ceteris paribus 
better than pain” etc.—are purely signitive, empty acts of thought which, on their own, 
provide no justification whatsoever for believing their contents. In order to yield a reason for 
belief, such signitive acts must be aided by intuitive acts of feeling, which present the 
 97 
evaluative matter itself by way of irreducibly affective contents.  On this view, the evaluative 
perception, properly speaking, consists not in the propositionally articulated thought that p, 
nor in the corresponding justified belief that p, but rather in the felt givenness of the 
evaluative state of affairs that p represents. In considering the class of acts of cruelty, for 
instance, the badness of such acts is given to me, and this insofar as the essential features 
underlying cruelty show up under a distinctive negative valence that satisfies my intention 
that cruelty as such is bad: such a felt aspect is what I aim at when I emptily intend the 
badness of cruelty.  
Of course, this is not to suggest that all evaluative judgments can be directly justified 
on the basis of evaluative perception.  Some propositions—such as “The 2003 U.S. invasion 
of Iraq was wrong”—cannot be immediately justified on the basis of simple perception 
alone, as their justification is conditional upon a network of inferentially linked propositions 
that must also be justified, including, for example such propositions as “The invasion was 
unnecessary if there were no weapons of mass destruction;” “There were no weapons of 
mass destruction;” “Unnecessary killing and suffering is wrong.”  Nevertheless, even 
inferentially implicated evaluative propositions must ultimately make essential reference to 
an epistemically basic evaluative belief—for instance, “Unnecessary killing and suffering is 
wrong”—and thus their justificatory chain must trace to a simple intuition of a foundational 
evaluative fact. In this way, all propositional evaluative knowledge ultimately refers back to 
the givenness afforded by evaluative perceptions. 
Having an evaluative perception that p is, to be sure, only a necessary condition for 
having a reason to believe that p, not a sufficient condition.  The animal or the pre-discursive 
toddler subject to torture and abuse may be perfectly capable of seeing the negative value of 
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her condition, and thus of having an evaluative perception, yet may not necessarily have the 
conceptual framework required to be justified in forming a predicative belief that it is bad, let 
alone a belief in the universalizing claims that “Cruelty for its own sake is bad” or “Pain in 
itself is bad.”  Thus, we must be careful to distinguish the givenness of an object in a way 
that would satisfy some empty intention—i.e. the evidence—from the higher-order awareness 
that the object is being given as such—i.e. the awareness of the evidence as evidence. Accordingly, 
the evaluative perception becomes a legitimizing source of noninferential justification only 
when it is taken together with the empty intention in a co-ordinated act of evaluative fulfillment: 
i.e. the joint awareness that the evaluative matter I am thinking is also being given in feeling 
precisely as it is meant.  Without the signifying act, the evaluative intuition thus amounts to 
unrecognized evidence. But by the same token, without the evaluative perception, the 
evaluative signification amounts to a mere thought without any reason giving force.  It is 
only through the concerted effort of evaluative signification and evaluative perception in a 
higher order act of evaluative fulfillment that we have the kind of noninferential justification 
needed for evaluative knowledge.  We can formulate this account of noninferential 
evaluative justification as follows: 
 
Affective Value Perceptualism: Some foundational evaluative beliefs are 
noninferentially justified in virtue of their propositional content being epistemically 
fulfilled through evaluative perceptions, which are irreducibly affective yet intentionally 
directed acts of feeling that constitute “originary” epistemic access to the truthmaking 
conditions of some first order evaluative claims, and this by way of non-conceptual yet 
intrinsically intentional affective contents. The objective correlates of evaluative 
perceptions are value properties. 
 
 99 
Unlike a purely propositional account of justification such as Phenomenal 
Conservatism, upon a phenomenological model of evaluative perceptualism, we have the 
resources to explain why some evaluative mental states with true seeming content confer 
more justification than others—to explain why, for example, the mature adult has a greater 
degree of justification for his belief that torturing the family cat is wrong than the merely 
deferential child does.  For whereas the child only emptily intends the wrongness of the act, 
the evaluative perception of the mature adult presents the wrongness itself in its actuality: in 
fulfilling the propositional content “Cruelty for its own sake is wrong,” the value of the class 
of cruel acts is not just emptily meant, but is given, and this in virtue of a felt disclosure of the 
essential disvalue of cruelty (or, what is the same, in the explosion of the essence of cruelty 
with any stipulative variations in the intentional matter that would otherwise yield a felt 
disclosure of a positive value).  
Furthermore, unlike the Phenomenal Conservative, we also have the resources to 
explain why some propositional contents are incapable of prima facie justification on the basis 
of intuition—and so to explain why, for instance, propositions like “Pain for its own sake is 
good” are incapable of seeming true.  For on a phenomenological model of evaluative 
fulfillment, evaluative perceptions are not the consciousness of appearances of reality, but 
are rather the interface between consciousness and reality itself. Accordingly, an evaluative 
perception must be able to give what it is about. Insofar as the realm of well-formed empty 
intentions exceeds the realm of what can be exhibited as existing—e.g. absurd propositions 
referring to round-squares, etc.—then it follows from this that there are some propositions 
that cannot serve as the contents of prima facie justified beliefs inasmuch as their objects are 
not among “the total realm of possible fulfillment.”  Just in the same way that impossible 
 100 
objects like “round-square” and “completely red and completely green patch” can be emptily 
intended but never receive a fulfilling sense, propositional contents like “Pain is good for its 
own sake” would be incapable of prima facie justification and seeming true insofar as there is 
no possible object or state of affairs that could be its corresponding truthmaker, and thus no 
possible exhibiting content that could fulfill such intentions. Thus, evaluatively absurd 
propositions like “Pain is good for its own sake” cannot serve as the signifying contents of 
noninferentially justified beliefs not because it just so happens that they do not seem true, but 
rather because such intentions are incapable of receiving a fulfilling sense in virtue of a 
constraint imposed by the way things are. On this view, it is no accident that “Cruelty for its 
own sake is wrong” seems true and “Pain is good for its own sake” does not seem true: such 
states of seeming are necessitated by the facts themselves, insofar as such evaluative matters 
are among the purview of originary intuition. 
 By shifting the epistemic heavy lifting from propositional content to the givenness 
afforded by affective-intuitive content, the foregoing model of evaluative fulfillment 
provides a superior framework for moral intuitionism insofar as it is able to account for the 
reason giving connection between a belief that p, an intuition that p, and its actually being 
the case that p.  All of this, of course, hinges on our ability to legitimately hold affective 
content up to the task of disclosing objective value-correlates.  According to a prevailing 
prejudice on both sides of the metaethical debate, however, affectivity qua irreducibly 
phenomenal feeling is not typically taken to be the kind of thing that is disclosive of objective 
values, and this because feeling as such is not typically understood as the kind of thing that 
can be disclosive of any objective matters whatsoever.  
 101 
Such a presumption against a feeling-based model of objective moral evaluation can 
be traced back to intellectualist prejudices about what constitutes the kind of intentionality 
that gives a mental state a “cognitive” or “mind-to-world” direction of fit.  Indeed, upon a 
moral objectivist account, whatever moral judgments are, they seem to turn upon a 
directedness to some way things actually are in the world.  When I attend to the wrongness 
of a deed or the goodness of a person, I am always directed towards some way things are 
taken to be, where this involves my awareness of a range of certain objects, events, and 
states of affairs. But according to the intellectualist picture, such matters are the sole 
province of propositional and/or conceptual content. By contrast, when considered strictly 
in virtue of their affective-phenomenal nature, any awareness enabled by emotions qua 
feelings would appear to be confined to the merely subjective interiority of sensory 
experience.  On this picture, feelings are either reducible to representationally inert sense 
data, or else reducible to an awareness of such sensations. In either case, when considered in 
virtue of their strictly phenomenal characters, feelings by themselves do not purport to open 
out onto the world to represent how things are outside of sensory experience itself.  Feelings 
cannot be disclosive of objective values, it is assumed, because feelings do not possess 
cognitive, world-directed intentionality. 
In the next section I aim to make some headway in overcoming this intellectualist 
prejudice. By drawing upon the phenomenological frameworks of Husserl and Scheler, I 
attempt to outline and cultivate the prospects for a sui generis account of affective 
intentionality. Though what follows will focus on values in general—as opposed to moral 
values—the account of affective intentionality it advances will pave the way for a feeling-
based model of moral realism. 
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3.1 Affective Intentionality: Feeling Sensations, Feeling Acts, and Objects-as-Felt 
 
 Throughout his works, Husserl affirms that certain feelings are intentionally directed 
experiences, though he evolves in defining the nature and role of affective contents in the 
act structure of these feelings. Central to Husserl’s early account in the Logical Investigations is 
the distinction between a feeling-sensation [Gefühlsempfindung] and a feeling-act [Gefühlsakt]. 
Feeling-sensations—e.g. sensations constitutive of pleasure and pain—are generally 
construed along the lines of hyletic data: i.e. as intrinsically non-intentional, immanent (reell) 
contents of consciousness that can be representationally animated by virtue of being taken 
up into intentional acts and directed to an object. Feeling-acts, by contrast, are evaluative 
experiences of objects that have already been given through founding presentations, and are 
precisely those intentional acts in which feeling-sensations are taken up and referred to 
intentional objects: e.g. joy, sadness, hate, love, etc. In general, for the early Husserl, feeling-
sensations are to feeling-acts as sensory data are to sensory perceptual acts.  
By the time of Ideas II, however, Husserl provides a significantly more nuanced 
picture. Here Husserl suggests that there is a class of non-objectifying sensations that are 
already consciously manifest—what Husserl refers to as belonging to a “primal sphere of 
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intentionality.”84 The interoceptive experience of feeling a toothache is one such example, as 
we can distinguish the consciousness involved in the simple painful toothache-sensation 
from the consciousness involved in our being intentionally directed towards this sensation in 
a complex feeling-act—e.g. turning towards this experience, say, as having a bodily location, 
or as the site of further feelings of discomfort or frustration. Now, while Husserl refers to 
such experiences as feeling-sensations, interpreting the simple experience of pain in terms of 
yet-to-be-animated hyletic data is problematic within the classical Husserlian framework, 
insofar as pain is something that is already manifest in awareness such that we can turn 
towards it in a complex feeling act. As Daniel O. Dahlstrom (2016) claims: “Hyletic data are 
not directly perceived at all...and, as components of sensory perceptual experiences, they are 
different from the properties of what is perceived...By contrast, we can be acutely aware of 
the pain or thirst making up an interoception.”85 And yet pain cannot be accurately rendered 
as a feeling-act either, insofar as it does not intend an object besides itself. Reconstructing 
Husserl’s often underdeveloped discussions of interoceptions, Dahlstrom proposes instead 
that ”Husserl differentiates a simple, pre-intentional from a complex, intentional experience 
of pain.”86 Converging with this reading, Geniusas argues that for Husserl ”[t]he 
intentionality of pain is founded upon pain’s pre-intentional givenness.”87  
Now, across these varyingly nuanced accounts of feeling, Husserl maintains that 
certain affective experiences are intentionally directed. The question, then, as in the case of 
sensory perception, is whether the affective-phenomenal dimensions of a feeling-act owe 
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their intentional directedness solely to conceptual capacities, or whether the latter might turn 
upon essentially affective intentional content. 
 Husserl makes claims that seem to support both positions. One the one hand, 
Husserl sometimes suggests that feeling acts are merely representationally inert “intentional 
characters” that attach to the otherwise affect-free intentional matters of the underlying 
presentation, and are therefore “plainly not to be regarded as complete and independent acts: they 
cannot be conceived apart from the act of objectifying presentation, on which they are 
accordingly based [...] They all ‘owe’ their intentional relation to certain underlying 
presentations.”88  On one way of reading this claim, feelings would contribute nothing to the 
representational content of an intentional act: my sadness at an event and my joy at an event 
would be only two manners of approaching one and the same represented state of affairs. 
On the other hand, Husserl also claims that the feeling-act discloses a distinct “object as felt” 
which presents the object as having certain value properties—e.g. a sad event, a beautiful sky 
etc.—and that while feeling acts are founded on underlying presentations, and in some sense 
owe the original constitution of their intentional objects to the latter, they also appear to 
acquire an intentionality and an intentional object of their own: “it is part of what we mean 
by such ‘owing’ that [feeling-acts] themselves really now have what they owe to something 
else.”89  To this end, Husserl suggests that the affective dimension of an act of feeling 
accounts for part of its intentional directedness: 
 
Joy, e.g., concerning some happy event, is certainly an act. But this act [...] does not 
merely hold in its unity an idea of the happy event and an act-character of liking 
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which relates to it: a sensation of pleasure attaches to the idea, a sensation at once 
seen and located as an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling-subject, 
and also as an objective property – the event seems as if bathed in a rosy gleam. The 
event thus pleasingly painted now serves as the first foundation for the joyful 
approach.90 
 
Here we have the suggestion that the properly affective contribution of a feeling act 
does not merely consist in one’s taking a sensation-laden attitude towards what is an 
otherwise evaluatively-neutral intentional matter. In other words, the difference between 
judging that a state of affairs is the case and feeling joy that a state of affairs is the case is not simply a 
matter of two different ways of being directed towards one and the same intended state of 
affairs—i.e. one with feeling, the other without. Rather, in the case of joy concerning a 
happy event, the pleasurable phenomenal character also shows up as a correlated feature on 
the object side of the feeling act, as an evaluative property of that object, and this in such a way 
that the intentional structure of the act of joy now includes the “event thus pleasingly 
painted” as a component—that is to say, the feeling act now includes an essential relation to 
the object as felt. Indeed, it is only in this way that we can explain Husserl’s claim that the object 
as felt is the “first foundation” for the subjective side of the feeling in question. I do not 
come to have a positive attitude towards an otherwise evaluatively-neutral object and only 
thereupon cause the object to have its evaluative aspect. Instead, it appears that for Husserl, 
the presence of the object as felt is the condition of the possibility of my taking a positive 
attitude towards the intentional object in the first place. Husserl corroborates this idea 
elsewhere when he claims that “pleasure without anything pleasant is unthinkable. And it is 
unthinkable, not because we are here dealing with correlative expressions, as when we say, 
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e.g., that a cause without an effect, or a father without a child, is unthinkable, but because the 
specific essence of pleasure demands a relation to something pleasing.”91 In other words, to like 
something does not cause it to be likable, and something’s being likeable is not merely a 
formal property reducible to our liking it; rather, something’s showing up for us as having a 
substantive positive property of some kind—e.g. likeable, pleasing, etc.—is just part of what 
it is to have a positive attitude towards it.  
Now, insofar as it is through affective experience that the object now shows up 
under its felt aspect, then it seems that affective content must play a crucial presentational 
role in the perception of values.  And yet the question once again is how the affective features 
of a feeling act participate in the constitution of its intended value-object.  And here it might 
be objected that while affective content may be put to use in the presentation of the 
evaluative aspect of an object, this content is not itself a proper part of the intentional matter 
of the act. In other words, it might be objected that the value property intended through the 
presence of the object as felt is ultimately adumbrated through the contribution of conceptual 
consciousness alone, and thus could just as well be intended through a non-affective act of 
empty signification. But if the latter were to hold, the presence of affective-phenomenal 
content would ultimately be inessential to the intentionality of a feeling act, as the precise 
manner in which an object is meant could just as well be captured by an affectively empty act 
with conceptual content—such as merely thinking that something is a joyful occasion. 
Intentional matters of feeling acts would thus be individuated by conceptual content alone. 
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The problem with the latter account of the intentionality of feeling acts, however, is 
that conceptual content appears to underdetermine the intentional matter of emotional 
appraisal.  For if it is possible for two feeling acts to bear identical conceptual content and 
yet also intend their objects in entirely different manners, then it cannot also be the case that 
conceptual content is sufficient to determine the intentional matter of an emotional 
appraisal.  Some other condition besides the tokening of conceptual content would have to 
be factored in to explain why one emotional appraisal should obtain as opposed to another, 
and I submit that careful attention to ordinary emotional experience suggests that this 
condition is supplied by the affective-phenomenal features of a given act of feeling. 
For example, say I have a colleague who is much more successful than myself.  
Suppose further that (i) I believe that my colleague is deserving of her success, that (ii) I 
believe it desirable for me to also possess all of the features that my colleague possesses, and 
finally that (iii) my recognition of her successes occasions a recognition of my comparative 
lack of success. All of these states of affairs appear to be surveyable through descriptive 
judgments, and none of them appear to make essential reference to any phenomenally basic 
content. And yet for all of the specificity of the foregoing conceptual content, it seems that 
the same complex of judgments could equally well underlie an appraisal of “Admiration” as 
it could of “Envy.” Indeed, it seems to be an essential feature of envy no less than 
admiration that I regard the other as enjoying some quality or state of being that I genuinely 
regard as desirable—indeed, there would be nothing to be envious of otherwise.  Furthermore, 
in the case of admiration, I may equally well recognize the superior state of the other, and 
thus the disparity between myself and the other, and yet this does not necessitate that I also 
see her as enviable. Even knowing that my own lot would improve were I to acquire all of 
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the features of my colleague, I may simply see her as a model to look up to rather than 
someone to envy. Indeed, when we survey the objective references of paradigmatic cases of 
envy and admiration, it seems that the posited facts underlying both the enviable object and 
the admirable object are often easily interchangeable. And yet, while admiration and envy are 
certainly capable of relating to the same intentional object—e.g. my colleague, her success 
etc.—each feeling act intends that object in drastically different manners 
Whatever distinguishes these distinct evaluative appraisals, then, it does not appear in 
the first place to be a matter of differing conceptual content: the latter can often be 
imaginatively varied interchangeably across both evaluations without violating the essence of 
the evaluative act in question.  Rather, what seems to distinguish the cases of admiration and 
envy are different distributions of “positive” and “negative” feelings overlaying what are 
otherwise the very same set of underlying posited facts, feelings which thereby serve to 
constitute distinct objects as felt.  In other words, it is a matter of experiencing differently 
valenced state of affairs. In particular, whereas admiration involves an overall positive valence 
on some aspect of the admirable object, in the case of envy, there is a distinctive negative 
feeling that attends the recognition of the differences between myself and the object of my 
envy—more specifically, it seems that the positively valenced features of my colleague are 
enjoined to and overridden by an even more salient negative valence on my own self-esteem, 
a displeasing feeling which in turn reflects upon the way my enviable colleague shows up for 
me as a felt object. 
Here the conceptualist will likely object that the difference between the two acts of 
evaluation can be explained without recourse to affective content, and this by expanding the 
scope of relevant information to include background beliefs and conceptually articulated 
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desires that may be implicitly operating as individuating criteria. For instance, all else being 
equal, the fact that I hold a background belief that “Anyone who surpasses me is a threat to 
my well-being” might be thought to determine my evaluative appraisal of my colleague as 
envy over and against admiration. Indeed, whatever the particular beliefs might be, so this 
argument goes, once we provide a full accounting of the relevant conceptual background 
information, it is possible that purely conceptual acts can ultimately shore up the difference 
between admiration and envy.   
There are two problems with this line of response. First, it seems that any sufficiently 
individuating background propositions must themselves make essential reference to yet 
another evaluative term. For example, if the conceptually surveyable facts underlying both 
the enviable and admirable state of affairs are only made into object of envy insofar as I hold 
the background belief that “Anyone who surpasses me is a threat to my well-being,” then it 
is this act which carries the evaluative content that is transferred to the object of envy, and 
this in virtue of the evaluatively loaded concepts of “threat” and “well-being.”  In such cases, 
however, the intentional content of these implicitly operative evaluative terms would 
themselves have to be explained without recourse to affective contents, and thus appealing 
to background beliefs only defers the challenge of conceptual underdetermination to these 
same beliefs.   
Second, if we suppose that the background information individuating envy from 
admiration were to consist of evaluatively neutral, purely descriptive propositions, it seems 
that any body of such propositions would be compatible with an attitude of indifference, in 
which case the evaluative appraisal would still be underdetermined.  Indeed, it appears that 
no matter how we imaginatively vary some set of purely descriptive facts, it is always an 
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open question whether a subject will respond with an attitude of indifference as opposed to 
any other evaluative appraisal. Failing to respond with sadness at a sad event may be 
indicative of a failure to grasp some feature of the situation. However, it is not necessarily an 
indication that one does not properly understand the descriptively surveyable facts. It seems 
that the only propositions that would preclude a valence of indifference must be those that 
make essential reference to an evaluative term, in which case we run into our initial problem 
of accounting for the evaluative appraisal without recourse to some affective-phenomenal 
content.   
With the introduction of such “positive” and “negative” valences, it appears that 
affectivity has penetrated into the intentional content of a feeling act, as the individuation of 
the intentional matter of an evaluative appraisal now looks to depend upon some affective-
phenomenal character of the evaluative appraisal in question. To the extent that acts with 
identical conceptual contents can consistently underlie a variety of distinct evaluations—e.g. 
“Admiration” and “Envy” (not to mention an attitude of complete indifference)— it seems 
that such contents are not sufficient to individuate the intentional matter of an evaluative 
appraisal.  What appears to be a determining factor is some affectively charged phenomenal 
feature of the feeling act in question—e.g. “positive” and “negative” feelings—which 
suggests that the intentional matter of an evaluative act must essentially include affective 
content.   
 
3.2 Affectivity and the Prepredicative Experience of Value  
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Of course, even if we grant the foregoing and accept that the intentional matters of 
feeling-acts must include essentially affective content, none of this touches upon how it is that 
affective contents carry out their presentational capacities in contradistinction to conceptual 
contents.  The apparent difficulty in providing such an explanation within Husserl’s 
framework is that feeling acts, while not responsible for the constitution of their underlying 
value bearing objects, nonetheless present their correlate value aspects as inhering in such 
objects, as features of such objects. The pleasantness of the sky, for instance, is experienced 
as being in the sky; the loss of a loved one is experienced as being a sad state of affairs. In this 
way, objects as felt appear to us under a relational unity that holds between their evaluative 
features and their objective foundations. But here we run up against the challenge of 
explaining how affective contents can present their correlate value properties as inhering in 
value bearing objects, where this seems to turn upon the paradigmatically propositional 
capacity of predication. 
Or so it would seem.  However, in the same way that we can distinguish one’s seeing a 
red square from one’s explicitly intending that the square is red, I submit that we can also 
distinguish one’s seeing the value of an object from one’s intending that the object has such a 
value. While the latter may very well turn upon an intellectual judgment that involves the 
conceptualization of a given value and the attribution of that value concept to a given state 
of affairs, it is not clear that the former must involve anything more than an immediate 
grasping of the valuable object itself. For example, in the simple case where I perceive a red 
square, the square shows up to me as red, and thus I experience a state of affairs that fulfills 
the judgment that there is a red square before me, however this experience is not necessarily 
itself of or about the fact of its being-red. That is to say, experiencing the unity of an object and 
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its property of being red does not entail that this unity itself becomes a thematic object for 
me. Extending this result to the case of affectivity would entail an ability to see the value of 
objects without the attending to the two-place predicative relation between an object and its 
value aspects—that is, it would entail the ability to see the pleasant sky without expressly 
judging that the sky is pleasant. But can I intend an object under its value aspects before I 
come to actively thematize the predicative unity between the value property and the value 
bearing object?  In other words, could there be a pre-predicative experience of value? And if 
so, can this experience be given through affective consciousness? 
The later Husserl seemed to think so. In Experience and Judgment, Husserl claims that if 
we can draw a distinction between “passive pregivenness” and “the active orientation of the 
ego” in the case of sensory perceptual experience, then: 
 
it is necessary to emphasize at the same time that such differences are not limited to the 
sphere of perception or even in general to the sphere of doxic lived experiences, but 
that these structures are to be found in all the other spheres of consciousness.  
Therefore, there is an original passivity not only of sensuous givens, of “sense data,” but 
also of feeling [...] In these cases, too, there are analogues of self-evidence, and therefore, 
of perception as well, in the original giving of values.92 
  
Here we have the suggestion that in pre-predicative experience, objects do not 
merely show up to us in virtue of their pre-thematic sensuous nature, but also in virtue of 
their affectively appreciable value aspects. Husserl says precious little about how this 
happens, however, and his insistence upon all acts of feeling being founded upon 
objectifying acts appears to be in tension with such a possibility. Nevertheless, a more 
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hospitable framework for the notion of pre-predicative value experience can be found in 
Max Scheler’s alternative account of feeling intentionality.   
Although he scarcely mentions Husserl by name, Scheler presents his account in 
clear conversation with Husserl’s.  Following Husserl, Scheler holds that the class of 
affective experiences can be divided into non-intentional feeling sensations and intentionally 
directed acts—or in Scheler’s language, between “feeling-states” and “feeling-functions.” 
Departing from Husserl’s ambivalence with respect to the originality of affective 
intentionality, however, Scheler is unequivocal in claiming that “it is not necessary for these 
feeling-functions to be connected with the objective sphere through the mediation of so-
called objectifying acts of representation, judgment, etc.”93 Rather, for Scheler: “feeling 
originally intends its own kind of objects...During the process of intentional feeling, the world 
of objects ‘comes to the fore’ by itself, but only in terms of its value-aspect.”94 To this latter 
end, Scheler points to cases of ordinary experience wherein the evaluative significance of an 
object can present itself prior to our thematic apprehension of the objective foundations of 
this value aspect.  For example, Scheler claims, “a man can be distressing and repugnant, 
agreeable, or sympathetic to us without our being able to apprehend how this comes about 
[...] A landscape or a room in a house can appear ‘friendly’ or ‘distressing,’ and the same 
holds for a sojourn in a room, without our knowing the bearers of such values.”95  
The virtue of Scheler’s account lies in his recognition of the possibility of 
experiencing the affectively appreciable value aspects of things without having a prior 
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thematic awareness of the objective features that underlie them. In fact, Scheler goes beyond 
this recognition when he goes on to claim that the value aspects of objects can be given 
without any experience whatsoever of the objects in which they inhere. To this end, Scheler 
even goes so far as to reverse Husserl’s subordination of feeling acts to objectifying acts, 
suggesting that things must be encountered in their value aspects before they can be given as 
objects.  In its strongest form, then, Scheler’s response to the problem of value aspect-value 
bearer unity is to simply deny that value features of objects must show up as inhering in 
objects at all. As Scheler claims, “Goods have no foundation in things such that in order for 
them to be goods they must first be things” and thus  “we know of a stage in the grasping of 
values wherein the value of an object is already very clearly and evidentially given apart from 
the givenness of the bearer of the value.”96 
While the latter is worthy of consideration in its own right, it’s worth noting that it 
lends itself to a stronger claim than is necessary.  For in order to establish the original 
intentionality of affective consciousness, we need not claim that value aspects must be 
perceptible apart from and prior to any other kind of givenness of an object whatsoever.  
Rather, we only need the claim that the encounter with value-bearing objects in acts of value 
apprehension need not be of a predicative nature, and that value-aspects and the value-
bearing objects to which they belong can be co-given in a state of prepredicative unity. In fact, 
Scheler himself comes closest to this more moderate position when he claims that “real 
objects are ‘at first’ neither pure things nor pure goods, but “complexes,” with the latter being “a 
thinglike unity” of both objective and evaluative features. Upon this account, prior to the 
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active intervention of thematic judgment, value-features and their objective bearers are 
already encountered in a blended state of agreement, and “from this intermediate field, as it 
were, the spectrum moving toward pure things (with deliberate setting aside of all values) and 
toward pure goods (with deliberate setting aside of all thingness) begins.”97  Seen this way, 
Scheler claims, “Goods and things have the same originality of givenness […] The world is 
originaliter as much a ‘good’ as a ‘thing.’”98 
In any case, whether we adopt the strong or moderate affective-perceptualist 
position, I submit that reflection upon ordinary experience supports the shared idea that the 
evaluative properties of things in the world can show up for us before we form a higher-
order conceptual awareness of these evaluative properties as properties. For example, when I 
cast my gaze around an empty room and my attention is suddenly lured by the pleasantness 
of the sky enframed though one of the windows, the felt phenomenal content constituting 
this pleasing-aspect already associatively links itself to the enframed sky as opposed to the 
blank walls surrounding the window. It is the sensuous unity constituting the sky and not 
that of the walls that suddenly enjoys the “rosy gleam” of agreeableness. But here, in 
attending to the pleasant sky, the associative connection between the felt value content—e.g. 
the pleasantness—and the objective bearer of this value—e.g. the sky—is not something that 
obtains only after I come to actively predicate the positive valence of my feeling to the idea of 
the sky, or only after I form the judgment that the sky is beautiful. Rather, the prior 
association between the sky and the feeling of agreeableness is what conditions my turning 
towards the pleasant sky as a thematic value object in the first place. Were this not the case 
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then there would be no reason in principle why the agreeable feeling content provoked by 
the sky should not be attributed to the blank walls—or any other object—instead.  
The latter result is precluded by the fact that the feeling content already presents 
itself in associative attachment to certain regions of the phenomenal field. When I shift my 
attention from the sky to the window frame and the blank wall surrounding it, the positive 
feeling diminishes in vivacity; when look back to the sky, it increases in vivacity. Now, if I 
were to stub my toe, the feeling content associated with the pleasing sky may certainly fall 
out of view. But this is only insofar as a competing affective salience has entered the 
phenomenal field, one that possess its own associative relationships. When I stub my toe, 
the otherwise pleasing sky doesn’t suddenly take on a disagreeable valence. Rather, the 
negative valence of the experience is immanent to and inextricable from the sensation of 
stubbing my toe itself. 
Such associative relationships suggest that sensory and affective data exist in a kind 
of blended state of prepredicative unity, one which pre-thematically guides the way in which 
they are to be taken up as thematic objects. For example, it is only on the back of a prior 
agreement between the sensory-perceptual fields constituting the sky and the sensory-
affective fields constituting the pleasing-aspect that one can erect the judgment that the sky is 
pleasant—and indeed, it is back to this blend of contents that we must return in the 
epistemic fulfillment of the thought that the sky is pleasant. In this way, there is an 
immanent, prepredicative thetic content that is built into the phenomenal character of the 
affective field itself, one that structures and organizes the experiential manifold such that it 
can be taken up by thematic consciousness in one way as opposed to another. In other 
words, affective content presents us with an intentionally structured phenomenal field 
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wherein matters of evaluative importance show up under their value aspects and are assigned 
differing degrees of phenomenal salience. To the extent that this dimension of the world 
cannot be given through merely theoretical consciousness alone, the disclosure of value must 
be seen as an achievement of affective consciousness, and an achievement carried out in 
virtue of non-conceptual affective contents that are intrinsically intentional. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 
In the foregoing, I have attempted to motivate an account of sui generis affective 
intentionality using the resources of Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenological 
frameworks. I take these considerations to provide a necessary step in the direction of a 
feeling-based model of evaluative perceptualism. To be certain, however, securing the 
intrinsic intentionality of affective-phenomenal content would not in and of itself show that 
such a feeling-based model of moral intuitionism is possible. For if affectively grounded 
moral judgments are to be understood as falling under criteria of legitimacy and thus as 
assessable for correctness—as the robust moral objectivist would claim moral judgments 
must be—then there would have to be something like an analogue of logic in the affective 
domain, an affective a priori that determines law-like constraints and conditions of satisfaction 
for genuine cognitions of value—an idea intimated by the later Husserl and argued for 
extensively by Scheler in Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. Whether affective 
consciousness can meet this latter condition is the subject of Part III.  
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PART THREE 
 
EMOTION, AXIOLOGY, AND THE FORMALIST PREJUDICE:  
A SCHELERIAN CASE FOR THE AFFECTIVE A PRIORI 
 
Introduction: Emotion, Formalism, and the A Priori  
 
 
The heart has its reasons, of which reason knows nothing. 
 
- Blaise Pascal (Thoughts; IV: 277) 
 
 
The second major prejudice against an affective model of moral intuitionism 
concerns its compatibility with the a priority of moral truth. As most moral objectivists will 
agree, if ethics is to remain an objective affair, it must make essential reference to at least 
some unconditional truths, facts, principles, or procedures that are not subject to the 
vicissitudes of empirical contingency.  According to a prevailing prejudice, however, the 
realm of the unconditional a priori is exhausted by the realm of formal reason. Indeed, the 
fact that certain moral propositions appear to constitute a priori knowledge is often taken for 
granted as evidence in favor of some form of moral rationalism.  In Scheler’s estimation, 
such a formalist prejudice in ethics extends to the ancient antithesis between form and 
matter and finds its apotheosis in Kant, for whom all knowledge derived from the material 
givens of experience was relegated to a posteriori contingency. Upon this view, even if we 
were to grant world-disclosive intentionality to the affective contents of mental acts, the 
epistemic relevance of such contents would be limited to disclosing those features of reality 
owing to its contingent natural arrangement. Accordingly, any a priori ethical truth disclosed 
by an act of moral evaluation must redound only to those propositional and conceptual 
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contents that can be derived from the application of purely formal reason. Feelings cannot 
ground our principle access to moral truth, it is assumed, unless we are to lose the a priori 
foundations of ethics.  
The lurking assumption of the formalist prejudice is that a priori judgments must be 
knowable not only independent of experience qua empirical observation of contingent states 
of affairs, but independent of any experiential content whatsoever. Accordingly, the 
unconditional necessity of all a priori knowledge must ultimately redound to those purely 
formal rules of thought (including pure forms of intuition) that justify propositions 
irrespective of the material givens of experience.  The problem with this view, however, is 
that it fails to account for so-called “phenomenological propositions”: i.e. those putatively a 
priori propositions whose validation nonetheless appears to turn upon consultation with 
experiential content.  If we can provide grounds for rejecting the formalist prejudice with 
respect to the domain of phenomenological propositions in general, we will pave the way for 
extending the realm of a priori moral truth to affectively given value phenomena. 
 
1. Phenomenological Propositions and the Formalist Prejudice:  
A Case Study in Achromatopsia 
 
Consider the following proposition:  
 
“The same patch cannot both be red and green at the same time.”  
 
While the judgment makes reference to experiential contents, it seems clear that the 
incompatibility is not known on the basis of an inductive generalization of a posteriori 
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empirical observations. I certainly have never seen a red-green patch, but neither this fact 
nor the attendant improbability that I therefore ever will observe one is what grounds my 
knowledge that such a patch cannot exist.  Indeed, if the claim were an empirically contingent 
a posteriori judgment, then in principle its negation would not constitute a contradiction, and 
thus the color incompatibility could have been otherwise: there could be some possible world 
in which the same patch can be both red and green at the same time. But anyone who 
understands what is meant by the proposition in question knows that the incompatibility 
could not have been otherwise. 
 If the proposition is not an a posteriori judgment, then according to the formalist 
prejudice, it must be knowable on the basis of formal reason alone. But is this proposition 
known on the basis of a logical necessity?  If we follow the Tractarian understanding of 
logical necessity strictly in terms of formal tautologousness, then in order to be logically 
necessary, the negation of the incompatibility—e.g. “The same patch can be both red and 
green”—must be a logical contradiction of the form “S is p and S is ~p.” However, the 
proposition that something is green does not, on the basis of formal rules alone, logically 
contain that it is not red, thus in saying that something is both red and green (i.e. S is r and S 
is g), I am not violating the rules of formal consistency. If the color incompatibility is not a 
standard tautology, then in what other sense can the proposition be derivable from formal 
reason?  
Here we might expand our understanding of logical necessity to include the semantic 
valuation of the conceptual terms in a proposition. On this account, the color 
incompatibility can be seen as a logical consequence of a consistently constructed system of 
concepts. Moritz Schlick (1949) advances one such view: 
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Red and green are incompatible...because the sentence ‘This is spot is both red and green’ 
is a meaningless combination of words. The logical rules which underlie our employment 
of colour words forbid such usage...The meaning of a word is solely determined by the rules which 
hold for its use. Whatever follows from these rules, follows from the mere meaning of the word, and is 
therefore purely analytic, tautological, formal.99 
 
On Schlick’s view, it is the linguistic conventions governing our use of color terms 
that prevent us from meaningfully saying that there can be a red-green patch: a red patch 
cannot be green, simply because it belongs to the full conceptual specification of the word 
“red” within a consistent system of signs that it cannot signify a patch that is “green.” 
However, this gets the order of things backwards. The reason why it is a linguistic convention 
that a patch’s being a given color excludes it from being another color at the same time is 
determined by material nature of such color predicates themselves, not by an arbitrarily 
constructed system of signs. That is to say, the rules for the legitimate use of the terms red 
and green can only be determined in consultation with the color phenomena that these 
terms signify. Otherwise, any violation of arbitrarily constructed rules of meaning would be 
merely nominal. Indeed, nothing prevents me from meaningfully signifying materially 
inconsistent objects like redgreen patches: though no such objects can possibly be exhibited 
in experience, I know what conditions an object would have to satisfy in order to be a 
redgreen patch. Contra Schlick, then, the proposition “This is patch is both red and green” is 
not a meaningless heap of words; indeed, it is morphologically well-formed. What 
determines the necessary falsehood of such a well formed proposition is rather the fact that 
it cannot possibly find fulfillment in intuition, and this impossibility is one that can only be 
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determined in consultation with experiential contents in question. Of course, once the 
incompatibility is known on the basis of intuition, it can be translated into purely conceptual 
rules; rules that someone who has never even experienced color could learn to correctly 
apply.  However, in order for the propositions generated by the rules to constitute genuine 
knowledge about the world, such concepts must ultimately be founded upon and refer back 
to intuitions of the phenomena that they signify. 
To draw this latter point into relief, consider the case of congenital achromatopsia. 
Recent studies suggest that some individuals are afflicted by a congenital condition of 
absolute or total color blindness. If these studies are any indication, the achromat not only 
lacks the ability to have perceptual experiences of color phenomena, but also the imaginative 
faculties needed to have any intuition of color whatsoever; in fact, subjects who have an 
acquired form of the condition—namely, cerebral achromatopsia—purport to be unable to 
even imagine color despite being able to remember having color experiences in the past (see 
Sacks 1995; Carota and Calabrese 2013).  
Now, if all a priori, non-contingent judgments are derivable from formal reason 
alone, and if the color judgment in question is genuinely a priori justified, then assuming that 
each of their logical faculties are unimpaired, the color-capable subject and achromat alike 
should theoretically have access to the same evidence and degree of justification for 
believing the proposition “The same patch cannot be both red and green.” And yet, it 
appears that a congenital achromat would not even be in a position to acquire the abstract 
concept of color, let alone the individual color concepts of red and green, were it not for the 
experiences of a color-capable subject. More importantly, even once the achromat acquires 
the abstract concept of color and learns the relevant linguistic conventions that govern color 
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predication, the epistemic status of propositions generated by such rules would be parasitic 
on the fulfilling experiences of color-capable subjects.  For example, consider the following 
intentionally distinct propositions:  
 
“The same patch cannot both be red and green” 
 
“The same patch cannot both be red and blue.”  
 
 While these two propositions can be generated in virtue of applying one and the 
same linguistic convention, they are ultimately about two distinct states of affairs: one being 
the incompatibility between red and green, the other being the incompatibility between red and 
blue. Now, upon acquiring the relevant linguistic conventions, the congenital achromat would 
be able to derive each of these propositions on her own and without any experience of the 
color phenomena concerned. And yet, despite such rule generated knowledge, the 
distinctness of the color relationship specified by each proposition is simply unavailable to 
her. There appears to be a gap in her knowledge.  
To demonstrate this, let’s suppose that the achromat were suddenly endowed with 
the faculty of color experience, and then presented with a palette of color swatches. Now 
suppose that she is asked to pair each proposition with the corresponding swatches. Clearly 
her discriminatory capacities would be different from the color capable subject: without a 
prior association of each color word with the corresponding color, she would be unable to 
connect the color judgments to the appropriate color contents to which they apply. 
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But the difference in discriminatory capacities raises the question of whether the 
achromat and the color capable subject really occupy the same epistemic position with 
respect to the color incompatibility claim. To be sure, this is not necessarily to deny that the 
achromat really knows the propositions learned from the color-capable subject.  We might 
grant that subjects with achromatopsia can come to know a great deal of color 
propositions—indeed, even enough to be competent color scientists. However, in order for 
these justified propositions to constitute knowledge about colors —as opposed to mere 
knowledge about the relationship between empty signs—the conceptual schema acquired by 
the achromat must bear a suitable inferential relationship to the experience of subjects with 
the sensory and imaginative faculties needed to acquire the relevant color concepts in the 
first place. And it is precisely on these grounds that the color capable subject’s knowledge of 
the incompatibility claim seems to be more adequate or complete than that of the 
achromat’s: that is, the color-capable subject sees what the achromat can only derivatively 
know in virtue of applying a rule given to her by color-capable subjects. That is to say, what 
makes the achromat’s color beliefs qualify as knowledge about colors is the fact that her 
judgments can be verified by some experiencing subject. As such, her knowledge appears to 
be parasitic upon color experiencing subjects who do have the experiential capacities. If we 
grant that the achromat has a priori knowledge that the same patch cannot be both red and 
green, then, she doesn’t appear to know this on the basis of reason alone.  
 
2. Experience, Essence, and Emotion: The Material A Priori and the Affective A 
Priori 
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The difficulties in accounting for phenomenological propositions within a purely 
formal account of a priori justification led Wittgenstein to flirt with “the temptation to 
believe in a phenomenology, something midway between science and logic.”100 It is in this 
middle region that the coherence of an affective model of a priori moral objectivity lies. But is 
there something besides formal reason and empirical contingency?  Can there be an a priori 
realm of experiential content? 
 An effort to answer these questions can be found in Scheler’s theory of the non-
formal [material] a priori. Central to Scheler’s account is his repudiation of what can be 
summarily termed the “Kantian error”: namely, the identification of the a priori with the 
formal understanding and the relegation of the non-formal to a posteriori empirical 
contingency.101  For Scheler, the distinction between a posteriori knowledge and a priori 
knowledge is not one between experience tout court and the mere formal conditions of the 
possibility experience, but is rather a distinction between two different kinds of experience: 
(i) the experience of empirically observable facts, and (ii) the experience of 
"phenomenological facts.” Empirical facts—e.g. The fact that Mars is red—are those 
inadequately given phenomena whose experience depends upon specific observational 
connections between particular positing subjects and particular posited objects.  
Phenomenological facts, by contrast, are those adequately given phenomena whose 
experience can obtain independent of any particular connections between positing subjects 
and posited objects.  For instance, when I attend to the “redness” that unifies the class of 
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red things, I don’t need to presuppose the existence of any particular red objects to which 
one must stand in more or less optimal conditions of observation.  In this way, 
phenomenological facts are those “immediate intuitive contents” that, despite being 
essentially intuitive, nonetheless function as “ideal units of meaning” insofar as they are in 
principle capable of being experienced independent of any specific arrangement of real 
objects in the world and by any subject with the appropriate faculties. In other words, 
phenomenological facts are essences and their essential interconnections conceived as self-posing 
contents of intuition. While such phenomenological facts can therefore only be known 
through “immediate intuitive experience,” the propositions they justify they are no less 
unconditional for that reason: 
 
Whenever we have such essences and such interconnections among them...which 
can be of different kinds, e.g., reciprocal, unilateral, conflicting...the truth of 
propositions that find their fulfillment in such essences is totally independent of the 
entire sphere of observation and description, as well as of what is established in 
inductive experience. This truth is also independent, quite obviously, of all that 
enters into causal explanation. It can neither be verified nor refuted by this kind of 
“experience.”102 
   
 According to Scheler, the proper realm of the unconditional a priori consists first and 
foremost in essences conceived as phenomenological facts. Propositions—including purely 
logical principles—are only a priori in the derivative sense that they find intuitive fulfillment 
in such facts: “it is in the content of intuition, which fills these kinds of propositions, that their 
apriority has its roots.”103  Insofar as such facts are disclosed by way of “an immediate 
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intuitive content,” then, the a priori is not to be understood as an empty form or forming 
activity of the understanding, but as a given of experience:  
 
[T]he a priori is first a “given” of an intuition, and...the propositions which are “thought” 
in judg-ments can be called a priori only insofar as they find their ful-fillment in the facts 
of phenomenological experience….Hence the a priori is not dependent on propositions (or 
even on acts of judgment corresponding to them). It is not dependent, for example, on 
the form of such propositions and acts (i.e., on “forms of judgments,” from which Kant 
developed his “categories” as “functional laws” of “thinking”). On the contrary, the a 
priori belongs wholly to the “given” and the sphere of facts. A proposition is only a priori 
true (or false) insofar as it finds its fulfillment in such “facts.”104 
 
 Whereas Husserl is sometimes read as equivocating on the pre-conceptual nature of 
essences,105 Scheler is explicit in insisting that the concept of an essence and the essence itself 
are two distinct things: “the concept ’thing‘ and the intuited ’thingness,’ the concept equality 
and the intuited equality, or the being-equal (as distinguished from the being-similar), etc., 
must be clearly distinguished.”106  In this way, Scheler’s account of the non-formal a priori 
marries Husserl’s notion of eidetic intuition with an explicitly sui generis account of the 
intentionality of intuitive content. On this account, a priori essential facts are not disclosed 
with the mere “help” of representationally animated intuitive content. Rather, as Scheler 
claims: “the a priori given is an intuitive content, not something “predesigned” or 
“constructed,” etc., through thinking.”107  Such self-posing intuitive contents afford the 
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originary givenness of not only those essences pertaining to all beings—i.e. those essences 
grounding a formal ontology of objects in general—but also of the “material” essences 
pertaining to a specified region of being: e.g. color, sound, space etc.108 It is to such 
regionally specific intuitive contents that we turn when we fulfill phenomenological 
propositions about the necessary impossibility of red-green patches, roundsquare shapes, 
and all other formally consistent yet materially impossible objects.  On this view, I know that 
red and green cannot properly coincide insofar as the material essences that govern every 
possible color phenomena (and their essential interconnections) are immediately given to me 
in intuition: that is to say, the proposition “The same patch cannot both be red and green” is 
a priori justified insofar as it finds intuitive fulfillment in a set of phenomenological facts. 
Contrary to the formalist prejudice, then, to the extent that we are aware of a vast range of 
both material consistencies and inconsistencies, we are thereby familiar with an equally vast 
range of a priori justified propositions that turn upon the material givens of experience.  
 
2.1 Essence and Emotional Experience: The Affective A Priori 
 
Now, to the extent that the phenomenological facts given in intuition can include feelable 
correlates, then the non-formal a priori must be seen to include a regional ontology of 
affective phenomena. Accordingly, once we have set aside the “groundless dualism” between 
formal reason and empirical contingency, the a priori lawfulness of affective phenomena is 
opened up as a possibility, and we can thereby see that: 
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An “emotive ethics,” as distinct from a “rational ethics,” is not at all necessarily an 
“empiricism” that attempts to derive moral values from observation and induction. 
Feeling, preferring and rejecting, loving and hating…possess their own a priori contents 
independent of inductive experience and pure laws of thought. Here, as with thought, 
there is the intuiting of essences [Wesensschau] of acts and their correlates, their foundations, 
and their interconnections. In both cases there is “evidence” and maximum exactness of 
phenomeno-logical findings.109  
 
  According to Scheler, just as we can we have material a priori insight into the spectral 
order of colors and the essential laws that govern their interrelations (e.g. that adding white 
to a color diminishes its coloredness; the impossibility of a red-green patch etc.), we can also 
have a priori insight into values and the essential laws that set constraints on the acts of 
valuing in which they are intended.  As with the case of color knowledge, such 
phenomenological insight can be given only in consultation with the experiential contents of 
our intuitions themselves: “The actual seat of the entire value a priori (including the moral a 
priori) is the value-cognition or value-intuition [Wert-Erschauung] that comes to the fore in feeling, 
basically in love and hate...These functions and acts supply the only possible access to the world 
of values.”110 It is in phenomenological reflection on acts of feeling that we encounter value 
essences as a realm of conceptually unanalyzable yet lawfully organized material essences. 
The first essential law available to phenomenological insight is that all values are 
either positive or negative. This axiom extends across all value modalities, including both non-
moral values (e.g. agreeable and disagreeable, beautiful and ugly, pleasurable and painful etc.) and 
moral values (e.g. good and evil) alike. According to Scheler, this bi-polarity of all value 
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phenomena is a reflection of the fact that all acts of valuing are ultimately grounded in love 
and hate as the “primordial affective comportments” through which we encounter the world. 
Falling under this essential fact are the axioms of value originally formulated by Franz 
Brentano which circumscribe the a priori interrelations that hold between values and 
existence conditions:      
 
B1. The existence of a positive value is itself a positive value. 
B2. The existence of a negative value is itself a negative value. 
B3. The non-existence of a positive value is itself a negative value. 
B4. The non-existence of a negative value is itself a positive value.      
 
Taken together, such axioms ground the basic “principle of valuation”: i.e. that “the 
same value cannot be both positive and negative,” and thus that acts of love and hate can 
never be directed at the same value.111  Of course, as the familiar phenomena of “love-hate 
relationships” attests, we certainly can and often do hold simultaneous positive and negative 
evaluations of the same value bearing object: e.g. the same person can simultaneously be the 
object of admiration and disdain. But in such cases, the opposing valuations are bound to 
wholly distinct ways of considering the same referential object, and thus correspond to 
entirely different intentional matters. As Scheler puts this point: “One can ‘value’ the same 
things positively and negatively, but only because of different complexes of values intended 
in the same thing.”112 Thus, I may admire a person for her work ethic and yet also have 
disdain for this person’s selfishness, but I cannot at once admire and disdain her work ethic 
or her selfishness unless the value-making objective features I am considering are different 
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for each act of feeling. For instance, I may admire someone’s work ethic qua their 
commitment to their goals, and disdain their work ethic to the extent that this commitment 
involves neglecting their relationship with me.  However, in each case, the underlying 
properties to which I am directing my positive or negative feeling are different. In this way, 
Scheler concludes: “the same complex of values can never be of both positive and negative 
value...If this seems to happen, there are different value-complexes hidden behind the 
supposedly identical intention of valuation.”113  
Now, according to Scheler, the foregoing axioms governing the essential laws of 
values and acts of valuing are just as a priori necessary and self-evident as the axioms of 
mathematics. But contrary to the formalist prejudice, such axioms of value are not validated 
by virtue of merely imposing an empty logical necessity on propositions that only 
incidentally concern some material value content. Rather, they are intuitively evident facts 
grounded in the very essence of values as such. As Scheler claims: “Axioms of values are 
wholly independent of logical axioms and are not mere ‘applications” of the latter to values...for 
here it is not a question of relations between propositions at their founda-tions, but one of 
essential interconnections.”114 Insofar as these essential interconnections are grounded in 
phenomenological facts, axioms of values thereby represent an autonomous domain of a 
priori laws irreducible to that of formal logic. 
At this point, one might object that such “essential interconnections” of values are 
themselves only the products of formal laws of thought which are always operative in all 
cognitions, no matter the content, as conditions of the possibility of any objectifying act 
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whatsoever. On this view, the fact that a positive value cannot at the same time be a negative 
value does not reveal an autonomous regional ontology of values, but is rather only an 
artefact of certain laws of formal apophantics governing all cognitions of objects, including 
in particular the principle of non-contradiction.  The so-called principle of valuation would 
then be nothing more than the manifestation of the principle of non-contradiction within 
the realm of value cognition: that is, the fact that the same value cannot be both positive and 
negative would only be a permutation of the fact that “A is B and not-B” must necessarily be 
false for all objects of cognition. 
The problem with this line of objection, however, is that the determination of 
positive values and negative values as mutually exclusive properties cannot be established by 
the form of contradiction alone.  As we have seen in the case of color incompatibility, 
whether a given pair of property attributions falls under the form of contradiction can only 
be determined by a prior disagreement that holds between the essences of these properties 
themselves.  For instance, the fact that “loud” and “high pitched” are not incompatible 
property pairs for a given object, while “completely red” and “completely green” are 
incompatible, is determined by the essential interconnection that obtains between these 
material contents as hypothetical properties of the same object.  Whereas the being of a loud 
tone does not entail the non-being of a high-pitched tone, we know that the being of a 
positive value entails the non-being of a negative value.  But here, we know that this mutual 
exclusivity either obtains or does not obtain only insofar as we are acquainted with the 
material content of each phenomenon in question. Accordingly, the mutual exclusivity of 
positive values and negative values cannot be seen as a mere application of the principle of 
non-contradiction, but rather as its material exemplification. In this way, on a Schelerian 
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framework, material consistency is ontologically prior to formal consistency. As Scheler 
argues this point: "The principle of non-contradiction is valid for being, not because it is 
valid for the ‘thinking of being’; rather, it pertains to the thinking of being because the 
essential interconnection fulfilling it is fulfilled in all being."115 In other words, the legitimate 
“thinking of being” is constrained by the nature of being, not the other way around.  Indeed, 
this is borne out by the fact that the domain of well-formed propositions exceeds the 
domain of propositions that can be authentically fulfilled.  For instance, despite the fact that 
no such objects could possibly exist, I can nonetheless meaningfully intend impossible 
objects like roundsquares that would otherwise violate the laws of material consistency. 
What I cannot do, however, is fulfill such intentions, and this insofar as such fulfillment is 
precluded by the essential nature of the things themselves: "the propositions “A is B” and 
“A is not B” cannot (salva veritate) agree with each other a priori, because being excludes this 
possibility."116 Likewise, if the same value cannot both be positive and negative, this is only 
insofar as the essence of values excludes this possibility.   
  Now, if it appears as though the principle of valuation is merely the product of a 
formal principle that holds for all cognitions, this is only because the axioms that govern the 
regional ontology of values must also coincide with the laws of formal ontology governing 
all objects of experience. But here the relationship between regional and formal ontology is 
not a “top down” imposition of empty form onto unorganized matter, but a “bottom up” 
constitution of pre-ordered material regions (color, space, matter, value etc.) whose coinciding 
laws together compose the formal laws governing objects in general. In this way, formal 
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ontological principles are built up out of, or supervene upon, the organizational laws that all 
regions of being share in common.  Properly speaking, then, the principle of non-
contradiction is not validated first and foremost by way of an “empty” logical necessity, but 
rather by way of an intuition of a universally manifesting fact:  
 
[T]he proposition that one of the two propositions, “A is B” and “A is not B,” is a false 
proposition is true only on the basis of the phenomenological insight into the fact 
[Sacheinsicht] that the being and the non-being of some thing are irreconcilable (in 
intuition). Taken in this sense, this proposition has a content of intuition for its basis, and 
the content is not diminished as content because it applies to any object. This 
proposition is “formal” only for the entirely different reason that any object can stand for 
A and B; it is formal with respect to two of any such objects. Likewise, 2 x 2 = 4 is 
“formal” for plums and pears alike.117 
 
On this view, the “formal” nature of the principle of contradiction—or any purely 
logical principle for that matter—consists not in its independence from being, but in the fact 
that each autonomous region of being shares an essential interconnection that fulfills it.  
 
3. The Order of Values and the Ought: A Value-First Account of Moral Objectivity 
 
Now, to the extent that constraints on acts of valuing are determined by material 
value essences, then we have secured the kind of minimal non-formal a priori conditions 
necessary for an affective model of a priori evaluative objectivity. Acts of valuing have 
conditions of correctness that are determined by the essential laws of values themselves, not 
by formal reason or the contingencies of empirical experience. For example, one cannot 
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correctly judge that the same thing under the same aspect bears both a positive and a 
negative value. This fact is grounded not in an empty formal necessity, but in the material 
nature of the experiential contents in question. That is to say, it is the essence of value that 
determines this law, and not formal reason. To the extent that affective phenomena exhibit 
their own a priori interconnections, we can see that the formalist prejudice in ethics wears no 
clothes. As Scheler claims:   
                      
Logic and a pure doctrine of values [reine Wertlehre] stand side by side ... The 
phenomenology of values and the phenomenology of emotive life are completely 
independent of logic, having an autonomous area of objects and research…For it is our 
whole spiritual life— and not simply objective thinking in the sense of cognition of 
being— that possesses “pure” acts and laws of acts which are, according to their nature 
and contents, independent of the human organization. The emotive elements of spirit, such 
as feeling, preferring, loving, hating, and willing, also possess original a priori contents 
which are not borrowed from “thinking,” and which ethics must show to be 
independent of logic. There is an a priori ordre du coeur, or logique du coeur, as Blaise Pascal 
aptly calls it.118       
 
To be sure, however, while such material constraints on evaluation are certainly 
necessary for moral objectivism, they are hardly sufficient, least of all for the kind of robust 
moral objectivity capable of grounding an action guiding ethics. Indeed, the latter would not 
merely require law-like constraints on apprehending values, but would also furnish 
normative criteria that would enable practical agents to adjudicate between values and the 
actions that realize them. This would not only give us law-like constraints on objective 
experiences of, say, beauty or admiration, but would also give us the resources to explain 
why someone who deliberately chooses to concern himself with enjoying the view of the 
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pleasing sky instead of saving his drowning child would be morally wrong. In this way, value 
realism sans phrase does not necessarily yield moral realism. In order to secure the latter, we 
need some way of explaining why some values are to be pursued over others, what makes a 
given motivational profile “good” or “bad,” as well as some explanation of how values yield 
deontic constraints that determine which actions are “right” and “wrong.” In other words, 
we need some account of how values determine reasons for agential activity without falling 
back to an empty formalist principle, where the apparent difficulty of the latter is to explain 
why the realization of one material value should be more or less morally significant than any 
other. Scheler himself fully recognizes this point: 
 
Kant is certainly correct in stating that the realization of a certain non-formal value is 
itself never good or evil. One would have to adhere to Kant’s position [of formalism] if 
there were no order of ranks among non-moral values, no order that lies in the essence 
of such values.119 
 
In other words, if the realm of values were not normatively ordered into a hierarchy 
of higher priority values and lower priority values, then it would seem that an action-guiding 
ethical theory could scarcely be derived from a material axiology: there would be no reason 
to prioritize the realization of one value over any other. And yet Scheler is quick to retort: 
 
But there is such an order of value ranks. If it exists, it is perfectly clear what relation 
“good” and “evil” have to other values. The value “good”—in an absolute sense—is the 
value that appears, by way of essential necessity, on the act aimed at realizing the value 
which (with respect to the measure of cognition of that being which realizes it) is the 
highest. The value “evil”— in an absolute sense— is the value that appears on the act 
aimed at realizing the lowest value. The value that appears on the act which is aimed 
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toward realizing a higher or lower value, as viewed form the initial-value-experience in 
every case, is relatively good or evil.120 
 
 On this account—what we can refer to as a material value ethics—the moral concepts 
of good and evil are thought to refer to actions insofar as they intentionally aim at realizing 
higher or lower substantive values, respectively.121 Now, whether we can motivate the idea of 
a material hierarchy of values is something we will turn to address. But assuming for now 
that such an order of values does exist—that is, that values are already ranked by nature into 
normatively stratified relations of being “higher” or “lower”—we would have the minimal 
conceptual resources needed to generate deontic constraints on actions: Morally ”good“ and 
thus “right” actions would be those actions that intentionally aim at realizing higher values 
over lower values; Morally “evil” and thus “wrong” actions would be those actions that 
intentionally aim at realizing lower values over higher values. On a material value ethics, 
then, deontic constraints on actions are parasitic on values. As Scheler claims: “[A]ll 
oughtness must have its foundation in values— i.e., only values ought or ought not to be.”64  
Now, these are crude strokes that will need to be refined. For one, Scheler is not as 
careful as he should be in clarifying the proper domain of morally relevant actions: Do good 
and thus right actions always aim at the absolute highest values conceivable? The highest values 
practically attainable in a given situation? Or only at some higher values above a certain 
threshold? Nevertheless, we can readily amend Scheler’s formulation as follows: Given a 
range of practically attainable values that a subject is consciously presented with, an action is 
morally good or morally bad in proportion to the extent that it aims at higher as opposed to 
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lower attainable values. This echoes the imperative given by Brentano and Husserl: “Do the 
best that is attainable!”122 Scheler comes closest to this formulation himself when he claims 
that “(t)he value that appears on the act which is aimed toward realizing a higher or lower 
value, as viewed from the initial value-experience in every case, is relatively good or evil.”123  
In emphasizing the “initial value experience,” Scheler appears to restrict the 
goodmaking criteria of a moral action to only those values perceivable from the evaluative 
standpoint of the subject. This captures the platitude that someone who was simply “blind” 
or unaware of a better possibility in acting as they did is less blameworthy than someone 
who was fully aware of the better possibility but intentionally chose otherwise. On the other 
hand, in restricting the province of moral action to only those values with which the subject 
is acquainted, we should be careful not to conclude that one cannot be held morally 
accountable for one’s blindness to higher values. Here we can draw a distinction between, on 
the one hand, the datable perceptually-guided intention behind a particular action, and, on 
the other, the etiology of one’s perceptual-evaluative field. One may lead a selfish life, and as 
a result they may have habituated a stultified set of evaluative discriminatory capacities. If 
this character were to have a moral conversion experience, it may be possible for them to 
genuinely aspire towards realizing the highest values in every case, yet fail to aim at the 
optimal values insofar as they have a habituated blindness to higher values. For a given 
datable action at T2, insofar as an agent was acting with an optimizing intention at T2, such 
that they would have aimed to realize the higher value set if they were not blind to it, then we 
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can say that their action was synchronously good. At the same time, however, insofar as (i) 
the action failed to aim at the higher values that were attainable for a veridically and 
adequately perceiving subject, and insofar as (ii) one’s blindness to the higher values is a 
result of an action at T1 in which one intentionally aimed at lower values, then we can say 
that action is also the indirect expression of a morally “evil" motivational profile.  
In this way, it is possible for a single action to express two different, diachronously 
related motivational profiles. Nevertheless, what makes a given action morally right or wrong 
under each mode of consideration is the extent to which it issues from the perception of 
values and their interrelationships. Morally good action, on this account, is perceptually-
guided action aligned towards higher material values. The moral import of actions can be 
given a number of different articulations depending upon (i) how we are to understand the 
ontological and conceptual status of the moral values of actions, and (ii) how we are to 
understand the normative status of values. I’ll treat each of these in turn.  
 
Maximalist Substantive Value Realism: On one picture, the moral "goodness” of an 
action is a numerically distinct substantive value property, one that supervenes on an action’s 
property of aiming at some set of higher as opposed to lower substantive values as ends. For 
example, when I aim at some set of higher substantive values—say, the values associated 
with friendship—over some set of relatively lower substantive values —e.g. fleeting 
gustatory pleasures—this act generates a new substantive value property—i.e. the value of 
being morally good—one that contributes to the set of all substantive values that obtain in the 
world. This account allows for the possibility that the propagation of moral agents and moral 
actions—say through investing in civics programs and moral education—can be a non-
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derivative end, insofar as we could be increasing the amount of higher substantive values in 
the world. Here, we do not merely aim to foster moral agency because it will lead to the 
increase of non-moral substantive values in the world; rather, moral actions are thought to 
possess their own substantive positive values. Likewise, morally bad actions also generate 
negative values distinct from those they may succeed in realizing.  For example, turning back 
to the disvalue of the cruelty of the Turkish soldiers depicted in The Brothers Karamazov, on 
the present account, we would say that the disvalue of this state of affairs is not only 
constituted by the disvalue of the pain and suffering inflicted on the mother and her child, 
but also includes the disvalue of the moral wrongness and evil of this act. The latter 
constitutes a unique substantive value of the scenario that can be perceived along with the 
other negative values, even if this moral value must also supervene upon the lower order 
values that the act of cruelty succeeds in realizing. 
 
“Buck Passing” Substantive Value Realism: On a more parsimonious substantive realist 
picture, moral values are merely formal or syncategorematic properties of actions, which are 
exhaustively analyzable in terms of an action’s property of aiming at higher or lower values 
which alone are substantive and sui generis. On this account, to call an action morally good is 
not to attribute to it a new substantive value property, but is just to specify a relation that the 
action bears to the substantive values at which it aims as ends. Thus, to the extent that values 
provide reasons for actions, the moral goodness of an action cannot constitute a numerically 
distinct reason for that action. Nevertheless, while moral values are thereby rendered as 
merely syncategorematic terms, this account is still a form of substantive value realism, 
insofar as the moral status of an action is determined by the extent to which it aims at higher 
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or lower sui generis value properties. According to this “buck passing” version of substantive 
realism, the disvalue of the cruelty perpetrated by the Turkish soldiers is exhausted by the 
negative values that serve as the objects aimed at or realized through the action of cruelty. 
One potential difficulty of this account is that it appears unable to countenance the idea that 
something of negative value obtains even when a malicious intention is unsuccessful. In any 
case, on this account, moral goodness is conceptually reducible to the alignment of an action 
towards higher over lower values. 
 
 
Now, on either maximalist or buck passing versions, the value-based account of moral 
objectivity can also vary according to the account of normativity at play. On a material value 
ethics, deontic terms are parasitic on values. As Scheler claims: “all oughtness must have its 
foundation in values— i.e., only values ought or ought not to be.”124 The precise nature of 
the connection between values and normativity, however, is unclear in Scheler’s own 
account. Here there are at least two possibilities:  
 
Intrinsic Irreducible Normativity: On one account, normative constraints are grounded in 
the intrinsic nature of values, but values and normative terms remain two distinct ontological 
kinds. Thus, to say that some state of affairs ought to obtain is to say that it possesses an 
optimal set of values, but this is precisely because higher values possess the further property of 
being such that they ought to obtain. In other words, for a given range of attainable value 
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sets, the relatively higher (or optimal) value set possesses an intrinsic and irreducibly 
normative feature of ought-to-be-ness. This version of material value ethics is committed to 
an ontologically extravagant “layer-cake conception” of value-based normativity articulated 
by Dancy: “[O]ur normative reasons are based on values…At bottom there are the [natural] 
features that generate value; above that there is the value so generated, and above that are 
the reasons and requirements that are laid on us by the prospect of value; and only by that.” 
While the layer-cake conception isn’t a charming picture for the ontologically parsimonious 
of heart, it retains the advantage of keeping all normative concepts at our disposal in 
accounting for the spectrum of ethical life.  
 
Value Fundamentalism: According to a more ontologically parsimonious alternative, 
ethical normativity is reducible to facts about values. To say that some possible state of affairs 
ought to obtain, for instance, means nothing more than the fact that realizing it would yield 
an ideal or optimal value set relative to the range of attainable possibilities. On this account, 
deontic constraints on moral actions are ontological constraints: to say that it ought to be the 
case that I Φ is just to make a claim about what must in fact be the case if I am to satisfy the 
condition of aiming at the realization of an optimal value set. The same reduction can be 
applied to agential deontic terms like obligation: to say that I am morally obligated to Φ is to 
make an ontological claim about what I must intend in order to satisfy the condition of 
aiming at the realization of an optimal value set. Now, one might object that by reducing 
normativity to values we eliminate normativity altogether, such that we can ask why we ought 
to care about values at all. Here, however, the proponent of a material value ethics can take 
the constitutivist strategy, and argue that normativity is constitutively grounded in the nature 
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of what it is to be value-responsive agent—that is, a caring agent.  To give a brief care-based 
sketch of how a material axiology can provide a constitutivist account of agency-based 
normativity: (i) Unlike merely rational, imperativistic forms of agency, caring is an irreducibly 
value-laden intentional act: To care is always to take something as a site of positive or 
negative value. (ii) Caring is a non-optional feature of what it is to be an ethical agent, and is 
prior to all other forms of personal agency. (iii) Caring has a constitutive aim—to be 
responsive to values —and is thus subject to constitutive constraints: by virtue of taking 
anything as a positive or negative value, one, so to speak, enters the “space of values,” and is 
thereby subject to the hierarchy of values on pain of violating what is to care, and ipso facto, 
what it is to be an ethical agent. On this account, morally right action just is action guided by 
the adequate perception of and appropriate responsiveness to the order of values.  
 
3.2 Material Value Ethics and the Order of Preference 
 
Upon either version of a material value ethics, a moral property, whether substantive 
or formal, is first and foremost a property of actions qua goal-oriented intentional acts, not 
of actions qua executed goals: that is to say, moral properties attach to actions insofar as they 
aim at the realization of a relatively higher substantive value, not insofar as they attain this 
end. Accordingly, the moral status of a deed is distinct from the value it aims to realize. 
Nevertheless, the respective moral value of an act is determined only insofar as it aims at 
higher or lower substantive values. Pace Kantian duty-based ethics, then, morally good 
actions are never those done for the sake of being good itself: "The value ‘good’ appears on 
the act of willing. It is for this reason that it can never be the content of an act of willing. It 
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is located, so to speak, on the back of this act.”125 In other words, a moral value, whether 
understood as a substantive or a formal term, is a property of an action, not its object. 
This supervenience of moral values on actions aiming at non-moral values enables a 
material value ethics to chart a middle course between consequentialist and deontological 
accounts of moral action, as it allows us to acknowledge the significance of both the value of 
the ends to be realized by the execution of a deed—for example, the saved life of a 
drowning child—as well as the motivational tenor that undertakes the action—e.g. saving 
the child because the value of the child's life is perceived to be higher than the values that 
would be otherwise be realized by not intervening. Contrary to the utilitarian 
consequentialist, then, the moral status of an action cannot be reduced to or identified with 
the concrete ends that it realizes—e.g. pleasures, pains, happiness etc.—as if the 
motivational tenor behind actions were irrelevant. But contrary to the Kantian deontologist, 
the moral status of a deed cannot obtain without a non-moral material value as its content 
and thus a concretely appreciable change in the material circumstances of the world as its 
end. As Scheler claims: 
 
[H]e who does not want to do good to his fellow man in such a way that he becomes 
concerned about the realization of his fellow man’s well-being but who merely seizes the 
opportunity “to be good” or “to do good” in this act, neither is good nor does “good”; he 
is truly an example of a pharisee, who wishes only to appear “good” to himself…[I]nsofar 
as [Kant] seeks to identify “good” with the concept of duty and what is in conformity 
with duty, and insofar as he also claims that one must do what is “good” for its own sake 
in order to be good, and, consequently, that one must do one’s duty “out of duty,” he 
falls victim to this pharisaism.126 
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 If deontic constraints on action can indeed be grounded in an a priori order of values, 
a Schelerian material value ethics can avoid both the empty formalism of Kantian 
deontology and the “agglomerative indifference” of utilitarian consequentialism. The 
question, then, is whether there really is such an order of value ranks. And at this point one 
might object that the foregoing account sounds like a "just so" story: It just so happens that 
there is an order of value ranks that conveniently explains how a material axiology can 
generate deontic constraints on actions. On this objection, any putative a priori order of value 
ranks is just as likely an ad hoc construction designed to legitimatize certain evaluative 
conventions.  
The problem with this line of thinking, however, is that the intelligibility of a just-so 
objection against a given theory requires the intelligibility of things being otherwise than 
what that theory posits. And that is precisely what is at stake in Scheler's account.  For 
Scheler, in the same way that it is unthinkable that 2+2 should not equal 4, or unthinkable 
that a red patch should also be simultaneously green, so too is it unthinkable that some 
values—e.g. beauty, wisdom, humor, honor etc.—should not be of a higher order of rank 
than others—e.g. pleasant sensations. And like all essential necessities, to determine this we 
can turn to the things themselves—that is, the particular non-formal values and the essential 
interrelations that hold between them. To this end, Scheler claims that an a priori order of 
value ranks is made evident in the experience of preference: the self-evident fact that certain 
"higher" values are necessarily preferable to "lower" ones, and that among all value 
modalities, the positive value is objectively preferable to the negative value. Scheler claims: 
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In the totality of the realm of values there exists a singular order, an 'order of ranks' that 
all values possess among themselves. It is because of this that a value is 'higher’ or 'lower’ 
than another one. This order lies in the essence of values themselves, as does the 
difference between “positive” and “negative” values. It does not belong simply to 
“values known” by us. The fact that one value is “higher” than another is apprehended 
in a special act of value-cognition: the act of preferring.127 
 
In the experience of preferring one value over another, values are given to me as 
higher or lower. By “preference” Scheler is careful to make clear that he does not mean a 
subjective “choice.” Preference for Scheler is a cognitive act, not a volitional act, which is made 
manifest in ordinary discourse when we talk about preferring even when we are not 
confronted with a decision: e.g. "we can say, “I prefer roses to carnations,” without thinking 
of a choice."128 In preference, we simply register our awareness of a value’s higher status: We 
may or may not choose things on the basis of what we prefer, but for Scheler the laws 
governing preference are already determined by an a priori order of rank that holds among all 
values. For instance, I cannot prefer what is disagreeable over what is agreeable; Nor can I 
prefer what is painful over what is pleasurable (ceteris paribus). Of course, we can and often 
do make judgments that would appear to violate these laws of preference. When this 
happens, according to Scheler, this is only because we are not properly acquainted with the 
higher value in question.  
Now, while Scheler holds that preference and volition are two entirely different acts, 
he maintains that our volitional choices are also determined by the adequate presentation of 
values:  
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A value (or its position) can be given in feeling and preferring in various degrees of 
adequation up to its “self-givenness” (with which “absolute evidence” coincides). If a value 
is self-given, however, willing (or choosing in the special sense of preferring) becomes 
necessary in its being...Hence whenever we choose an end founded in a lower value, there 
must exist a deception of preferring.”129  
 
On this view, I choose the pleasure of a vice only because I am not in full view of 
the higher value to be had in abstaining, which I undoubtedly prefer. Here Scheler presents 
us with a materialization of the Socratic dictum that moral vice is a matter of ignorance: in 
value-based terms, when we are properly acquainted with a given range of possible values to 
be realized, we cannot err in moral judgment, and thus moral violations, whether of 
assessment or action, are failures of cognition and not of willing. Contra Socratic 
Intellectualism, however, this failure of cognition is one based not upon errors in the 
theoretical judgments of propositional knowledge, but in certain shortcomings of intuition 
not unlike visual distortions: “Not (intellectual) error, but on deception in feeling itself...Only 
where a valuation takes place can evil willing also rest on “aberration” [Verirrung], which is 
distinct from, and not a type of, theoretical “error.”130 Imminently realizable values like the 
pleasure of a cigarette, for example, can appear higher than they actually are in relation to 
deferred values like health and well-being. Nevertheless, on Scheler’s account, if I were able 
to set both value kinds in full view—e.g. if I were able to compare the anticipated pleasure 
of the cigarette against an adequate intuition of the value of staying healthy for the sake of 
my family’s well-being—I would undoubtedly choose the higher value, which I necessarily 
prefer.   
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Now, Scheler’s adoption of a “materialized” Socratic position is a regrettable turn, as 
it flies in the face of ample evidence to the contrary. Human beings often exhibit immoral 
conduct even in those cases where we grant full awareness of the values at stake. 
Nevertheless, we can reject Scheler’s claim that immoral choice is always borne of deception 
or blindness to values without also needing to reject the claim that preference, as a strictly 
cognitive act of recognizing the order of values, is necessarily determined by an adequate 
perception the values at hand. Indeed, some cases of immoral conduct depend upon our full 
awareness of the objective preferability of higher values over lower values. Take for instance 
Scheler's own example of the character of ressentiment, who seeks to subvert some evaluative 
order insofar as she cannot enjoy in its higher values—e.g. the disgruntled college dropout 
who feels spurned by the academia, and so sets about through bad faith to convince herself 
and others that the examined life is really not worth living. In such cases, it is precisely insofar 
as one actually prefers some set of values that they are anguished by their inability to satisfy 
their desire to realize these preferred values. To the extant that the frustration of conative 
desires in beings like us correlates with a feeling of displeasure, this makes us liable to desire 
the obliteration of our preferred value as a means of relieving ourselves form the pain. As 
Scheler observes: “We have a tendency to overcome any strong tension of desire and 
impotence by depreciating and denying the value of the desired object.”131 However, the 
initial condition of the possibility of such a desire to negate what one prefers is the 
recognition of a preference that one cannot satisfy. In this way, the ham-fisted translation of 
ressentiment as “re-feeling” bears a certain fittingness: we begin with the authentic veridical 
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perception of some disvalue in being unable to realize our preference, but then through 
illegitimate rationalizing, we redirect that negative feeling to an undeserved target.  
  The upshot of this account of moral failure is that any time a subject is adequately 
acquainted with a set of values at hand, they cannot fail to register their cognitive preference of 
the higher value, and this is true even if they do not, and indeed cannot, choose on the basis of 
what they ideally prefer. Preference should thus be seen as a perceptual recognition of 
phenomenological facts, no different in kind from grasping a mathematical axiom. As such, 
just as there could be no subject for whom 2+2 does not equal 4 under the assumption that 
these terms are properly understood, we can know a priori that there can be no subjects who 
are contingently constituted such that they disprefer a properly represented higher value:  
 
The proposition that the agreeable is preferable to the disagreeable (ceteris paribus) is not 
based on observation and induction. The preference lies in the essential contents of 
these values as well as in the nature of sensory feelings. If a traveler or a historian or a 
zoologist were to tell us that this preference is reversed in a certain kind of animal, we 
would “a priori” disbelieve his story. We would say that this is impossible unless it is 
only things different from ours that this animal feels are disagreeable and agreeable.132 
 
While the preferability of a value is grounded in the essence of that value, its 
“height” is not a substantive feature to be given in the same manner as the value itself is 
given, but is rather a relational property of being higher than: I only see the higher status of a 
value in relation to and in juxtaposition with other values. Preferring a value does not make it 
higher than another, either. Rather, “the being-higher of a value with respect to other ones is 
given in the act of ‘preferring.”’133 Accordingly, Scheler claims, "if the height of a value is 
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given “in” preferring, this height is nevertheless a relation in the essence of the values 
concerned."134  Furthermore, preferring a value is not a matter of seeing some separate set of 
non-evaluative explanatory facts that makes it higher than another value. In the same way 
that G.E. Moore argued that “good” is an unanalyzable simple that cannot be derived from 
or reduced to non-evaluative facts, Scheler claims that the order of value ranks that 
determines moral values is likewise unanalyzable: “[T]he order of the ranks of values can 
never be deduced or derived. Which value is ‘higher’ can be comprehended only through the 
acts of preferring and placing after. There exists here an intuitive ‘evidence of preference’ 
that cannot be replaced by logical deduction.”135  Accordingly, there are no further 
explanatory facts in virtue of which this order of rank obtains: any explanation of the "being-
higher" of a positive value over a negative value, or the "being-higher" of wisdom over, say, 
physical pleasure, will always invoke the very order of ranks it intends to explain. As Scheler 
claims:     
 
In correctly determining a value or its position, it never suffices to attempt to derive it 
from characteristics and properties which do not belong to the sphere of value-
phenomena. The value itself always must be intuitively given or must refer back to that 
kind of givenness. Just as it is senseless to ask for the common properties of all blue or 
red things, since they have nothing in common except their blueness or redness, so is it 
senseless to ask for the common properties of good or evil deeds.136 
  
In order to delineate the actual hierarchy of value ranks, then, we can only look in 
the direction of the values themselves. Now, as it happens, Scheler’s own proposed 
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hierarchical taxonomy of value ranks is both vast in scope and far from intuitive, inviting the 
criticism that any putatively self-evident relations among values should be immune to 
considered disagreement. Nevertheless, departing from Scheler’s own analysis, if there are 
grounds to establish at least one self-evident order of rank between value kinds, then we will 
have the groundwork needed to motivate an affective intuitionist model of robust action 
guiding moral objectivity.   
 
3.3 A Schelerian Analysis of Mill’s Competent Judge: A Case for Value Hierarchy 
from Self-Evidence 
 
To this end, a canonical case for the a priori order of value ranks can be found in J.S. 
Mill’s famous “competent judge” rebuttal to the doctrine of swine argument. Of course, Mill 
fancies himself a reductive hedonist, and thus, on a first pass, his framework is not amenable 
to countenancing values as sui generis intentional correlates distinct from the immanent sense 
data found in psychological states—the latter being what Scheler would call “Feeling states” 
in opposition to “Feeling acts.” Nevertheless, in countenancing a qualitative hierarchy 
between different kinds of pleasure contents, Mill at times treads close to countenancing 
values distinct from that of pleasure. As T.H. Green claims, “Mill is unaware that in holding 
some kinds of pleasure to be intrinsically more desirable than others he gives up the first 
principle of Hedonism...For if pleasure alone is the ultimate good or desirable, on what 
ground can some pleasures be described as in their quality better than others?”137 On 
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Green’s reading, unless the distinction amounts to merely quantitative differences, the very 
notion of a genuinely qualitative distinction between pleasures suggests that the so-called 
higher pleasures must be desirable for some reason other than their algedonic aspect. In any 
case, setting aside these interpretive issues, while Mill’s doctrine of swine rebuttal is arguably 
a problematic argument for hedonism, I think it presents the outline of a rather good 
phenomenological argument in favor of affective value a priorism. 
 Consider the following passage, wherein Mill sets forth his argument for the 
qualitative difference between so-called lower, base pleasures and higher, intellectual 
pleasures—or, following Green’s reading, what we might refer to as the values of pleasure 
simpliciter and the values of dignity: 
 
If I am asked what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one 
pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in 
amount, there is but one possible answer. If one of the two is, by those who are 
competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even 
though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not 
resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are 
justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality so far outweighing 
quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.138 
 
 The foregoing looks very much like a phenomenological argument from perceptual 
intuition. Here, the fact that the values of dignity are of a higher value than the value of the 
base pleasures is given by the fact that, once competently acquainted with both value kinds, 
one is simply preferred to the other. Such acquaintance is given through first-hand 
experience with the values in question, which suggests that the preferability of one kind of 
                                                        
138 Mill Utilitarianism II.5 
 153 
value over another is something that is surveyable in consultation with the values 
themselves. On this account, the value of wisdom is objectively preferable to that of pleasure 
not in virtue of some further explanatory facts or principles, but because in comparing the 
respective values, one is given to me as being higher than the other. In keeping with 
Scheler’s account, preference is here presented not as an arbitrary choice, but as a kind of 
cognitive responsiveness to facts. As such, preference only reveals the being higher of values 
of dignity, it does not make it the case that they are higher. Accordingly, provided that one is 
properly acquainted with both value kinds, it is simply not possible for one to prefer base 
pleasures to values of dignity. As Mill claims: 
 
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it 
is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the 
comparison knows both sides.139 
 
 Here the suggestion is that a subject who is properly acquainted with both values of 
dignity and values of pleasure cannot fail to prefer the former over the latter. The only 
explanation for one falling under an opinion to the contrary—what Scheler would count as a 
value deception—is that one either has not been or is not able to be competently or 
adequately acquainted with the higher value to be compared. As with the case of color 
incompatibility judgments, while the justification of the competent judge’s assessment turns 
upon experiential content, the judgment in question is not matter of a posteriori contingency: 
Mill makes no indications that would leave room for the possibility that empirical 
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observation could eventually discover a base pleasure so quantitatively perfected that it could 
be preferred to the value of dignity.   
In fact, hypothesizing the quantitative limits of pleasure, Mill even appears to 
explicitly rule out such a discovery when he claims that the competent judge “would not 
resign [higher pleasures] for any quantity of the other pleasure of which their nature is capable.”140 
Indeed, in order for the competent judge’s preference to hold any definitive weight, it cannot 
be subject to unanticipated magnitudes of lower pleasures. Such contingency must be 
unthinkable, which explains why Mill goes so far as to say that “it is an unquestionable fact that 
those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, 
both [pleasures], do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which 
employs their higher faculties.”141  The “unquestionability” that Mill attributes to this 
preference suggests that its correctness is not a matter of inductive generalization, but one of 
unconditional necessity. And yet, to the extent that this preference can only be established 
under first hand acquaintance with the values in question, the competent judge’s preference 
is an essentially experiential judgment. That is to say, whether Mill himself would accept the 
terminology or not, the preference of the competent judge looks for all the world like a 
material a priori judgment from the experience of phenomenological facts. To apply a 
Schelerian analysis to the foregoing: Just as one has material a priori insight into the fact that 
the same patch cannot be red and green at the same time, the “competent judge” is able to 
see on the basis of non-formal a priori intuition that the value of pleasure cannot be preferred 
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over the values of dignity, and ipso facto that the values of dignity are higher than the value of 
pleasure. 
Now, the upshot of all of this is not that either Mill or Scheler were finally right 
about which values were higher than any others. Perhaps neither were adequately acquainted 
with the values in question. Rather, the main insight here is that the phenomenon of 
preference is ineluctable in evaluative experience. Values can and do present themselves to 
us as being higher or lower, which means that our experiences provide a meaningful sense to 
the idea of a value hierarchy to which our datable preferences correspond. And what seems 
right about the Schelerian reading of Mill’s competent judge is that whether our 
determinations of value rankings are accurate or inaccurate, these determinations are made 
phenomenologically, by acquaintance with the value experiences themselves.  
For this reason, little else can be done to confirm or deny the competent judge’s 
verdict than to direct our adequate and competent attention to the phenomenological facts. 
As Scheler puts the point: “as is the case with all basic value-phenomena...all that can be 
requested is that one attend to seeing precisely what is immediately experienced.” However, 
provided that we are adequately acquainted with the values in question, our experience of 
value preference cannot be mistaken, anymore than we can be mistaken about the 
impossibility of a redgreen patch upon granting our adequate acquaintance with each color 
type. On this score, the evaluative intuitionist can find common cause with the appeal to 
self-evidence in mathematics. In the latter case, we do often do not take our inability to 
provide a non-circular argument for elementary mathematical propositions to count as an 
objection. As Justin Clarke-Doane (2002) claims, “It is hard to see how one might argue, on 
epistemological grounds, for moral antirealism while maintaining commitment to 
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mathematical realism [...] mathematical propositions do not seem to be “provable” or “self-
evident” in any interesting sense in which moral propositions do not.”142 If we accept the 
appeal to self-evidence in one domain of inquiry, we should have a principled reason to deny 
it in any other. 
One important line of objection against the analogy with self-evident mathematical 
intuition can be raised on the basis of disagreement. As Leiter (2009) claims: “[P]ersistent 
disagreement on foundational questions, of course, distinguishes moral theory from inquiry 
in the sciences and mathematics, not, perhaps, in kind, but certainly in degree.”143 It would 
be one thing, so this line of thinking goes, if our putatively self-evident moral judgments 
exhibited the same degree of cross-cultural and progressive convergence as mathematical 
judgments. But the fact that moral inquiry doesn’t enjoy anywhere near this level of 
consensus undermines the analogy.  
In response to objections of this kind, the perceptualist intuitionist has the resources 
to deflate the apparent severity of disagreement in moral inquiry on two fronts. First, there is 
reason to expect a context-sensitivity that is operative in the case of moral judgments that 
would not apply to the objects of mathematical knowledge, thereby complicating 
straightforward comparative assessments of consensus across fields of inquiry. Along these 
lines, it is possible that many ostensible disagreements in moral judgment can be explained 
away by virtue of contextually variable yet equally legitimate applications of more basic moral 
intuitions over which there is clear widespread agreement—in which case the disagreement 
would be merely apparent. Second, even in cases where there is a genuine disagreement, this 
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could be the result of illegitimate inferential or deliberative applications of more 
epistemically basic moral intuitions over which there is nevertheless convergence. On either 
count, investigating the sources of divergence in moral judgments may actually reveal 
widespread agreement over more foundational moral intuitions.  
To give an example that could potentially be in keeping with either explanation, the 
Inuit practice of engaging in infanticide, however controversial, might actually demonstrate 
cross-cultural agreement in the self-evident value of human life. In such cases, divergence in 
beliefs about the moral permissibility of infanticide can either be a product of (a) contextual 
variation in legitimate applications of more basic moral intuitions over which there is a 
general consensus, in which case the disagreement is only apparent, or (b) in cases where the 
disagreement is genuine, the illegitimate application of more epistemically basic moral 
intuitions over which there is indeed a consensus. With respect to the latter point, Clarke-
Doane argues that when we draw a distinction in the domain of mathematical inquiry 
between more basic intuitions (e.g. “1+1=2”) and far reaching theoretical applications (e.g. 
Axiom of Choice; Successor Axiom etc.), there is significant evidence that a similar degree of 
disagreement is present in the case of mathematics. Putting Clarke-Doane's point in another 
way, I submit that the apparent difference in consensus between mathematical and ethical 
inquiry is deflated when we compare unsurprising mathematical claims (e.g. “1+1=2”) with 
commensurately unsurprising moral claims—for example, “It is sometimes permissible to 
breathe”; “Pleasure is ceteris paribus better than pain,” etc. When we move from such trivial 
claims to more inferentially complex moral theorems, such as the doctrines of double effect 
or negative responsibility, as well as their denials, we can expect that disagreement will 
correlate with inferential complexity, just as it does in the domain of mathematical inquiry. 
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To this last point, when compared to the intellectualist intuitionist, the affective 
perceptualist is uniquely well-suited to reconcile disagreement in moral discourse with an 
intuitionist model of self-evidence. Only values and value-relations are intuitively given facts 
on this model, not the concepts, propositions, or general principles that may be founded 
upon them. Values, as Scheler claims, “are not simple conceptual terms [...] In correctly 
determining a value, it never suffices to attempt to derive it from characteristics and 
properties which do not belong to the sphere of value-phenomena. The value itself always 
must be intuitively given or must refer back to that kind of givenness.”144 It follows from this 
that discursively generated moral propositions are derivative forms of moral cognition whose 
fulfillment and justification are always inferred from and refer back to the self-evidence of 
values. Unlike purely logical inferences, then, which mediate through homogenous contents, 
moral inferences from intuitively given value facts to propositional moral knowledge must 
move across distinct modalities of representation. In this way, error in moral beliefs can be 
seen as a natural by-product of conceptualizing and discursive operations. For one, 
inferential generalizations from concretely given facts (e.g. pain is a negative value; other 
persons have value, etc.) to derived theoretical hypotheses depend upon a joint-carving 
conceptual layout of the world, and are thereby liable to imprecise determinations of non-
moral categories and facts (e.g. whether animals experience pain; whether a fetus is a person, 
etc.). Moreover, the inferential process linking a foundational proposition to other 
propositions is liable to a number of illegitimate influences, such as uncritically adopted 
background beliefs and bad faith rationalizations born of ressentiment. 
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Of course, even if we find points of cross-cultural agreement, this consensus in 
moral belief does not entail that these beliefs are true. To this point, as both Scheler and Mill 
acknowledge, it is certainly possible for one to be deceived in their evaluative judgments 
insofar as they are not adequately or competently acquainted with the higher values in 
question. But if this is possible, one might ask, how can we distinguish a genuine intuition of 
values and their rank of order from a value deception?  To this end, how can we be sure that 
the putatively objective order of preference is not actually a fictive construct generated by 
practically advantageous conventions or adaptive evolutionary mechanisms? In response to 
these questions, I turn now to consider genealogical debunking arguments against intuitions, 
as well as the failure of an existing attempt to defeat them. I close by sketching the unique 
prospects for defeating debunking arguments on a phenomenological model of intuitionism.  
 
4. Intuition, Debunking, and Dispensability:  
From Rational Indispensability to Phenomenological Indispensability 
 
Evolutionary debunking arguments against intuitionism generally take their cue from 
a “causal sensitivity” variation on Mackie’s classic argument from epistemological queerness. 
If our ordinary perceptions and beliefs are generally thought to be sensitive to causal 
influences, and if moral intuitions make reference to causally inefficacious objects or 
properties, then, as Mackie claims, “If we were aware of [objective values], it would have to 
be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our 
ordinary ways of knowing everything else.” Given that we can furnish alternative 
explanations of our having the beliefs we do that don’t require the postulation of queer 
faculties, then it might be thought that we ought to prefer those explanations that comport 
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better with our natural scientific worldview. Among others, Sharon Street has argued that 
anti-objectivist accounts can better accommodate the influence of non-truth tracking causal 
forces of adaptive selection on our moral beliefs. As Street claims: 
 
[A]s a purely conceptual matter...normative truths might be anything....Noting this 
sense in which the normative truth might be anything, and noting the role 
of...[adaptive] forces in shaping the content of our basic normative tendencies, we 
may wonder whether...these forces would have led us to...the...normative 
truth...Unfortunately for the realist...to explain why human beings tend to make the 
normative judgments that we do, we do not need to suppose that these judgments 
are true. Rather, all we need to suppose is that making these normative judgments (or 
rather “proto” versions of them) got us to act in ways that tended to promote 
reproductive success.145          
 
According to Street, if adaptive forces would ensure that we would have had the 
same basic moral beliefs even if they were false, then the truth of our moral beliefs would 
not only be unnecessary, but uncanny: “[T]he realist must hold that an astonishing 
[inexplicable] coincidence took place—claiming that as a matter of sheer luck...[causal] 
pressures affected our evaluative attitudes in such a way that they just happened to land on 
or near the true normative views among all the conceptually possible ones.”146 Now, Street’s 
account is directed toward moral beliefs, not experiences, and at first glance might not 
appear to pose a challenge for a perceptualist account of moral intuitions according to which 
evaluative facts and properties are presented to us in experience. However, insofar as it is 
plausible that every successful evaluative perception has a phenomenally indiscriminable 
counterpart—e.g. a hallucination—the debunker could claim that we don’t need to suppose 
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that there really are such evaluative facts in order to explain why we have the evaluative 
experiences we do.  
Applying Street’s debunking argument to evaluative experience, we get the following: 
(i) It may be the case that we have the evaluative experiences we do—say, as if some object 
in the world possesses some value property—insofar as organisms disposed to having these 
experiences are more successful at reproducing than organisms that did not have these 
experiences. (ii) However, even if the moral facts had been altogether different, so this 
argument would claim, then to the extent that the same adaptive-selective mechanisms 
would be in place, our evaluative experiences would have likewise remained the same: e.g. 
evaluative experiences of the world could be merely advantageous hallucinations. (iii)  Since we 
cannot rule out the influence of non-truth-tracking adaptive forces on our evaluative 
experiences, then even if our experiences were veridical, their reason-giving force is 
undermined. In that case, it would have to be by some uncanny coincidence that our 
evaluative phenomenology really was veridical. 
Debunking arguments are especially attractive to the parsimonious and 
naturalistically inclined. One vulnerability of debunking arguments, however, is that they 
would apply equally well to a form of realism that is often assumed to be exempt from 
debunking worries, and indeed one to which the debunker herself is arguably committed—
namely, mathematical realism. On a realist interpretation, mathematical inquiry also relies on 
self-evident intuitions about causally inert objects and properties, and a classic problem in 
the philosophy of mathematics—namely, Benacerraf’s challenge—is the apparent difficulty 
of explaining the reliability of such intuitions: Hartry Field gives the clearest expression of 
this challenge:        
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We start out by assuming the existence of mathematical entities that obey the 
standard mathematical theories; we grant also that there may be positive reasons for 
believing in those entities [...] Benacerraf’s challenge [...] is to [...] explain how our 
beliefs about these remote entities can so well reflect the facts about them [...] [I]f it 
appears in principle impossible to explain this, then that tends to undermine the 
belief in mathematical entities, despite whatever reason we might have for believing 
in them.147     
 
Mackie’s epistemological queerness objection against intuitionism looks for all the 
world like a direct application of Benacerraf’s challenge to ethical inquiry. But if reliability 
worries on the basis of queerness should hold against the notion of self-evident intuition in 
moral inquiry, then mathematical intuition should suffer from the same vulnerability to 
debunking. However, this is often not taken to be the case. As Hillary Putnam (2004) 
observes: “[A]rguments for “antirealism” in ethics are virtually identical with arguments for 
antirealism in the philosophy of mathematics; yet philosophers who resist those arguments 
in the latter case often capitulate in the former.”148 
To be sure, pointing to the complicity of mathematical inquiry does nothing in itself 
to resolve the initial epistemological concerns raised against ethical intuitionism. While there 
may be similar degrees of agreement across domains of inquiry, this does nothing to show 
that these agreed upon intuitions are safe from debunking worries. However, if there are 
grounds to think that mathematical intuitions share similar justificatory burdens as moral 
intuitions, then there are grounds to think that moral objectivism might also benefit from 
analogous strategies used to defend mathematical realism. To give one example: The 
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indispensability of the contents of our mathematical beliefs for any explanation of our 
having such beliefs is often taken to exempt mathematical realism from the foregoing 
genealogical defeaters—otherwise known as the Quine-Putnam Indispensibility thesis. 
Consider Putnam (1971): 
 
[Q]uantification over mathematical entities is indispensable for [empirical] 
science...therefore we should accept such quantification; but this commits us to 
accepting the existence of the mathematical entities [that satisfy our theories, 
realistically construed]. This type of argument stems, of course, from Quine, who has 
for years stressed...the intellectual dishonesty of denying the existence of what one 
daily presupposes.149 
 
Following this strategy, recent attempts have been made to show that moral facts 
exhibit a similar kind of rational indispensability, thereby warranting the moral realist a 
similar exemption from such skeptical defeaters. For instance, David Enoch has argued that 
the stipulation of robust normative facts is indispensable to the rationally non-optional 
activity of deliberation. Enoch formulates his argument as follows: 
 
(1) If something is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable (rationally 
non-optional) project, then we are (epistemically) justified (for that very reason) in believing 
that that thing exists. 
 
(2) The deliberative project is intrinsically indispensable (rationally non-optional) 
 
(3) Irreducibly normative truths are instrumentally indispensable to the deliberative project. 
 
(4) Therefore, we are epistemically justified in believing that there are irreducibly normative 
truths.150 
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One the face of it, Enoch’s argument promises to convert the ubiquity and 
inescapability of evaluative deliberation in our daily lives into a knock-down argument for 
moral realism. If some rationally non-optional activity requires the stipulation of moral facts, 
then, by appeal to reflective equilibrium, we are rationally justified in believing that such facts 
exist. However, Enoch’s argument for (1) and (3) actually turns out to be an argument for 
the indispensability of belief in irreducibly normative facts, not the indispensability of the 
actual existence of such facts. Call this the indispensability of belief version of the 
indispensability argument—or IAB—which is to be distinguished from an argument in 
which the actual existence or obtaining of some normative or evaluative fact is taken to be 
indispensable to some rationally non-optional activity—or IAF.  
While a suitably articulated version of IAF may indeed block against evolutionary 
debunking, the IAB is vulnerable to evolutionary debunking even if it is successful in showing 
that belief in robust normative facts is rationally non-optional. For the rational 
indispensability of belief in normative facts is logically consistent with an anti-realist 
genealogy of our coming to have those beliefs. Adaptive forces could have selected for 
organisms who are constitutionally predisposed to practical deliberation, insofar as the latter 
involves a codification of advantageous attitudes into action-guiding policies. Such 
organisms would be inescapably prone to deliberation. If we grant that belief in irreducibly 
normative facts is indispensable to the rationally non-optional activity of deliberation, then 
the reflective equilibrium of such deliberatively predisposed organisms may force them to 
hold a belief in the existence of normative facts, and this even if no such facts exist. In such 
cases, skeptical debunking arguments can accommodate the rationally non-optional status of 
belief in normative facts, while maintaining the advantage of ontological and explanatory 
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parsimony over realist accounts by withholding assent to the existence of truthmakers for 
such beliefs. Reflective equilibrium may rationally require that we hold a belief even if that 
belief is not true.  
Now, notably, this type of response to Enoch-style indispensability arguments would 
permit a particularly striking consequence. In the event that deliberation is rationally non-
optional, the debunker who rejects moral facts is forced to accept that she cannot believe her 
own theory. As Leng (2016) notes, the error theorist who concedes the rational non-
optionality of deliberation appears to be claiming, “‘Well yes, I do believe that there are such 
truths, but I don’t believe them,’” which, Leng claims, “is simply contradictory.” However, in 
response to worries of this kind, Streumer (2013) has argued that while it may be the case 
that error theory can’t be believed, this does nothing to show that it is false. As Streumer 
(2013) claims:  
 
It is clearly not a problem for a theory if we do not believe it. So why should it be a 
problem for a theory if we cannot believe it?  Just as a theory can be true if we do not 
believe it, a theory can also be true if we cannot believe it. Of course, if we cannot 
believe a theory, we cannot sincerely say that this theory is true. But our inability to 
sincerely say that a theory is true does nothing to show that it is false.151 
 
Building on Streumer’s account, if we allow that deliberation may be inescapable 
only with respect to certain circumstances within a human life—something Enoch himself 
acknowledges as possible—the debunker can argue that there might be a contextual scope 
on believability that mitigates some disadvantages on this front. For example, error theory 
might only be unbelievable when we are actively engaged in rationally non-optional moral 
                                                        
151 Streumer (2013) p. 194-212 
 166 
deliberation. Likewise, moral realism might only be rationally non-optional when we are so 
engaged. In any case, the debunker need not actually accept the rational non-optionality of 
deliberation. The point is rather that the conjunction of rationally non-optional moral belief 
and error theory constitutes logical space, and that IAB therefore cannot serve as a blockade 
against evolutionary debunking worries. Furthermore, even if successful in establishing 
justification for belief, rational indispensability arguments do not resolve the challenge of 
explaining how our intuitions themselves are non-accidentally veridical. If we have moral 
knowledge on the basis of intuition, then the argument from rational indispensability does 
not explain this fact.  
While Enoch’s case misses the mark, it does get us in the ballpark of a better 
strategy. Consider the version of the indispensability argument that Enoch’s argument comes 
close to advancing but doesn’t quite reach, namely, the argument that it is not just the belief in 
but the actual existence of some evaluative fact that is indispensable to some ineluctable aspect 
of our ethical life. To this end I contend that genealogical debunking could be blocked if 
there were reason to think that the existence of some evaluative facts were in some way 
indispensable to any explanation of our having the evaluative experiences we do. Call this 
the argument from phenomenological indispensability. The challenge for any argument from 
phenomenological indispensability is also its winning strategy: that is, to explain how our 
experiences can guarantee the existence of evaluative facts even if they are subject to non-
truth tracking causation, such as adaptive forces that select for evolutionarily advantageous 
hallucinations.  
Consider, once again, our achromatic subject. Now imagine that an evil demon 
grants the achromat the gift of color experience, only to deliver her to a series of 
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hallucinations of colored objects. During her chromatic hallucinations, our newly color-
capable subject has experiences as if of colored objects, and these experiences are 
phenomenally indiscriminable from the experiences had by a veridically perceiving subject. 
Yet nothing in the world with those color properties is instantiated. Can our former 
achromat come to know anything about color through these hallucinations? It seems 
plausible to say that she can. After all, if released from her hallucinations and set free to 
enjoy the colored objects of the actual world, she would possess a new set of discriminatory 
capacities. She would encounter, in the actual world, objects with properties she would be 
able to recognize from her hallucinatory experiences. But if something is known about color, 
then this entails that there is a truth or fact known. And yet how can this be the case if all of 
her experiences are hallucinatory? John Bengson (2015) attempts to address this problem 
through the analogous case of “Trip”: 
 
Trip has never before encountered the colors red, orange, or blue. Nor has he ever 
encountered any elliptical, circular, or hexagonal shapes. Then, one evening, Trip has 
an experience with the phenomenal character of the experience had when viewing a 
red ellipse labeled ‘I,’ an orange circle labeled ‘II,’ and a blue hexagon labeled 
‘III’...As it happens, Trip is not actually viewing these things: rather, he is unwittingly 
the subject of a spontaneous, vivid, hallucinatory experience.152 
 
 
 Bengson claims that upon undergoing the experience, Trip would be able to possess 
knowledge of the following facts: 
 
[α] The color of I resembles the color of II more than the color of III. 
                                                        
152 Bengson (2015) p. 13 
 168 
[β] The shape of I resembles the shape of II more than the shape of III. 
 
In order to explain how Trip’s hallucination can be a source of knowledge of α and β, 
Bengson advances a form of naïve realism, according to which our experiences can serve as 
sources of knowledge about objects insofar as they are constituted by those objects: “[An] 
experience as if p is non-accidentally correct, hence able to serve as a source of knowledge 
that p, because it is partly constituted by the fact that p.153” On this account, Trip can know α and β 
insofar as objects possessing those properties are, quite literally, a proper part of the 
experience. As Bengson claims: “Trip’s hallucinatory experience is non-accidentally correct, 
hence able to serve as a source of knowledge about the relevant colors and shapes, because it 
is partly constituted by those colors and shapes...[P]art of what it is for Trip’s hallucinatory 
experience to exist is for those very colors and shapes...to exist.”154  
Now, what makes Trip’s experience a hallucination on Bengson’s account is the fact 
that I, II, and III are taken to be denizens of the actual world when in fact they are not—in 
other words, the experience is not constituted by the actual world objects that it presumed to 
be about. Thus, even if we were to suppose that there happened to be objects in the actual 
world the successful veridical perception of which is indiscriminable from Trip’s experience, his experience 
could not provide knowledge about these objects: “A veridical sensory hallucination that p is 
unable to serve as a source of knowledge that p because it is not constituted by the fact that p.”155 
And yet insofar as I, II, and III, as non-actual world objects possessing the color and shape 
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properties in question, are indeed a proper part of the experience, then Trip’s experience 
enables him to know things about the properties of these objects and their resemblance 
relations.  
If successful, Bengson’s proposal would provide a model of phenomenological 
indispensability that we could put to use in the evaluative domain. On this account, the 
existence of certain facts about some domain D are indispensable to our having the D-
experiences we do, and this insofar as certain D-facts are proper constituents of D-experiences 
themselves. On the face of it, there is something attractive about this picture. It seems 
extremely plausible to say that Trip at least knows something about the colors and shapes in 
question. Moreover, insofar as Trip’s experience fails to make contact with objects in the 
actual world, it seems plausible that this knowledge must have something to do with the 
nature of the experience itself.  
The problem with Bengson’s naïve realist account, however, is that it entails that an 
experience can only provide knowledge about some fact p when it is both (i) as if of p, and 
also (ii) constituted by the fact that p. However, when both (i) and (ii) are satisfied, the 
experience in question is no longer a hallucination, but a case of successful veridical perception. 
For example, if the objects I, II, and III specified in α and β are understood as actual world 
objects, then Trip’s experience as if of α and β cannot be a source of knowledge of α and β, as 
it is not constituted by the facts specified in α and β. On the other hand, if the objects I, II, 
and III specified in α and β are just the non-actual world objects as they are tokened in 
Trip’s experience, then Trip’s experience as if of α and β is no longer a hallucination of actual 
world objects and facts about their resemblance relations, but a successful veridical 
perception of different objects and different facts—namely, the merely apparently actual objects 
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that populate Trip’s experience, and facts about their resemblance relations. However, in 
seeing I, II, or III as a non-actual or merely apparently actual object, the experience would no longer 
qualify as a hallucination. Walter Hopp (2011) makes this point in the course of mounting a 
series of forceful objections against relational and naïve realist views of perception: 
 
If the intentional object of a hallucinatory experience were a mere appearance, then 
the hallucination would be a perfectly veridical perception of a mere appearance. 
And in taking things to be as they appear, one would take an appearance to be as it 
appears, and be right...To be aware of something that exists as that thing is the very 
furthest thing from error.156 
 
By the naïve realist’s own lights, if a hallucination can put one in a position to know 
some fact p, this cannot be explained by supposing that the experience is as if p and also 
constituted by the fact p: for in that case, it would not be a hallucination. At the same time, 
however, if we remove either constraint (i) or (ii) on a given experience with respect to some 
fact p, then by the naïve realists own lights, we are not in a position to know anything about 
p through that experience. For a given experience E as if p, if the experience presents itself as 
if of actual world object O, but E is instead constituted by phenomenally indiscriminable non-
actual world object O’, then this experience E as if of actual world object O is not correct, and 
thus, on Bengson’s account, cannot be a source of knowledge that p. If, however, the 
experience E as if p presents itself as if of non-actual object O’ and E is indeed constituted by 
O’, then the experience E as if of non-actual world object O’ is non-accidentally correct, and thus 
not a hallucination. If a hallucination, qua hallucination, can put us in a position to know 
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something, an adequate explanation for this cannot consist in its being partly constituted by 
some fact.  
Furthermore, even if we understand Trip’s experience of non-actual objects as a 
successful veridical perception, Bengon’s naïve realist account fails to take adequate 
inventory of what Trip is in a position to know from this experience. For according to 
Bengon’s account, an experience cannot put one in a position to know some fact unless it is 
partly constituted by that fact. But this entails that what Trip knows through his experience 
are only facts about the resemblance relations between I, II, and III. But that would grossly 
understate the knowledge that Trip is in a position to have through his experience. If Trip is 
in a position to know the resemblance relations for non-actual objects I, II, and III, then it 
seems he is also in a position to know the resemblance relations for all propertied objects 
sufficiently similar to I, II, and III, whether or not those objects populate Trip’s experience. 
As Hopp puts the point: 
 
If I have a hallucination that is indistinguishable from a perception of my new couch 
fitting through my doorway, then I am in a position to know that my couch will fit 
through my doorway. Nothing, however, instantiates the properties that are made 
manifest to me in such an experience. There isn’t a little mental couch somewhere 
fitting through a little mental doorway....nor is there another immaterial couch out 
there fitting through an immaterial doorway. I have a veridical experience of 
uninstantiated sense-perceptible properties. What makes my experience an error, a 
hallucination, is that, unlike an imagination, it presents those properties as though 
they are instantiated in some particular objects – those particular objects, in fact – and 
there are no such objects.157 
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Following Husserl, on Hopp’s account, experiences can be sources of knowledge insofar as 
they have intuitive contents that present things as being a certain way. These intuitive 
contents not only present a certain distribution of objects, but also possible ways these 
objects can be—in other words, they can present properties of these objects. As Hopp points 
out in the passage above, these properties and facts about them can be made evident 
irrespective of their actual instantiation in the objects in which they are presented as 
inhering. For example, in having the veridical hallucination as if of his couch fitting through 
the door, Hopp is in a position to know facts about the properties of his couch and his 
doorway that he might not have otherwise known; in having a hallucination of a flute playing 
centaur, I can see the properties that would have to be instantiated for my experience to be 
veridical. In this way, pace Bengson, what makes my hallucination a source of knowledge is 
precisely not that it is composed of some instantiated propertied object, but indeed that it 
makes me aware of something that does not depend for its givenness upon its being instantiated in any 
object at all, whether in the actual world or as some kind of non-actual mental or immaterial 
object. For in turning towards some object presented as having some property, even in a 
hallucination, I am now in a position to see the property itself. This not only enables me to 
know things about that property insofar as it inheres in objects similar to those presented in 
my experience, but also insofar as it is in principle multiply realizable in a number of other 
possible objects,  and indeed insofar as it is in principle detachable from any object. That is 
to say, a hallucination, as in perception and imagination alike, enables me to grasp the essence 
of a property. 
Suppose right now I am enjoying the experience as if of a spot of green paint on my 
desk. While enjoying this experience, I begin to attend to the unique color of the paint spot, 
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and I decide I should like to create a paint color matching it. I begin mixing my paints with 
this green color in sight. Yet through some mistake I end up with a color altogether different 
than this green color I have in sight— I end up with something looking more like red. I 
know that this botched paint color is wrong, because I know what my new paint would have 
to look like if it were like the color I see before me. After all, I see the property that my new 
paint would have to possess. Now suppose this experience as if of a green spot of paint on 
my desk is a hallucination. Or on second thought, don‘t. Suppose it is a veridical perception. 
Or, suppose it is alternately a hallucination and a veridical perception. None of this alters my 
ability to know that the paint I have produced is wrong. Regardless of whether the green 
paint exists as presented, whether it is presented as an actual world object or as a non-actual 
world object, or whether it is a proper part of my experience in each case, through all of 
these variations in constitution and correctness, there is something which I am undoubtedly 
in a position to grasp. Namely, the unique green color at hand, not just as a property of the 
putative paint spot on my desk, but also as a multiply realizable property, a property that I 
am aiming to approximate in creating a new paint, and indeed a property that could in 
principle belong to a number of color-bearing objects. That is to say, I am able to grasp the 
essence of the unique green color in question. The fact that I am hallucinating does nothing to 
undermine my ability to grasp this color essence through this experience. For what it is to be 
that green color is immediately given just in virtue of having the experience. As Husserl 
claims in a 1907 lecture: “It is senseless to question and to doubt what the essence of red 
is...provided that, while one is seeing red and grasping in terms of its specific kind, one 
means by the word “red” exactly what is grasped and seen....We grasp it –  there it is; there is 
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what we mean, the species red. Could a divine being, an infinite intellect, to grasp the 
essence of red than to see it as a universal?”158 
 No failure of my experience to refer to some instantiated object can make it the case 
that I am mistaken about what it is for something to possess the color in question.  Even if 
there is nothing in the actual world that possesses these properties, I cannot be mistaken 
about what it would mean for the world to comport with my experience as if of red and 
green objects: for this is available to me simply in virtue of having the experience. In this 
way, epistemically speaking, a hallucination provides the material for the grasping of essences 
in the same way that the tokening of intuitive content in imagination does. When I imagine 
the color properties of red and green by tokening some imagistic content, my ability to see 
that these properties cannot be co-extensive does not depend upon the existence of any 
objects in which I might imagine them inhering. Likewise, when I hallucinate a set of red 
objects, upon reflective attention, the phenomenal property of  'being red’ uniting the class 
of red objects manifested in hallucination is also self-posing. Upon reflection, when I 
compare my hallucination of a green shape and my hallucination of a red shape, I can attend 
to the way each is manifested in experience. In doing so, I find phenomenal properties 
presented as inhering in some object, properties that can be grasped as multiply instantiable 
apart from the existence of the object in which they are presented as inhering. For example, 
while I may have hallucinated a red star and green circle, I can imaginatively vary these 
properties, and imagine a red circle and green star. Furthermore, I can also grasp the modal 
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relationships between these properties, and see that for all possible worlds, the same thing 
cannot be both green and red at the same time.  
The upshot of this is that I can come to know essential truths about colors and their 
necessary interrelationships and incompatibilities even if every prior experience of colored 
objects I have ever had was a hallucination. While I can be mistaken about whether anything 
possessing those properties is instantiated in the actual world, I cannot be mistaken that 
something shows up for me as red, and thus what it is for any other thing to be that color is 
made immediately evident to me in virtue of having the experience. Thus, while we may be 
systematically deceived about whether there are objects in the world that possess the 
phenomenal properties that our experiences present them as having, we cannot be mistaken 
about our grasping the essence of these properties themselves as they are afforded in 
experience. No error in experience can make it the case that there is nothing it is for 
something to be green, nor can an error make it the case that something can be presented to 
me as red and green. As such, this knowledge is immune to debunking considerations about 
the causal genesis of our experiences, as my adequate intuition of my experience as if of red 
or green objects doesn’t depend upon the instantiation of objects possessing those 
properties. To have the experience as if of green or red objects in the world already 
necessitates that the color properties of being red and being green are ideal possibilities for 
some possible objects of consciousness, and, moreover, that the essence of what it is to be 
green precludes the possibility that the same thing can be given as both red and green at 
once. In this way, essential facts about color properties and their interrelationships are 
indispensable to our experiences having the phenomenology they do. That is, they are 
phenomenologically indispensable. 
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With this model of phenomenological indispensability in hand, I’d like to close by 
sketching a strategy that the intuitionist can take in order to argue for the indispensability of 
moral facts to any explanation of our having the evaluative experiences we do.  
Imagine a subject incapable of tokening affective content, and thus incapable of 
having evaluative experiences, whether these be simple perceptions of concrete states of 
affairs in the world or imaginative evaluative intuitions of possible states of affairs. Now 
suppose that an evil demon endows our heretofore feeling-blind subject with the capacity 
for evaluative experience, yet at the same time delivers this subject to a series of 
hallucinations spanning the affective spectrum, from experiences of being tortured and vistas 
of wanton killing, to experiences of ecstatic joy, natural beauty, and parental love. These 
experiences are indiscriminable from veridical evaluative perceptions of these states of 
affairs. Yet nothing in the world possessing these evaluative properties is instantiated.  
Does the newly feeling-capable subject come to know anything about values? If the 
question is interpreted as a question about how things are, evaluatively speaking, in the actual 
world, then it seems we must remain skeptical. For the experiences in question present 
certain evaluative properties as inhering in certain objects in the world, and what makes 
these experiences an error is precisely the fact that the objects and properties are not 
instantiated as presented. However, if the question is whether those hallucinatory 
experiences enable the subject to know necessary evaluative and moral truths that must hold 
for all possible worlds, then the answer is that they do.  
Consider experiences of pain and suffering. Imagine that after submitting our 
feeling-capable subject to the hallucination as if of her arm being severed with a blunt 
implement, complete with all of the painful interoceptive sensations and feelings of fear and 
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panic this involves, the demon then subjects her to a hallucination as if of a world in which 
affectless automata inflict the same torture on young children. While none of the evaluative 
properties are instantiated as presented, our subject is in a position to know evaluative truths. 
For in attending to the world as it is given in experience, she can attend to the disvalue of 
pain and suffering itself, and consider these properties in abstraction from the objects in 
which they are presented as inhering. In doing so, she can see that, for any possible state of 
affairs, pain and suffering for its own sake is immanently disvaluable, such that to token an 
instance of pain is ipso facto to token something of negative value. Thus, while there may be 
no children in pain, she would be in a position to know that a certain set of evaluative 
properties would obtain in the world if her experience were veridical. Furthermore, in 
attending to the essences of certain negative values, she can also consider these value 
essences in relation to other value kinds. All else being equal, if we were to compare the 
experience of wanton torture to the range of experiences afforded by the demon’s 
phantasmagoria, we would a priori disbelieve anyone who claimed that pain and suffering for 
its own sake was not objectively dispreferable to at least some possible world in which there 
are other values besides. Thus, in having the experiences in question, the subject would not 
only be in a position to know hypothetical truths about the world as presented, but truths 
that must obtain for all possible worlds. For instance, she would be able to see that, ceteris 
paribus, a world consisting of pain and suffering for its own sake is dispreferable to a world 
in which pain and suffering finds its end in happiness and joy.  
As in the case of my intuition of color essences and their interrelations, none of 
these evaluative insights are subject to defeat by debunking worries about the etiology and 
veridicality of our experiences, as none of them depend upon the instantiation of objects 
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possessing the evaluative properties in question. By virtue of the fact that our experiences 
present objects as if they possessed evaluative features, we can grasp these evaluative 
properties and their necessary interrelations apart from any object. Thus, whether I 
hallucinate the disvalue of pain and suffering or only imagine it, in either case I can see what 
something would have to be in order to instantiate the evaluative property as presented, in 
the same way that I can see what property something would have to possess in order to 
instantiate the hallucinated color of the spot on my desk. Furthermore, my experience as if 
some value not only puts me in a position to grasp the essence of particular values, but also 
the modal relationships that hold between them. In the same way that one can come to 
know through a hallucination that the same thing cannot be simultaneously red and green, I 
can see that for all possible worlds and all possible value-bearing states of affairs, pleasure is 
ceteris paribus better than pain. These eidetic intuitions hold for all possible value-bearing 
objects, whether objects given only as imaginary, or objects presented as being instantiated in 
the world, and they hold even if nothing of value has ever been instantiated.  
For all the reasons noted, debunking concerns about the causal etiology and 
veridicality of our experiences cannot pose doubt for this kind of intuition. Once I have the 
relevant experiences, I cannot be mistaken about the disvalue of pain and suffering, nor that 
pleasure is ceteris paribus better than pain and suffering, nor that if my experience as if of a 
world of ceaseless wanton torture were veridical, then something disvaluable would be 
instantiated in the world. For I could not have these experiences were it not for the fact that 
there is a unique class of ideal properties, namely values, and that these properties stand in 
necessary relations to each other such that some are objectively lower than others. These are 
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necessary evaluative truths that are indispensable to our having the evaluative 
phenomenology we do.  
In closing, it will likely be objected that granting phenomenological indispensability 
would commit us to a metaphysically queer picture, as we must posit the existence of an 
ontological realm distinct from the actual world in which such essential facts subsist. For if I 
can come to know the a priori nature of values apart from my ever coming into contact with 
some way the world actually is, then, one might ask, in what sense does this truth obtain?  
One possible response is to absorb the charge of queerness altogether. If our best 
theories, and indeed our only intelligible theories, require us to expand our ontology in order 
to accommodate indispensable theoretical posits, then explanatory parsimony should not 
come at the cost of theoretical coherence, nor at the erasure and obliteration of the 
phenomena that we are attempting to understand. Queerness, we might say, can only be an 
objection if nothing in the world were ever queer. On the other hand, we might resist the 
idea that the stipulation of value essences commits us to positing an ontological realm 
distinct from the evaluative experiences with which were already familiar, or we might at 
least deflate the metaphysical commitments involved in drawing an ontological distinction 
between value essences and their instances. Finally, on a so-called “mysterian” reading, it 
may be claimed that neither explanation will succeed, and that the metaphysical grounding of 
value essences remains a necessarily insoluble problem due to the impossibility of explaining 
what conscious experience is, let alone how there can be ideal essences pertaining to it. On 
this front, however, the mysterian predicament cannot be thought to pose a special problem 
for evaluative phenomena, as it redounds to our capacity to be intentionally directed to any 
possible propertied object of experience, whether a concrete individual like a red house or 
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abstracta like numbers and ideal shapes. In this way, the mystery of our knowledge of values 
is just the mystery of our knowledge of essences, and the mystery of our knowledge of 
essences is just the mystery of our knowledge of the world.  
 
 181 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Audi, Robert, (2013), Moral Perception. Princeton University Press. 
Audi, Robert (2004). The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton 
University Press. 
Bengson, John (2015). “Grasping the Third Realm.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5. 
Blackburn, Simon (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Brady, Michael S., (2011), “Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons” In Morality and the Emotions, 
ed. Carla Bagnoli, Oxford University Press.  
Brandt, Richard B. (1946). “Moral Valuation.” Ethics 56: 106-121. 
Brentano, Franz Clemens (1889). The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong. Trans. 
Roderick M. Chisholm and Elisabeth H. Schneewind, London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1969. 
Broad, C. D. (1954). “Emotion and Sentiment.” In Broad’s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy. 
ed. H. D Lewis, London, Allen et Unwin, 1971. 
Broad, C. D. (1930). Five Types of Ethical Theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Brewer, Talbot (2002). “The Real Problem with Internalism about Reasons.” Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy 32 (4): 443-473. 
Bykvist, Krister (2009). “No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis Fails.” Mind 118:1-
30. 
Charland, Louis C. (1995). “Feeling and Representing: Computational Theory and the 
Modularity of Affect.” Synthese 105: 273-301. 
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1981). “Defining Intrinsic Value.” Analysis 41: 99-100. 
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1986). Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Clarke, Samuel (1706). A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion. In 
The British Moralists, ed. D. D. Raphael. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969. 
Cowan, Robert, (2015), “Perceptual Intuitionism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 
(1):164-193. 
Crisp, Roger (2005) “Value, Reason and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing 
the Buck.” Analysis 65 (1) 2005: 80-85. 
 182 
Crisp, R. (2008). “Goodness and Reasons: Accentuating the Negative.” Mind 117 (466), 257-
265. 
Cuneo, Terence, (2006), “Signs of Value: Reid on the Evidential Role of Feelings in Moral 
Judgment.” The British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11: 69-91. 
Dancy, J. (2005). “Should We Pass the Buck?” In Work on Intrinsic Value, ed. T. Rønnow-
Rasmussen & M. J. Zimmerman, (pp. 33-44). Netherlands: Springer. 
Danielsson Sven and Jonas Olson (2007). “Brentano and the Buck-Passers.” Mind 115: 511-
522. 
D’Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson (1994). “Expressivism, Morality, and the Emotions.” 
Ethics 104: 739-763. 
D’Arms, J. and D. Jacobson (2000a). “Sentiment and Value.” Ethics 110: 722-748. 
D’Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson (2000b). “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 
‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 65-90. 
D’Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson (2003). “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions; Or 
Anti-Quasi Judgmentalism.” Proceedings of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, supp. vol.: 
127-146. 
Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton (1992). “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: 
Some Trends.” The Philosophical Review 101: 115-189. 
Deonna, Julien (2006), “Emotion, Perception and Perspective.” Dialectica 60 (1): 29-46. 
Döring, Sabine (2007). “Affective Perception and Rational Motivation.” Dialectica 61:363-
394. 
Drummond, John (2008). “Moral Phenomenology and Moral Intentionality.” Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49. 
Enoch, David, (2011), Taking Morality Seriously. Oxford University Press. 
Ewing, A. C. (1947). The Definition of Good. London: Macmillan. 
Ewing, A. C. (1959). Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Fine, Kit, (2001), “The Question of Realism.” Philosophers’ Imprint 1 (1): 1-30. 
Geniusas, Saulius (2014). “The Origins of the Phenomenology of Pain: Brentano, Stumpf 
and Husserl.” Continental Philosophy Review 47 (1):1-17. 
 183 
Gibbard, Allan (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Goldie, Peter (2001). The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Green, Thomas Hill (1969). Prolegomena to Ethics (1888/2004). Oxford University Press. 
Greene, Joshua, (2003), “From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What Are the Moral 
Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4: 
847-50. 
Griffiths, Paul E. (1997). What Emotions Really Are. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Gutting, Gary (1998). “Rethinking Intuition: A Historical and Metaphilosophical 
Introduction.” In Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in 
Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 3-13. 
Haidt, Jonathan, (2012), The Righteous Mind, New York: Random House, Inc.  
Haidt, Jonathan, (2001), “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail.” Psychological Review 108 
(4): 814-834. 
Harman, Gilbert, (1977), The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, Oxford University 
Press. 
Helm, Bennett (2001). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hopp, Walter (2011). Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hopp, Walter (2008). “Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation.” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):219-245. 
Horgan, Terence, and Tienson, John, (2002), “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the 
Phenomenology of Intentionality.” In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, ed. David Chalmers, Oxford University Press. 
Huemer, Michael, (2008), “Revisionary Intuitionism.” Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1): 368-
392.  
Huemer, Michael, (2005), Ethical Intuitionism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Huemer, Michael, (2001), Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
 184 
Hume, David (1740). A Treatise of Human Nature. ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (2nd edn.), Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Hutcheson, Francis (1725). An Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. 
Hildensheim: Georg Olms, 1971. 
Johnston, Mark (1989). “Dispositional Theories of Values.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, supp. vol. 63: 139-174. 
Johnston, Mark (1991). “Explanation, Response-Dependence and Judgement Dependence”. 
Response-Dependent Concepts, Working Papers in Philosophy 1: 122-83. 
Johnston, Mark (2001). “The Authority of Affect.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 
181-214. 
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press. 
Lange, C. G., (1885), “Om Sindsbevaegelser: et Psyko-fysiologisk Studie” København: Jacob 
Lunds  
Lemos, Noah M. (1994). Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mackie, John L. (1977). Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin.  
McHugh, Conor & Way, Jonathan (2016). “Fittingness First.” Ethics 126 (3):575-606. 
McDowell, John (1985). “Values and Secondary Qualities”. In Morality and Objectivity: A 
Tribute to John Mackie, ed. Ted Honderich. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Meinong, Alexius (1917). On Emotional Presentation, trans. with intro. by Marie-Luise Schubert 
Kalsi, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 
Mill, J. S. (1998). Utilitarianism. Oxford University Press UK. 
Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Moore, G. E. (1912). Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mulligan, Kevin (1998a). “From Appropriate Emotions to Values.” The Monist 81: 161-188. 
Oddie, Graham (2005). Value, Reality, and Desire. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Olson, Jonas (2006). “G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons.” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 84 (4): 525-534. 
 185 
Olson, Jonas (forthcoming). “Fitting Attitude Analyses of Values and the Partiality 
Challenge.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Doi 10.1007/s10677-009-9176-4. 
Putnam, H. (2002). “The Entanglement of Fact and Value.” In The Collapse of the Fact/Value 
Dichotomy and Other Essays (pp. 45). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.  
Peacocke, Christopher (1992). A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. 
Pettit, Philip (1991). “Realism and Response-Dependance.” Mind 100: 587-626. 
Pettit, Philip (1998). “Terms, Things and Response-Dependence.” European Review of 
Philosophy 3: 55-66. 
Prinz, J. Jesse (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Prinz, J. Jesse (2006). “Is Emotion a Form of Perception?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 
supp. vol. 32: 137-160. 
Prinz. J. Jesse (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Rabinowicz Wlodek and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004). “The Strike of the Demon: on 
Fitting Pro-attitudes and Value.” Ethics 114 (3): 391-423. 
Sainsbury, R. Mark (1998). “Projections and Relations.” The Monist 81: 133-160. 
Scanlon, T.M. (1998). What we Owe to Each Other. Harvard: Harvard University Press.  
Scanlon, T. (2002). “Reasons, Responsibility, and Reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and 
Deigh.” Ethics 112, 507-528. 
Shafer-Landau, Russ, (2003), Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press. 
Shaftesbury, Cooper, A. A. Earl of (1711). An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit, in 
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. 1711, revised ed. in 1714, New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1964. 
Skorupski, John (2000). “Irrealist Cognitivism.” In Normativity, ed. John Dancy. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Skorupski, John (2010). Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits. Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 13 (2):125-136. 
Street, Sharon (2006). “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical 
Studies 127 (1):109-166. 
 186 
de Sousa, Ronald (1987). The Rationality of Emotions. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. 
de Sousa, Ronald (2002). “Emotional Truth.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 76: 
247-263. 
Tappolet, Christine (2000). Emotions et Valeurs. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France. 
Tappolet, Christine (2004). “Through Thick and Thin: Good and its Determinates”. 
Dialectica 58 (2): 207-220. 
Tappolet, Christine (2011). “Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects.” In 
Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press. 
Tieszen, Richard (1996). “Edmund Husserl: Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and 
Mathematics,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 27 (3):328-330. 
Wedgwood, Ralph (2001). “Sensing Values?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
53: 215-223. 
Wedgwood, Ralph (2009). “The ‘Good’ and the ‘Right’ Revisited”. Philosophical Perspective 
23: 499-519.  
Wiggins, David (1976). “Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life”, in his Needs, Values, 
Truth, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
Willard, Dallas (2003). “Utilitarianism and Phenomnology.” Phenomenological Approaches to 
Moral Philosophy – A Handbook. Studia Phaenomenologica 3 (3-4):379-381. 
Wallace, R. J. (2002). “Scanlon's Contractualism.” Ethics, 112, 429-470. 
Zimmerman, Michael (2001). The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. 
 187 
 188 
 
 189 
 190 
 
 191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
